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The use of information technology (IT) has significant environmental and social impacts, including human mortality from climate change. One striking example is the carbon emissions and impacts associated with digital communication.

To quantify the human cost of carbon-emitting technology, researchers use the 1,000-ton rule that estimates that for every 1,000 tons of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere, one person dies prematurely.

This rule is derived from the following calculation: burning one trillion ton of fossil carbon is likely to cause 2 C of anthropogenic global warming, which in turn is likely to cause about one billion premature deaths spread over the next century.

This theory can be used as a decision-making framework for policymakers to compare the value of an activity to the cost of that activity in human lives.

It’s also what I used in my recent study that analyzed how additional information in email signatures contributes to climate-related deaths in Canada.

Email signatures causing emissions

Sending emails is an everyday activity, but it comes with an environmental cost. Emails use energy, and that energy often comes from burning fossil fuels, which in turn, contribute to increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide levels.

The overwhelming scientific consensus is that human activity is destabilizing the climate and is likely to cause irreversible damage to the global environment and humanity.

My recent study explored the environmental impact of lengthening email signatures, focusing specifically on two types of information: gender pronouns and land acknowledgements because both are relatively new additions to email signatures.

In both cases, the extra carbon emissions for each email for the extra characters is estimated and aggregated over the population that uses them.

The environmental consequences of minor digital habits are often overlooked.
(Shutterstock)

The results showed that in Canada, where about 15 per cent of people include gender pronouns in emails, the resulting carbon emissions from this small change (three extra words) may contribute to the premature deaths of one person a year, according to the 1,000-ton rule.

The environmental harm and human mortality caused by this seemingly minor digital habit is evident. Large blocks of text like legal disclaimers and land acknowledgements cause even more harm. Images and logos, which contain even larger amounts of data, cause more emissions and deaths still.

Doing away with email signatures

Most of the content in email signatures is redundant, as we tend to email the same people repeatedly. The environmental and human cost of using email signatures clearly outweighs the benefits. One solution to this issue is to replace email signatures with a hyperlinked name to additional information.

Another simple way to increase efficiency and reduce emissions is by eliminating email signatures entirely, since emails already identify senders in the header. After all, we don’t sign our texts, so why do we feel the need to sign our emails?

If you receive an email with a long signature, you might consider asking the sender to switch to a hyperlink instead, or eliminate their signature all together.

Additionally, you can encourage others to use free, open-source ad blockers to reduce unnecessary data from ads while browsing or emailing. Ads, especially on websites, generate an enormous amount of unnecessary data and energy consumption.

While these steps may seem small on their own, collectively, they can make a significant difference in reducing digital waste and unnecessary emissions.

The hidden cost of spam emails

The results of my recent study make it clear that Canada’s current IT and energy infrastructure are unsustainable. The study should serve as a wake-up call for the need to eliminate the use of fossil fuels from our energy systems entirely, particularly because it is already possible to displace fossil fuels with renewable energy with lower costs.

It also gives pause for the far more damaging impacts of other forms of digital communications, particularly email spam.

Already more than half of all emails are spam.
(Shutterstock)

Spam accounts for over half of all emails and, despite having lower carbon emissions per email (since many are deleted without being opened), spam accounts for far more emissions-producing data. Beyond its environmental toll, spam also wastes the time of every email user.

In response, several proposals and laws have been put forward to reduce this digital waste, from including taxes on emails, opt-in or opt-out systems to even outlawing spam entirely. While these efforts are a step in the right direction, we all still suffer through an enormous amount of spam.

The environmental impact of our online habits is far larger than most realize, and as digital communication continues to evolve, we must consider its long-term consequences on the environment and human life. We should take the easy steps of cutting wasteful energy use in our communications and it can start with eliminating email signatures. Läs mer…

Cyclone Alfred will cost the March 25 budget at least A$1.2 billion, hit growth and put pressure on inflation, Treasurer Jim Chalmers says.

In a Tuesday speech previewing the budget, Chalmers will also say that on preliminary estimates, the cyclone’s immediate hit to GDP is expected to be up to $1.2 billion, which could wipe a quarter of a percentage point off quarterly growth.

“It could also lead to upward pressure on inflation. From building costs to damaged crops raising prices for staples like fruit and vegetables,” Chalmers says in the speech, an extract of which has been released ahead of delivery.

The treasurer says the temporary shutting of businesses due to the cyclone lost about 12 million work hours.

By last Thursday, 44,000 insurance claims had been lodged. Early modelling indicated losses covered by the Cyclone Reinsurance Pool were about $1.7 billion.

The estimated costs to the budget, which are over the forward estimates period, are preliminary.

The government has already co-sponsored with the states $30 million in support for immediate recovery costs, Chalmers says. Millions of dollars are being provided in hardship payments.

“The budget will reflect some of those immediate costs and we’ll make sensible provisions for more to come,” he says.

“I expect that these costs and these new provisions will be in the order of at least $1.2 billion […] and that means a big new pressure on the budget.”

This is in addition to the already budgeted for disaster relief.

“At MYEFO, we’d already booked $11.6 billion for disaster support nationally over the forward estimates.

”With all of this extra funding we expect that to rise to at least $13.5 billion when accounting for our provisioning, social security costs and other disaster related support.”

Chalmers will again argue in the speech his recent theme – that the economy has turned a corner. This is despite the global uncertainty that includes the Trump tariff policies, the full extent of which is yet to be spelled out.

Australia is bracing for the possibility our beef export trade could be caught in a new tariff round to be unveiled early next month.

