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In the digital economy, data is more than just information – it is an asset with immense economic and strategic value. Yet, despite its significance, a fundamental legal question remains unresolved: Can data be owned? While privacy laws worldwide focus on protecting individuals’ rights over their personal data, they often sidestep the issue of ownership. This has led to legal uncertainty, particularly in South Africa, where the Protection of Personal Information Act (Popia) grants data subjects various rights over their personal information but does not explicitly address ownership.

This gap in legal clarity raises pressing questions: If personal data – such as private health information – exists within a vast and ever-growing digital landscape, can it be owned? And if so, who holds the rightful claim?

Legal academic Donrich Thaldar, whose research focuses on data governance, explores these questions in a recent academic article. He unpacks his findings for The Conversation Africa.

Why does it matter who owns data?

In today’s digital economy, data is the most valuable asset – it’s often referred to as “the new oil”. Whether in commerce, research, or social interactions, the ability to generate, use and trade with data is central to economic competitiveness.

If data ownership is not clearly established, it could stifle innovation and investment. Companies require legal certainty to operate effectively in a knowledge-driven economy.

Countries have taken different legal approaches to tackling the question of who owns data. China, for instance, formally recognises the proprietary rights of data generators, meaning that businesses and individuals who generate data have legally defined rights over its use and commercialisation. This provides legal support for the country’s digital industries.

What does South African law say?

In the past, the South African Information Regulator has taken the position that personal information is automatically owned by the data subject – the person to whom the data relates – rather than by the entity generating the data. In this view, the rights created by Popia imply that data subjects themselves are the owners of their personal data, and nobody else.

I suggest that this stance is legally flawed, as it conflates two different branches of the law: privacy law and property law. Moreover, it could severely disrupt the digital economy. The digital economy depends on data as a tradeable asset – it must be capable of being sold, licensed and commercialised like any other economic object. If ownership must always be with data subjects, businesses face uncertainty in using and monetising data. Uncertainty stifles innovation, discourages investment, and undermines South Africa’s digital competitiveness.

You applied property law to the question of data ownership. Why?

Ownership is a concept in property law, not privacy law. Therefore, to answer the data ownership question, we need to look for answers in property law.

Property law governs the relationship between subjects (legal persons) and objects (things external to the body, whether physical or not). Ownership is about the rights that a subject has over an object. For an object to be capable of being owned, it must be valuable, useful, and – importantly – capable of human control. A bottle of water meets these criteria, but the vast oceans do not, as they are not within human control.

Personal data in the abstract is like the water in the ocean – vast, uncontained, and beyond individual control. However, a digital instance of personal data, such as a computer file, is more like a bottled version of that water – defined and subject to human control. Just like digital money and other valuable digital assets, a specific instance of personal data meets all the requirements under South African common law for private ownership. Thus, in this sense personal data can be owned.

Is the data owner not the data subject?

At first glance this might seem so, but no, not necessarily. The reason that it might seem so, is because some of the privacy rights created by Popia resemble ownership rights. For example, an owner’s agreement is required before someone else can use the owned object (e.g., loan for use and rent). Similarly, a data subject’s consent is in most cases required before personal data can be processed. Furthermore, the owner of a thing has the right to destroy it; similarly, a data subject typically has the right to have personal data deleted.

Do these privacy rights mean that data subjects actually own their personal data? I suggest not. Wearing a feather in one’s hat does not make one a bird. In the same way, privacy rights that resemble ownership rights do not mean that they constitute ownership. Ownership is acquired by following the rules of property law.

So who owns the data?

Because a newly created personal data instance has no antecedent legal object – in other words, it is not created out of another legal object – it initially belongs to no one. It is res nullius. Ownership of res nullius is acquired through appropriation, which requires two elements: control and the intention to own.

This means that the entity generating the data, such as a company or university collecting and recording it, is best positioned to acquire ownership. Since it already has control over the data, the only remaining requirement is simply the intention to be the owner.

If an entity like a university generates data and intends to own it, then – provided it is in control of that data – it will legally become the owner. This in principle allows the entity to use, license and trade the data as an economic asset. Indeed, it is prudent for data-generating entities, such as universities, to explicitly assert ownership over the data they produce. This not only establishes their legal rights with clarity but also serves as a safeguard against unauthorised access and misuse by malicious actors.

Doesn’t this compromise data privacy?

No, it should not. Ownership is always limited by other legal rules. For example, while I might own a car, I cannot drive it in any way I like – I must obey the rules of the road. Similarly, ownership of personal data is subject to strict limitations, particularly the privacy rights of data subjects under Popia.