Despite last week’s rebuff to its efforts to get an exemption from the aluminium and steel 25% tariffs, the government has vowed to fight on for a carve out from that, as well as trying to head off any further imposts on exports to the US.

In seeking the exemption, Australia was unsuccessful in trying to leverage its abundance of critical minerals, which are much sought after by the US.

Trade Minister Don Farrell told Sky on Sunday:

What we need to do is find out what it is that the Americans want in terms of this relationship between Australia and the United States and then make President Trump an offer he can’t refuse.

In Tuesday’s speech, Chalmers is expected to say the budget will contain fewer surprises than might be the case with other budgets.

This is because this budget – which would have been avoided if the cyclone had not ruled out an April 12 election – comes after the flurry of announcements already made this year and before further announcements in the campaign for the May election.

Those announcements already made include:

$8.5 billion to boost Medicare
$644 million for new Urgent Care Clinics
a multi-billion dollar package to save Whyalla Steelworks
$7.2 billion for the Bruce Highway and other infrastructure
funds for enhanced childcare and to provide some
student debt relief
new and amended listings for contraception, endometriosis and IVF on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.

Read more:
Labor and the Coalition have pledged to raise GP bulk billing. Here’s what the Medicare boost means for patients

Deloitte Access Economics in its budget monitor predicts the budget will have a deficit of $26.1 billion for 2024-25.

Deloitte’s Stephen Smith said that although a $26.1 billion deficit was slightly smaller than forecast in the December budget update, the longer-term structural deterioration should be “a reality check for politicians wanting to announce election sweeteners in the weeks ahead”.

Deloitte projects a deficit of nearly $50 billion in 2025-26.

Open to a ‘small’ Ukraine peacekeeping role

Over the weekend, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese took part in the “coalition of the willing” virtual meeting convened by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer in support of Ukraine.

The meeting also included Ukraine, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Greece, Italy, Poland, Bulgaria, the Scandinavian countries, Canada and New Zealand. The United States did not participate. President Donald Trump is trying to force an agreement between Ukraine and Russia to end the conflict.

Albanese reiterated after the meeting: “Australia is open to considering any requests to contribute to a future peacekeeping effort in support of the just and lasting peace we all want to Ukraine”.

He added the obvious point: “Of course, peacekeeping missions by definition require a precondition of peace”.

Albanese said that any Australian contribution to a Ukraine peacekeeping force would be “small”.

Opposition Leader Peter Dutton has opposed sending Australians to a peacekeeping force.

Read more:
Politics with Michelle Grattan: Peter Dutton on why he’s not Australia’s Trump – ’I’m my own person’ Läs mer…

The civil war in Sudan that began in April 2023 involves several external actors. The conflict pits the Sudanese Armed Forces against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in a quest for political and economic power. The situation has created one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Various foreign states have picked a side to support. They include Chad, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

In particular, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are providing financial and military support to the warring parties, although they have denied it. Political scientist Federico Donelli, who has studied the influence of these Gulf monarchies in Sudan, unpacks the implications of their intervention.

How did the UAE and Saudi Arabia get involved in Sudan?

Domestic factors within Sudan were the primary triggers for the outbreak of the civil war. Framing the Sudanese conflict as a proxy war may underestimate or overlook important internal variables.

But it’s also important to highlight the indirect involvement of other states. In the Horn of Africa region, Sudan has interacted the most with Middle Eastern states over the past two decades. Among these states, two Gulf monarchies – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – stand out.

Political relations between Saudi Arabia and Sudan date back to the independence of the Sudanese state in 1956. And people-to-people links have flourished over centuries. This is largely because Sudan is geographically close to Saudi and the two Muslim holy cities of Mecca (Makkah) and Medina.

The case of the UAE is different. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the Emirates have expanded their economic and financial influence in Africa, investing in niche sectors such as port logistics. Sudan in particular came to the fore for the Emirates at the end of the 2010s when regional balances shifted before and after the Arab uprisings.

Between 2014 and 2015, Saudi Arabia and UAE influence in Sudanese politics increased under President Omar al-Bashir. Both monarchies wanted to counter Iran’s ability to project power into the Red Sea and in Yemen. In 2015, after breaking off relations with Iran, Sudan contributed 10,000 troops to a Saudi-led military operation in Yemen to fight Houthi rebels. Both the Sudanese army and paramilitary forces took part, and personal links were forged.

In the post-Bashir era that began in 2019, Saudi and UAE influence has continued to grow, thanks to those direct links.

In general, both monarchies are status seekers. In a changing international context, Sudan is a testing ground for their ability to influence and shape future political settlements.

Seeing the post-2019 transition as an opportunity to influence Sudan’s regional standing, the two monarchies chose to support different factions within Sudan’s security apparatus. This external support exacerbated internal competition.

Riyadh, in conjunction with Egypt, maintained close ties with army leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Abu Dhabi aligned itself with the head of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Dagalo, or Hemedti.

Since 2019, the relationship between the UAE and Saudi Arabia has changed. After more than a decade of strategic convergence, especially on regional issues, the two Gulf monarchies began to diverge on issues like their view on political Islam. This divergence has been evident in various crisis scenarios, including in Sudan.

Although both countries jointly supported the initial Sudanese transition after Bashir’s ouster, the deterioration of relations between Hemedti and al-Burhan created conditions for a showdown between the two monarchies.

However, the conflict in Sudan didn’t break out because of the rift between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. But Sudan’s local actors felt able to go to war because they were aware of external support. And once the conflict broke out, both monarchies were reluctant to withdraw local support lest they appear weak in the eyes of their regional counterpart.

Why is Sudan important to these countries?

My recent study with political scientist Abigail Kabandula shows that the UAE and Saudi Arabia gradually increased their presence in Sudan after the 2011 Arab uprisings. The fall of some regimes, including Egypt, made the two Gulf monarchies fear that instability could entangle them.

Our analysis identifies two main reasons for the two countries’ influence in Sudan:

changes to the regional power structure
the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa.

The US pivot to Asia – shifting resources from the Middle East to the Pacific – and the Arab Spring protests increased uncertainty among Gulf states. This led to a realignment of regional power dynamics and the formation of rival blocs. As a result, the UAE and Saudi Arabia sought closer ties with African countries. In Sudan, the relationship has developed through both military and political engagement.

Our analysis shows an increase in both countries’ interest in Sudan between 2012 and 2020. However, our research also highlighted some key differences in their growing influence.

In the early years after the Arab uprisings, the UAE’s influence grew rapidly, driven by concerns about the spread of protests. This was particularly important given Sudan’s proximity to Egypt.

Saudi Arabia maintained a more stable level of influence from 2010 to 2020. This was despite Riyadh also initially fearing the spread of the protests.

Both Gulf states were wary of al-Bashir’s growing ties with Turkey and Qatar, which they feared would strengthen a pro-Islamist bloc in the region. However, after Bashir’s overthrow in 2019, their approaches began to diverge.

The two Gulf monarchies view Sudan as a key country because of its geographical location.

Sudan is situated between two major regions – the Sahel and the Red Sea – characterised by instability and conflict. These regions face interconnected challenges: political instability, poverty, food insecurity, and internal and external wars. They also face population displacement, transnational crime and the threat of jihadist groups.

Moreover, Sudan is an important link between the Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa. The country is a crossroads, influencing current and future geostrategic dynamics in the region.

The Gulf monarchies, including Qatar, have also invested heavily – between US$1.5 billion and US$2 billion – in Sudan’s agri-food sector, which is vital to their food security. Sudan, with its abundant water resources, offers a large amount of fertile land, making it attractive to Gulf companies.

What can we expect to see next?

Similar to other current global crises – such as those in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Democratic Republic of Congo – the conflict in Sudan seems difficult to resolve through negotiations. Two main factors contribute to this difficulty.

First, both parties see the victory of one side as entirely dependent on the defeat of the other. Such logic leaves no room for a win-win solution. Second, the current international context supports the continuation of hostilities. The global shifting balance of power provides both warring parties with opportunities for external support. This complicates efforts to find a peaceful solution.

There are now two centres of power and governance in the country. It is likely that this division will become more pronounced. Läs mer…

In the digital economy, data is more than just information – it is an asset with immense economic and strategic value. Yet, despite its significance, a fundamental legal question remains unresolved: Can data be owned? While privacy laws worldwide focus on protecting individuals’ rights over their personal data, they often sidestep the issue of ownership. This has led to legal uncertainty, particularly in South Africa, where the Protection of Personal Information Act (Popia) grants data subjects various rights over their personal information but does not explicitly address ownership.

This gap in legal clarity raises pressing questions: If personal data – such as private health information – exists within a vast and ever-growing digital landscape, can it be owned? And if so, who holds the rightful claim?

Legal academic Donrich Thaldar, whose research focuses on data governance, explores these questions in a recent academic article. He unpacks his findings for The Conversation Africa.

Why does it matter who owns data?

In today’s digital economy, data is the most valuable asset – it’s often referred to as “the new oil”. Whether in commerce, research, or social interactions, the ability to generate, use and trade with data is central to economic competitiveness.

If data ownership is not clearly established, it could stifle innovation and investment. Companies require legal certainty to operate effectively in a knowledge-driven economy.

Countries have taken different legal approaches to tackling the question of who owns data. China, for instance, formally recognises the proprietary rights of data generators, meaning that businesses and individuals who generate data have legally defined rights over its use and commercialisation. This provides legal support for the country’s digital industries.

What does South African law say?

In the past, the South African Information Regulator has taken the position that personal information is automatically owned by the data subject – the person to whom the data relates – rather than by the entity generating the data. In this view, the rights created by Popia imply that data subjects themselves are the owners of their personal data, and nobody else.

I suggest that this stance is legally flawed, as it conflates two different branches of the law: privacy law and property law. Moreover, it could severely disrupt the digital economy. The digital economy depends on data as a tradeable asset – it must be capable of being sold, licensed and commercialised like any other economic object. If ownership must always be with data subjects, businesses face uncertainty in using and monetising data. Uncertainty stifles innovation, discourages investment, and undermines South Africa’s digital competitiveness.

You applied property law to the question of data ownership. Why?

Ownership is a concept in property law, not privacy law. Therefore, to answer the data ownership question, we need to look for answers in property law.

Property law governs the relationship between subjects (legal persons) and objects (things external to the body, whether physical or not). Ownership is about the rights that a subject has over an object. For an object to be capable of being owned, it must be valuable, useful, and – importantly – capable of human control. A bottle of water meets these criteria, but the vast oceans do not, as they are not within human control.

Personal data in the abstract is like the water in the ocean – vast, uncontained, and beyond individual control. However, a digital instance of personal data, such as a computer file, is more like a bottled version of that water – defined and subject to human control. Just like digital money and other valuable digital assets, a specific instance of personal data meets all the requirements under South African common law for private ownership. Thus, in this sense personal data can be owned.

Is the data owner not the data subject?