However, it is also important to understand that privacy rights apply only to personal data. If personal data is de-identified, meaning that it can no longer be linked to the data subjects, privacy rights cease to apply. What remains are the ownership rights in the data itself. It can be a fully tradeable asset.

Recognising that a digital instance of personal data can be owned – and that the rightful owner is typically the data generator – does not undermine the privacy protections of Popia. Rather, it clarifies the legal landscape, ensuring that the rights of both data subjects and data generators are recognised and protected. Läs mer…

It didn’t take long for the new government of John Mahama in Ghana to find a dramatic way to highlight its commitment to combating corruption. On 12 February 2025 his special prosecutor declared the previous finance minister a “wanted fugitive” for going abroad to evade questioning for suspected financial irregularities, before later agreeing to schedule a return.

In that one move, the government of Mahama’s National Democratic Congress sounded a couple of familiar notes from past campaigns. First, that the widespread graft so many Ghanaians bemoan was largely the fault of the other party, in this case the New Patriotic Party, voted out the previous December. And second, that dishonesty and misconduct are most damaging when they involve high public officials.

The reality of corruption lived by ordinary Ghanaians is far more complicated than that. Across the past 30 years of electoral democracy, both parties have been tainted by scandal and malfeasance. And over the country’s much longer history, as I detail in a new book, Ghanaians have complained about a wide range of misdeeds by figures in both the public and private realms, in positions high and low.

Ordinary people have often challenged abuses, misdeeds and outright theft by the wealthy and powerful. They did so well before the territory’s indigenous societies were subjugated by Britain and incorporated into its Gold Coast colony.

Based on my research into corruption over Ghana’s centuries-long history, it’s clear to me that the effectiveness of any new initiatives depends as much on action from below as from above. Poor people feel the effects of corruption and exploitation more acutely than the better off. And if they are organised they can push the authorities to be more active in rooting out fraud and graft.

Pre-colonial anticorruption actions

The strongest precolonial society was Asante, an empire that ruled over a wide area of what is today Ghana. At times, the excesses and injustices of Asante’s monarchs provoked turmoil, fuelled by anger among elites and ordinary people alike.

One, Kofi Kakari, was dethroned in 1874 after violating established norms by removing gold ornaments from a sacred mausoleum. His successor, Mensa Bonsu, prompted a popular insurgency and was finally overthrown in 1883 by an alliance of junior aristocrats and commoners.

Meanwhile, the coastal areas populated by Fante developed a more institutionalised method of ensuring chiefly accountability. Commoner-led defence groups, known locally as asafo, which performed a range of civic functions, could depose unpopular chiefs. In some removal ceremonies asafo members seized a chief and bumped his buttocks on the ground three times.

According to Ghanaian social anthropologist Maxwell Owusu, asafo companies

had a sacred duty to safeguard the interests of the wider local community against rulers or leaders who misused or abused their power.

The asafo remained active into the early colonial period. In the 1920s, however, the colonial administration curtailed their powers, to protect chiefs willing to implement colonial orders.

Echoes of asafo could still be heard many decades later. Following a succession of postcolonial administrations, Ghana erupted in widespread mobilisations against corruption and injustice. The popular outpourings of 1979 and the early 1980s were set off by two lower-rank coups led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. Recalling past traditions of resistance, protesters sang asafo war songs, beat drums, and employed other popular rituals.

Many of those activists regarded corruption not as a failing of individuals in high office, but as a problem rooted in Ghana’s class-divided society. As one leading figure of the new People’s Defence Committees put it in 1982:

Corruption … is the product of a social system and enriches a minority of the people whilst having the opposite effect on the majority.

Soon the Rawlings government moved towards accommodation with both western financial circles and domestic elites. The youth-led defence committees were purged and eventually abolished.

The multiparty era

Radical social perspectives persisted into the era of multiparty electoral democracy, though not in the two mainstream parties. Both say they are opposed to corruption. But according to critics like political scientist Kwame Ninsin, they in effect take turns at the helm to “control the state for private accumulation”.

Most official anticorruption strategies tend to ignore political contention and social distinctions. And the standard international corruption ratings of Transparency International largely rely on external financial and investor assessments.

Afrobarometer research surveys provide a more comprehensive view. In 2019, for example, Afrobarometer interviewers asked Ghanaians whether corruption had worsened over the previous year. Some 67% of those living in greater poverty said it had, while only 47% of the better off thought so. And although poor respondents also cited misdeeds by high officials, they often stressed more tangible aspects in their daily lives, such as having to pay bribes to local police or to obtain health or education services.