At first glance this might seem so, but no, not necessarily. The reason that it might seem so, is because some of the privacy rights created by Popia resemble ownership rights. For example, an owner’s agreement is required before someone else can use the owned object (e.g., loan for use and rent). Similarly, a data subject’s consent is in most cases required before personal data can be processed. Furthermore, the owner of a thing has the right to destroy it; similarly, a data subject typically has the right to have personal data deleted.

Do these privacy rights mean that data subjects actually own their personal data? I suggest not. Wearing a feather in one’s hat does not make one a bird. In the same way, privacy rights that resemble ownership rights do not mean that they constitute ownership. Ownership is acquired by following the rules of property law.

So who owns the data?

Because a newly created personal data instance has no antecedent legal object – in other words, it is not created out of another legal object – it initially belongs to no one. It is res nullius. Ownership of res nullius is acquired through appropriation, which requires two elements: control and the intention to own.

This means that the entity generating the data, such as a company or university collecting and recording it, is best positioned to acquire ownership. Since it already has control over the data, the only remaining requirement is simply the intention to be the owner.

If an entity like a university generates data and intends to own it, then – provided it is in control of that data – it will legally become the owner. This in principle allows the entity to use, license and trade the data as an economic asset. Indeed, it is prudent for data-generating entities, such as universities, to explicitly assert ownership over the data they produce. This not only establishes their legal rights with clarity but also serves as a safeguard against unauthorised access and misuse by malicious actors.

Doesn’t this compromise data privacy?

No, it should not. Ownership is always limited by other legal rules. For example, while I might own a car, I cannot drive it in any way I like – I must obey the rules of the road. Similarly, ownership of personal data is subject to strict limitations, particularly the privacy rights of data subjects under Popia.

However, it is also important to understand that privacy rights apply only to personal data. If personal data is de-identified, meaning that it can no longer be linked to the data subjects, privacy rights cease to apply. What remains are the ownership rights in the data itself. It can be a fully tradeable asset.

Recognising that a digital instance of personal data can be owned – and that the rightful owner is typically the data generator – does not undermine the privacy protections of Popia. Rather, it clarifies the legal landscape, ensuring that the rights of both data subjects and data generators are recognised and protected. Läs mer…

It didn’t take long for the new government of John Mahama in Ghana to find a dramatic way to highlight its commitment to combating corruption. On 12 February 2025 his special prosecutor declared the previous finance minister a “wanted fugitive” for going abroad to evade questioning for suspected financial irregularities, before later agreeing to schedule a return.

In that one move, the government of Mahama’s National Democratic Congress sounded a couple of familiar notes from past campaigns. First, that the widespread graft so many Ghanaians bemoan was largely the fault of the other party, in this case the New Patriotic Party, voted out the previous December. And second, that dishonesty and misconduct are most damaging when they involve high public officials.

The reality of corruption lived by ordinary Ghanaians is far more complicated than that. Across the past 30 years of electoral democracy, both parties have been tainted by scandal and malfeasance. And over the country’s much longer history, as I detail in a new book, Ghanaians have complained about a wide range of misdeeds by figures in both the public and private realms, in positions high and low.

Ordinary people have often challenged abuses, misdeeds and outright theft by the wealthy and powerful. They did so well before the territory’s indigenous societies were subjugated by Britain and incorporated into its Gold Coast colony.

Based on my research into corruption over Ghana’s centuries-long history, it’s clear to me that the effectiveness of any new initiatives depends as much on action from below as from above. Poor people feel the effects of corruption and exploitation more acutely than the better off. And if they are organised they can push the authorities to be more active in rooting out fraud and graft.

Pre-colonial anticorruption actions

The strongest precolonial society was Asante, an empire that ruled over a wide area of what is today Ghana. At times, the excesses and injustices of Asante’s monarchs provoked turmoil, fuelled by anger among elites and ordinary people alike.

One, Kofi Kakari, was dethroned in 1874 after violating established norms by removing gold ornaments from a sacred mausoleum. His successor, Mensa Bonsu, prompted a popular insurgency and was finally overthrown in 1883 by an alliance of junior aristocrats and commoners.

Meanwhile, the coastal areas populated by Fante developed a more institutionalised method of ensuring chiefly accountability. Commoner-led defence groups, known locally as asafo, which performed a range of civic functions, could depose unpopular chiefs. In some removal ceremonies asafo members seized a chief and bumped his buttocks on the ground three times.

According to Ghanaian social anthropologist Maxwell Owusu, asafo companies

had a sacred duty to safeguard the interests of the wider local community against rulers or leaders who misused or abused their power.

The asafo remained active into the early colonial period. In the 1920s, however, the colonial administration curtailed their powers, to protect chiefs willing to implement colonial orders.

Echoes of asafo could still be heard many decades later. Following a succession of postcolonial administrations, Ghana erupted in widespread mobilisations against corruption and injustice. The popular outpourings of 1979 and the early 1980s were set off by two lower-rank coups led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. Recalling past traditions of resistance, protesters sang asafo war songs, beat drums, and employed other popular rituals.

Many of those activists regarded corruption not as a failing of individuals in high office, but as a problem rooted in Ghana’s class-divided society. As one leading figure of the new People’s Defence Committees put it in 1982:

Corruption … is the product of a social system and enriches a minority of the people whilst having the opposite effect on the majority.

Soon the Rawlings government moved towards accommodation with both western financial circles and domestic elites. The youth-led defence committees were purged and eventually abolished.