Some corruption scholars see benefits to “frying big fish”, to publicly demonstrate their seriousness. Ghanaian governments have a long history of doing that, however, and face an increasingly sceptical public. To be more credible, anticorruption campaigns cannot target only the opposing party or just those at the heights of power.

Strengths and weaknesses

Ghana now has a range of laws and institutions to combat graft, fraud and other injustices. Some focus on exposure and punishment, both through the regular courts and through institutions such as the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, which annually hears thousands of citizens’ complaints.

Some official actions stress prevention. High office-holders have to declare their families’ assets, to make it harder to hide illegal wealth. Mahama made his own declaration of assets public, the first president ever to do so.

Government anticorruption measures have improved over the years. But they still suffer from bureaucratic inertia and limited commitment. That’s why many activists argue against relying solely on politicians.

The effectiveness of any new initiatives by Mahama or other officials depends as much on action from below as from above. After all, it’s ordinary Ghanaians who know where corruption pinches them the most. Läs mer…

Thrips are tiny insects – their sizes range between 0.5mm and 15mm in length and many are shorter than 5mm. But the damage they cause to crops is anything but small. A 2021 research paper found that in Indonesia “the damage to red chilli plants caused by thrips infestation ranges now from 20% to 80%”. In India, various thrips infestations in the late 2010s and early 2020s “damaged 40%-85% of chilli pepper crops in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana”.

In Africa, a number of thrips species feed on sugarcane and have been known to damage nearly 30% of the crop in a single hectare of a farm. High rates of destruction have been recorded in Tanzania and Uganda on onion and tomato crops.

Now it’s emerged that thrips are hardly new to the African continent and the southern hemisphere more broadly. South Africa’s first and only Black palaeoentomologist, Sandiso Mnguni, who studies fossil insects, recently described a fossil thrips from Orapa Diamond Mine in Botswana that’s more than 90 million years old. He discussed his unique fossil find with The Conversation Africa.

What are thrips and how do they cause damage?

Thrips, also known as thunderflies, thunderbugs or thunderblights, are small, slender and fragile insects. They can be identified by their typically narrow, strap-like, fringed and feathery wings. Over time, they have also evolved distinctive asymmetrical rasping-sucking mouthparts consisting of a labrum, labium, maxillary stylets and left mandible. Most species use these to feed primarily on fungi. Some feed on plants and eat the tender parts of certain crops like sugarcane, tomatoes, pepper, onions, avocado, legumes and citrus fruits, focusing on the buds, flowers and young leaves.

This, along with their habit of accidentally distributing fungal spores while feeding or hunting, makes them destructive crop pests. They tend to feed as a group in large numbers, causing distinctive silver or bronze scarring on the surfaces of stems or leaves.

However, not all thrips are harmful. A small fraction of the 6,500 species that have already been described so far are pollinators of flowering plants; and a handful are predators or natural enemies of moths and other smaller animals such as mites.

Larva, pupa and adult Weeping fig thrips (Gynaikothrips uzeli)
fcafotodigital

Tell us about the fossil thrips you’ve discovered

This is the first time that a fossil thrips has been recorded anywhere in Africa – or the entire southern hemisphere.

The Orapa Diamond Mine in Botswana is one of the most important fossil deposits on the continent. It’s about 90 million years old, dating back to the Cretaceous period.

Read more:
Fossil beetles found in a Botswana diamond mine help us to reconstruct the distant past

The deposit is situated 960 metres above sea level in the Kalahari Desert, about 250km due west of Francistown in Botswana, and 824km away from Johannesburg in South Africa. It was first discovered in 1967 and started producing carat diamonds in 1971.

Roughly 90 million years go, steam and gas caused a double eruption of diamondiferous kimberlites. These are vertical, deep-source volcanic pipes that form when magma rapidly rises from the Earth’s mantle, carrying diamonds and other minerals up to the surface. They create a distinctive rock formation that gets studied by geologists. This explosive volcanic eruption formed a deep crater lake at the centre of the mine.

Mining excavations during the 1980s and earlier uncovered and exposed fine-grained sedimentary rocks containing well preserved fossil plants and insects. These have already been studied by many researchers in the past. At the time, geology and palaeontology researchers from what was then the Bernard Price Institute, which has since been renamed the Evolutionary Studies Institute, at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, were invited to collect the fossil material.

Although some of the material has been studied in the past, the fossil thrips hadn’t yet been put under the microscope. And that’s just what we did. By using its body characteristics and comparing it to living thrips, we can say for sure that it’s a thrips. But we didn’t give it a formal scientific name because it doesn’t have enough characteristics to classify it at the species level and describe it either as a new species or one that still exists today.