The multiparty era

Radical social perspectives persisted into the era of multiparty electoral democracy, though not in the two mainstream parties. Both say they are opposed to corruption. But according to critics like political scientist Kwame Ninsin, they in effect take turns at the helm to “control the state for private accumulation”.

Most official anticorruption strategies tend to ignore political contention and social distinctions. And the standard international corruption ratings of Transparency International largely rely on external financial and investor assessments.

Afrobarometer research surveys provide a more comprehensive view. In 2019, for example, Afrobarometer interviewers asked Ghanaians whether corruption had worsened over the previous year. Some 67% of those living in greater poverty said it had, while only 47% of the better off thought so. And although poor respondents also cited misdeeds by high officials, they often stressed more tangible aspects in their daily lives, such as having to pay bribes to local police or to obtain health or education services.

Some corruption scholars see benefits to “frying big fish”, to publicly demonstrate their seriousness. Ghanaian governments have a long history of doing that, however, and face an increasingly sceptical public. To be more credible, anticorruption campaigns cannot target only the opposing party or just those at the heights of power.

Strengths and weaknesses

Ghana now has a range of laws and institutions to combat graft, fraud and other injustices. Some focus on exposure and punishment, both through the regular courts and through institutions such as the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, which annually hears thousands of citizens’ complaints.

Some official actions stress prevention. High office-holders have to declare their families’ assets, to make it harder to hide illegal wealth. Mahama made his own declaration of assets public, the first president ever to do so.

Government anticorruption measures have improved over the years. But they still suffer from bureaucratic inertia and limited commitment. That’s why many activists argue against relying solely on politicians.

The effectiveness of any new initiatives by Mahama or other officials depends as much on action from below as from above. After all, it’s ordinary Ghanaians who know where corruption pinches them the most. Läs mer…

Thrips are tiny insects – their sizes range between 0.5mm and 15mm in length and many are shorter than 5mm. But the damage they cause to crops is anything but small. A 2021 research paper found that in Indonesia “the damage to red chilli plants caused by thrips infestation ranges now from 20% to 80%”. In India, various thrips infestations in the late 2010s and early 2020s “damaged 40%-85% of chilli pepper crops in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana”.

In Africa, a number of thrips species feed on sugarcane and have been known to damage nearly 30% of the crop in a single hectare of a farm. High rates of destruction have been recorded in Tanzania and Uganda on onion and tomato crops.

Now it’s emerged that thrips are hardly new to the African continent and the southern hemisphere more broadly. South Africa’s first and only Black palaeoentomologist, Sandiso Mnguni, who studies fossil insects, recently described a fossil thrips from Orapa Diamond Mine in Botswana that’s more than 90 million years old. He discussed his unique fossil find with The Conversation Africa.

What are thrips and how do they cause damage?

Thrips, also known as thunderflies, thunderbugs or thunderblights, are small, slender and fragile insects. They can be identified by their typically narrow, strap-like, fringed and feathery wings. Over time, they have also evolved distinctive asymmetrical rasping-sucking mouthparts consisting of a labrum, labium, maxillary stylets and left mandible. Most species use these to feed primarily on fungi. Some feed on plants and eat the tender parts of certain crops like sugarcane, tomatoes, pepper, onions, avocado, legumes and citrus fruits, focusing on the buds, flowers and young leaves.

This, along with their habit of accidentally distributing fungal spores while feeding or hunting, makes them destructive crop pests. They tend to feed as a group in large numbers, causing distinctive silver or bronze scarring on the surfaces of stems or leaves.

However, not all thrips are harmful. A small fraction of the 6,500 species that have already been described so far are pollinators of flowering plants; and a handful are predators or natural enemies of moths and other smaller animals such as mites.

Larva, pupa and adult Weeping fig thrips (Gynaikothrips uzeli)
fcafotodigital

Tell us about the fossil thrips you’ve discovered

This is the first time that a fossil thrips has been recorded anywhere in Africa – or the entire southern hemisphere.

The Orapa Diamond Mine in Botswana is one of the most important fossil deposits on the continent. It’s about 90 million years old, dating back to the Cretaceous period.

Read more:
Fossil beetles found in a Botswana diamond mine help us to reconstruct the distant past

The deposit is situated 960 metres above sea level in the Kalahari Desert, about 250km due west of Francistown in Botswana, and 824km away from Johannesburg in South Africa. It was first discovered in 1967 and started producing carat diamonds in 1971.

Roughly 90 million years go, steam and gas caused a double eruption of diamondiferous kimberlites. These are vertical, deep-source volcanic pipes that form when magma rapidly rises from the Earth’s mantle, carrying diamonds and other minerals up to the surface. They create a distinctive rock formation that gets studied by geologists. This explosive volcanic eruption formed a deep crater lake at the centre of the mine.

Mining excavations during the 1980s and earlier uncovered and exposed fine-grained sedimentary rocks containing well preserved fossil plants and insects. These have already been studied by many researchers in the past. At the time, geology and palaeontology researchers from what was then the Bernard Price Institute, which has since been renamed the Evolutionary Studies Institute, at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, were invited to collect the fossil material.

Although some of the material has been studied in the past, the fossil thrips hadn’t yet been put under the microscope. And that’s just what we did. By using its body characteristics and comparing it to living thrips, we can say for sure that it’s a thrips. But we didn’t give it a formal scientific name because it doesn’t have enough characteristics to classify it at the species level and describe it either as a new species or one that still exists today.

We think that the thrips either flew into the palaeolake that was formed by the volcanic eruption or was transported there through grass from a bird’s nest.

Why is this useful to know?

This discovery sheds light on the biodiversity and biogeography of thrips and many other groups of insects during a time when we know flowering plants that heavily relied on insect pollination were rapidly diversifying. This plant-insect reciprocal interaction goes back to the Devonian period, a time when there was a large super-continent called Gondwana. That’s when the first land plants evolved and dominated the Earth, and inadvertently led to many groups of insects, including thrips, diversifying to keep up with drastic changes in their preferred plant diets and habitats due to the dramatic environmental and climatic changes.

Read more:
Fossil insects help to reconstruct the past: how I ended up studying them (and you can too)

The fossil find also contributes to a more accurate documentation of life on Earth during the Cretaceous and helps scientists in reconstructing the past environment and climate in Botswana.

Hopefully there are more fossil insects waiting to be discovered in Botswana and elsewhere in Africa, to keep improving our picture of this long-ago world, and preserve the heritage of our continent. Läs mer…

The UK Court of Appeal recently ruled on an appeal brought by 16 environmental activists serving prison sentences for planning or participating in a series of disruptive non-violent protests.

The cases include the five-year term being served by Roger Hallam, co-founder of Extinction Rebellion and Just Stop Oil, and the terms of two years and 20 months handed down to Phoebe Plummer and Anna Holland respectively, for throwing soup over Van Gogh’s Sunflowers while the painting was on display at the National Gallery in London.

Some news reports emphasised the reduction of sentences for some of the defendants (Hallam’s term was reduced to four years, for example), but the court’s decision upheld most of the sentences. There were only minor sentence reductions where the court found the initial sentences to be “manifestly excessive”, while the appeals of ten activists were dismissed outright.

In Holland and Plummer’s case, the court rejected original trial judge Christopher Hehir’s insistence that throwing soup over a painting was violent (equivalent to assaulting a person, Hehir had argued). Yet the court still upheld the lengthy prison sentences Hehir handed down, maintaining that the soup action was “disproportionate or extreme”.

The defendants’ motives for such disproportionate actions – to raise awareness about climate change and pressure the UK government to issue no new licences for the exploration and production of fossil fuels – were not considered relevant by either Hehir or the Court of Appeal.

Does this amount to a fair and appropriate hearing? In an article published in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, we suggest that the cases of non-violent disruptive protesters should be governed by what we call “the integrity principle”. This would spur a radical rethink of how the courts approach the trials of such protesters.

Integrity in protest trials

The trials of protesters are different from most criminal trials. Just as legal philosopher Anthony Duff once argued, we consider that the purpose of all criminal trials is to “call the defendant to account”. Duff tells us that we can be held responsible as citizens, to the community, for our moral wrongs. A criminal trial is not just about deciding “did they do it”, but also about communicating what, as a society, is considered right and wrong. For that to happen, a trial must engage defendants in a discussion as to why they did what they did.

It is here where the trials of non-violent protesters should be different from “ordinary” criminal trials. There are two reasons. First, unlike in most criminal trials, defendants prosecuted for staging disruptive protest rarely dispute the facts of what they did. Instead, they seek to explain why they did it.

Just Stop Oil blocked roads in a series of disruptive protests.
EPA-EFE/Tolga Akmen

Second, they do so because their action is not intended for personal gain, but to improve the life of the community. Political philosophy tends to maintain that disobedient and disruptive actions can be morally justified if they are motivated by an attempt to uphold the fundamental rights of, or avoid harms caused to, others, or highlight injustices and the failures of political processes.

In other words, these activists are seeking to act as citizens, and give a public account of their action as justified and proportionate. In Duff’s reasoning, this sort of accountability must be central to a criminal trial. But this depends on the defendants’ ability to explain their motives to a jury, in ways that are consistent with their beliefs and values. In short, the trial should allow defendants to demonstrate to the jury they had acted with integrity.

If the trial is a site of moral communication that engages the sense of right and wrong of the community – and, like Duff, we argue it should be – then protest defendants should be able to offer a legally relevant account of their actions, and the jury should be able to decide whether they accept this account.

Yet, as we have previously written, the law in England and Wales has been reframed over the past five years to reduce the defences that activists are able to rely upon. What protest defendants can say in court is inconsistently policed by judges. But in all cases, even where defendants can explain their motivations, they cannot now do so as part of a legal defence. Instead, they must rely on juries deciding (in rare cases) with their conscience rather than legal direction. This breaches the integrity principle, because juries are not able to decide, in law, whether they accept the account of action that might otherwise be put to them by the defence.

Read more:
Just Stop Oil’s harsh sentences are the logical outcome of Britain’s authoritarian turn against protest

If the jury does decide to convict, we argue that the integrity principle must also apply to sentencing. Where they are found guilty, it is illogical that activists should be expected to express remorse for their actions. This would be to disavow their motives, moral consistency and public accountability. Rather than remorse, their the integrity of their intentions and the honesty of their explanation of them should be regarded as a mitigating factor.

Integrity and democracy

Disruptive protest directs our attention to the failure of the democratic process to properly address pressing social problems. For the courts to punish those who attempt to highlight this failure only exacerbates it. Crucially, it denies both the moral purpose of criminal law and the social function of juries. Yet this is exactly what is happening right now in British courts.

We can see in the Court of Appeal’s judgment how the courts are failing to follow the integrity principle. Not only did the court sideline the motivations of the defendants, holding that the harm caused was too serious to take them into account, but it also acted to endorse more severe and deterrent sentences.

If we reorganise the trials of activists to place their integrity at the heart of the process, enabling them to give a legally meaningful account of their action, the law would finally recognise that disruptive protest is not an irritant outside of the democratic process, but is integral to it.