We think that the thrips either flew into the palaeolake that was formed by the volcanic eruption or was transported there through grass from a bird’s nest.

Why is this useful to know?

This discovery sheds light on the biodiversity and biogeography of thrips and many other groups of insects during a time when we know flowering plants that heavily relied on insect pollination were rapidly diversifying. This plant-insect reciprocal interaction goes back to the Devonian period, a time when there was a large super-continent called Gondwana. That’s when the first land plants evolved and dominated the Earth, and inadvertently led to many groups of insects, including thrips, diversifying to keep up with drastic changes in their preferred plant diets and habitats due to the dramatic environmental and climatic changes.

Read more:
Fossil insects help to reconstruct the past: how I ended up studying them (and you can too)

The fossil find also contributes to a more accurate documentation of life on Earth during the Cretaceous and helps scientists in reconstructing the past environment and climate in Botswana.

Hopefully there are more fossil insects waiting to be discovered in Botswana and elsewhere in Africa, to keep improving our picture of this long-ago world, and preserve the heritage of our continent. Läs mer…

The UK Court of Appeal recently ruled on an appeal brought by 16 environmental activists serving prison sentences for planning or participating in a series of disruptive non-violent protests.

The cases include the five-year term being served by Roger Hallam, co-founder of Extinction Rebellion and Just Stop Oil, and the terms of two years and 20 months handed down to Phoebe Plummer and Anna Holland respectively, for throwing soup over Van Gogh’s Sunflowers while the painting was on display at the National Gallery in London.

Some news reports emphasised the reduction of sentences for some of the defendants (Hallam’s term was reduced to four years, for example), but the court’s decision upheld most of the sentences. There were only minor sentence reductions where the court found the initial sentences to be “manifestly excessive”, while the appeals of ten activists were dismissed outright.

In Holland and Plummer’s case, the court rejected original trial judge Christopher Hehir’s insistence that throwing soup over a painting was violent (equivalent to assaulting a person, Hehir had argued). Yet the court still upheld the lengthy prison sentences Hehir handed down, maintaining that the soup action was “disproportionate or extreme”.

The defendants’ motives for such disproportionate actions – to raise awareness about climate change and pressure the UK government to issue no new licences for the exploration and production of fossil fuels – were not considered relevant by either Hehir or the Court of Appeal.

Does this amount to a fair and appropriate hearing? In an article published in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, we suggest that the cases of non-violent disruptive protesters should be governed by what we call “the integrity principle”. This would spur a radical rethink of how the courts approach the trials of such protesters.

Integrity in protest trials

The trials of protesters are different from most criminal trials. Just as legal philosopher Anthony Duff once argued, we consider that the purpose of all criminal trials is to “call the defendant to account”. Duff tells us that we can be held responsible as citizens, to the community, for our moral wrongs. A criminal trial is not just about deciding “did they do it”, but also about communicating what, as a society, is considered right and wrong. For that to happen, a trial must engage defendants in a discussion as to why they did what they did.

It is here where the trials of non-violent protesters should be different from “ordinary” criminal trials. There are two reasons. First, unlike in most criminal trials, defendants prosecuted for staging disruptive protest rarely dispute the facts of what they did. Instead, they seek to explain why they did it.

Just Stop Oil blocked roads in a series of disruptive protests.
EPA-EFE/Tolga Akmen

Second, they do so because their action is not intended for personal gain, but to improve the life of the community. Political philosophy tends to maintain that disobedient and disruptive actions can be morally justified if they are motivated by an attempt to uphold the fundamental rights of, or avoid harms caused to, others, or highlight injustices and the failures of political processes.

In other words, these activists are seeking to act as citizens, and give a public account of their action as justified and proportionate. In Duff’s reasoning, this sort of accountability must be central to a criminal trial. But this depends on the defendants’ ability to explain their motives to a jury, in ways that are consistent with their beliefs and values. In short, the trial should allow defendants to demonstrate to the jury they had acted with integrity.

If the trial is a site of moral communication that engages the sense of right and wrong of the community – and, like Duff, we argue it should be – then protest defendants should be able to offer a legally relevant account of their actions, and the jury should be able to decide whether they accept this account.

Yet, as we have previously written, the law in England and Wales has been reframed over the past five years to reduce the defences that activists are able to rely upon. What protest defendants can say in court is inconsistently policed by judges. But in all cases, even where defendants can explain their motivations, they cannot now do so as part of a legal defence. Instead, they must rely on juries deciding (in rare cases) with their conscience rather than legal direction. This breaches the integrity principle, because juries are not able to decide, in law, whether they accept the account of action that might otherwise be put to them by the defence.