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Kim Honey, CEO and Editor-in-Chief.
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CEO|Editor-in-Chief, The Conversation Canada Läs mer…

Facing a threat of imminent government shutdown, nine Democrats joined GOP Senate colleagues to defeat a filibuster, moving the six-month government funding bill to final passage in a late-day vote on March 14, 2025.

Since January 2025, Republicans in Washington have enjoyed what’s commonly known as a governing “trifecta”: control over the executive branch via the president, combined with majorities for their party in both the House and the Senate.

You might think that a trifecta, which is also referred to as “unified government” by political scientists, is a clear recipe for easy legislative success. In theory, when political parties have unified control over the House, the Senate and the presidency, there should be less conflict between them. Because these politicians are part of the same political party and have the same broad goals, it seems like they should be able to get their agenda approved, and the opposing minority party can do little to stop them.

But not all trifectas are created equal, and not all are dominant. And several weaknesses in the Republicans’ trifecta made passing their six-month stopgap spending bill so difficult, and they help explain why the federal government came so close to shutting down completely.

Research shows that political gridlock can still happen even under a unified government for reasons that have been on display ever since Republicans assumed leadership of Congress and the presidency in January.

With a slim majority, will GOP House Speaker Mike Johnson, left, be able to pass Donald Trump’s priorities?
Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

Majority size matters

A unified government clearly makes President Donald Trump’s ability to enact his agenda much easier than if, for example, Democrats controlled the U.S. House, as they did during the second half of his first term, from 2021-2022. But tight margins in both congressional chambers have meant that, even with a trifecta, it hasn’t been an easy.

Trump was the sixth consecutive president with a trifecta on Day 1 of his second term. But history – and simple math – show that presidents with trifectas have an easier time passing partisan legislation with bigger majorities. Bigger majorities mean majority-party defections won’t easily sink controversial or partisan legislation. A bigger majority also means that individual members of Congress from either party have less leverage to water down the president’s policy requests.

Trump also held a trifecta during the beginning of his first term in office; in particular, a big Republican majority in the House, which passed major legislation with relative ease and put pressure on Senate colleagues to comply. Trump signed a major tax reform package in 2017 that was the signature legislative achievement of his first term.

But Trump has a much smaller advantage this time.

Every president since Bill Clinton has entered office with a trifecta, but Trump’s seat advantage in the House on Day 1 of his second term was the smallest of all of them. This slim House margin meant that Republicans could afford to lose only a handful of their party’s votes on their spending bill in order for it to pass over unanimous Democratic opposition.

And Trump’s relatively small advantage in the Senate meant that Republicans needed at least eight Democratic votes to break a filibuster. Nine Democrats ultimately voted to advance the bill to final passage.

Majority party troubles

In addition to opposition from Democrats in Congress, Trump and other Republican leaders have continued to confront internal divisions within their own party.

In a closely divided House or Senate, there are plenty of tools that Democrats, even as the minority party, can use to stymie Trump’s agenda. This most notably includes the filibuster, which would have forced Republicans to garner 60 votes for their short-term spending bill. A small proportion of Democrats ultimately bailed out Senate Republicans in this case; but any major defections within the GOP would have required even more Democratic support, which Republicans were unlikely to get.

Even dominant legislative trifectas, again like the one former President Barack Obama enjoyed when he took office in 2009, can’t prevent divisions within political parties, as different politicians jockey for control of the party’s agenda.

Despite entering office with a 17-vote advantage in the Senate, 11 more than Trump enjoys now, Obama’s signature legislative achievement – the Affordable Care Act, also sometimes known as Obamacare – had to be watered down significantly to win a simple majority after backlash from conservative Democrats.

Obama’s trifecta was bigger in size; but in a polarized America, a large majority also means an ideologically diverse one.

Just as Republican leaders did in the last Congress, Trump has faced similar pushback behind the scenes and in public from members of his own party in his second term. For the past two years, the Republican-led House has been repeatedly riven by leadership struggles and an often aimless legislative agenda, thanks to a lack of cooperation from the the party’s far-right flank.

This group of ideologically driven lawmakers remains large enough to stall any party-line vote that Speaker Mike Johnson hopes to pass, and the spending bill very nearly fell victim to this kind of defection.

Even though the GOP squeaked out a win on this spending bill, the potential for continued chaos is monumental, especially if Trump pursues more major reform to policy areas such as immigration.

Competing pressures

Despite Congress’ reputation as a polarized partisan body, members of Congress ultimately serve multiple masters. The lingering Republican divisions that made it so difficult to pass this resolution reflect the competing pressures of national party leaders in Washington and the local politics of each member’s district, which often cut against what party leaders want.

For example, some Republicans represent heavily Republican districts and will be happy to go along with Trump’s agenda, regardless of how extreme it is. Others represent districts won by Kamala Harris in 2024 and might be more inclined to moderate their positions to keep their seats in 2026 and beyond. There admittedly aren’t many of this latter group; but likely enough to sink any party-line legislation Speaker Johnson has in mind.

What’s next?

Republicans managed to pass a hurried, stopgap spending bill on March 14, 2025 only by the skin of their teeth. Failing to do so would have driven the federal government into shutdown mode. Small margins, internal divisions and conflicting electoral pressures will continue to make legislating difficult over the next two years or more.

Thanks to these complications, it may be that congressional Republicans will continue to rely on the executive branch, including Elon Musk and the efforts at the Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, to do the policymaking for them, even if it means handing over their own legislative power to Trump.

This is an updated version of a story first published on Nov. 19, 2024. Läs mer…

Facing a threat of imminent government shutdown, nine Democrats joined GOP Senate colleagues to defeat a filibuster, moving a six-month government funding bill to final passage in a late-day vote on March 14, 2025.

Since January 2025, Republicans in Washington have enjoyed what’s commonly known as a governing “trifecta”: control over the executive branch via the president, combined with majorities for their party in both the House and the Senate.

You might think that a trifecta, which is also referred to as “unified government” by political scientists, is a clear recipe for easy legislative success. In theory, when political parties have unified control over the House, the Senate and the presidency, there should be less conflict between them. Because these politicians are part of the same political party and have the same broad goals, it seems like they should be able to get their agenda approved, and the opposing minority party can do little to stop them.

But not all trifectas are created equal, and not all are dominant. And several weaknesses in the Republicans’ trifecta made passing their six-month stopgap spending bill so difficult, and they help explain why the federal government came so close to shutting down completely.

Research shows that political gridlock can still happen even under a unified government for reasons that have been on display ever since Republicans assumed leadership of Congress and the presidency in January.

With a slim majority, will GOP House Speaker Mike Johnson, left, be able to pass Donald Trump’s priorities?
Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

Majority size matters

A unified government clearly makes President Donald Trump’s ability to enact his agenda much easier than if, for example, Democrats controlled the U.S. House, as they did during the second half of his first term, from 2021-2022. But tight margins in both congressional chambers have meant that, even with a trifecta, it hasn’t been an easy.

Trump was the sixth consecutive president with a trifecta on Day 1 of his second term. But history – and simple math – show that presidents with trifectas have an easier time passing partisan legislation with bigger majorities. Bigger majorities mean majority-party defections won’t easily sink controversial or partisan legislation. A bigger majority also means that individual members of Congress from either party have less leverage to water down the president’s policy requests.

Trump also held a trifecta during the beginning of his first term in office; in particular, a big Republican majority in the House, which passed major legislation with relative ease and put pressure on Senate colleagues to comply. Trump signed a major tax reform package in 2017 that was the signature legislative achievement of his first term.

But Trump has a much smaller advantage this time.

Every president since Bill Clinton has entered office with a trifecta, but Trump’s seat advantage in the House on Day 1 of his second term was the smallest of all of them. This slim House margin meant that Republicans could afford to lose only a handful of their party’s votes on their spending bill in order for it to pass over unanimous Democratic opposition.

And Trump’s relatively small advantage in the Senate meant that Republicans needed at least eight Democratic votes to break a filibuster. Nine Democrats ultimately voted to advance the bill to final passage.

Majority party troubles

In addition to opposition from Democrats in Congress, Trump and other Republican leaders have continued to confront internal divisions within their own party.

In a closely divided House or Senate, there are plenty of tools that Democrats, even as the minority party, can use to stymie Trump’s agenda. This most notably includes the filibuster, which would have forced Republicans to garner 60 votes for their short-term spending bill. A small proportion of Democrats ultimately bailed out Senate Republicans in this case; but any major defections within the GOP would have required even more Democratic support, which Republicans were unlikely to get.**

Even dominant legislative trifectas, again like the one former President Barack Obama enjoyed when he took office in 2009, can’t prevent divisions within political parties, as different politicians jockey for control of the party’s agenda.

Despite entering office with a 17-vote advantage in the Senate, 11 more than Trump enjoys now, Obama’s signature legislative achievement – the Affordable Care Act, also sometimes known as Obamacare – had to be watered down significantly to win a simple majority after backlash from conservative Democrats.

Obama’s trifecta was bigger in size; but in a polarized America, a large majority also means an ideologically diverse one.

Just as Republican leaders did in the last Congress, Trump has faced similar pushback behind the scenes and in public from members of his own party in his second term. For the past two years, the Republican-led House has been repeatedly riven by leadership struggles and an often aimless legislative agenda, thanks to a lack of cooperation from the the party’s far-right flank.

This group of ideologically driven lawmakers remains large enough to stall any party-line vote that Speaker Mike Johnson hopes to pass, and the spending bill very nearly fell victim to this kind of defection.

Even though the GOP squeaked out a win on this spending bill, the potential for continued chaos is monumental, especially if Trump pursues more major reform to policy areas such as immigration.

Competing pressures

Despite Congress’ reputation as a polarized partisan body, members of Congress ultimately serve multiple masters. The lingering Republican divisions that made it so difficult to pass this resolution reflect the competing pressures of national party leaders in Washington and the local politics of each member’s district, which often cut against what party leaders want.

For example, some Republicans represent heavily Republican districts and will be happy to go along with Trump’s agenda, regardless of how extreme it is. Others represent districts won by Kamala Harris in 2024 and might be more inclined to moderate their positions to keep their seats in 2026 and beyond. There admittedly aren’t many of this latter group; but likely enough to sink any party-line legislation Speaker Johnson has in mind.

What’s next?

Republicans managed to pass a hurried, stopgap spending bill on March 14, 2025 only by the skin of their teeth. Failing to do so would have driven the federal government into shutdown mode. Small margins, internal divisions and conflicting electoral pressures will continue to make legislating difficult over the next two years or more.

Thanks to these complications, it may be that congressional Republicans will continue to rely on the executive branch, including Elon Musk and the efforts at the Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, to do the policymaking for them, even if it means handing over their own legislative power to Trump.

This is an updated version of a story first published on Nov. 19, 2024. Läs mer…