Read more:
Just Stop Oil’s harsh sentences are the logical outcome of Britain’s authoritarian turn against protest

If the jury does decide to convict, we argue that the integrity principle must also apply to sentencing. Where they are found guilty, it is illogical that activists should be expected to express remorse for their actions. This would be to disavow their motives, moral consistency and public accountability. Rather than remorse, their the integrity of their intentions and the honesty of their explanation of them should be regarded as a mitigating factor.

Integrity and democracy

Disruptive protest directs our attention to the failure of the democratic process to properly address pressing social problems. For the courts to punish those who attempt to highlight this failure only exacerbates it. Crucially, it denies both the moral purpose of criminal law and the social function of juries. Yet this is exactly what is happening right now in British courts.

We can see in the Court of Appeal’s judgment how the courts are failing to follow the integrity principle. Not only did the court sideline the motivations of the defendants, holding that the harm caused was too serious to take them into account, but it also acted to endorse more severe and deterrent sentences.

If we reorganise the trials of activists to place their integrity at the heart of the process, enabling them to give a legally meaningful account of their action, the law would finally recognise that disruptive protest is not an irritant outside of the democratic process, but is integral to it.

Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?
Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 40,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far. Läs mer…

It is my privilege to join The Conversation Canada as CEO and editor-in-chief at a time when the world needs fact-based journalism more than ever.

Kim Honey, CEO and Editor-in-Chief.
CC BY

I have been reading The Conversation Canada since it launched in 2017, and I’m a big believer in its mission to tap the breadth and depth of knowledge of the country’s academic brain trust to provide timely, relevant and informative news and analyses.

The Conversation Canada‘s talented editors bring the journalistic flair to the academic rigour, and I’m excited to help them support academics and researchers in sharing their knowledge and informing public debate. As democracy faces unprecedented threats, The Conversation Canada will continue to counteract misinformation, promote free speech and inform public discourse.

I look forward to contributing to the valuable and increasingly vital work of The Conversation Canada and La Conversation Canada by developing and strengthening our partnerships with member universities.

All the best,

Kim Honey

CEO|Editor-in-Chief, The Conversation Canada Läs mer…

Facing a threat of imminent government shutdown, nine Democrats joined GOP Senate colleagues to defeat a filibuster, moving the six-month government funding bill to final passage in a late-day vote on March 14, 2025.

Since January 2025, Republicans in Washington have enjoyed what’s commonly known as a governing “trifecta”: control over the executive branch via the president, combined with majorities for their party in both the House and the Senate.

You might think that a trifecta, which is also referred to as “unified government” by political scientists, is a clear recipe for easy legislative success. In theory, when political parties have unified control over the House, the Senate and the presidency, there should be less conflict between them. Because these politicians are part of the same political party and have the same broad goals, it seems like they should be able to get their agenda approved, and the opposing minority party can do little to stop them.

But not all trifectas are created equal, and not all are dominant. And several weaknesses in the Republicans’ trifecta made passing their six-month stopgap spending bill so difficult, and they help explain why the federal government came so close to shutting down completely.

Research shows that political gridlock can still happen even under a unified government for reasons that have been on display ever since Republicans assumed leadership of Congress and the presidency in January.

With a slim majority, will GOP House Speaker Mike Johnson, left, be able to pass Donald Trump’s priorities?
Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

Majority size matters

A unified government clearly makes President Donald Trump’s ability to enact his agenda much easier than if, for example, Democrats controlled the U.S. House, as they did during the second half of his first term, from 2021-2022. But tight margins in both congressional chambers have meant that, even with a trifecta, it hasn’t been an easy.

Trump was the sixth consecutive president with a trifecta on Day 1 of his second term. But history – and simple math – show that presidents with trifectas have an easier time passing partisan legislation with bigger majorities. Bigger majorities mean majority-party defections won’t easily sink controversial or partisan legislation. A bigger majority also means that individual members of Congress from either party have less leverage to water down the president’s policy requests.

Trump also held a trifecta during the beginning of his first term in office; in particular, a big Republican majority in the House, which passed major legislation with relative ease and put pressure on Senate colleagues to comply. Trump signed a major tax reform package in 2017 that was the signature legislative achievement of his first term.

But Trump has a much smaller advantage this time.

Every president since Bill Clinton has entered office with a trifecta, but Trump’s seat advantage in the House on Day 1 of his second term was the smallest of all of them. This slim House margin meant that Republicans could afford to lose only a handful of their party’s votes on their spending bill in order for it to pass over unanimous Democratic opposition.

And Trump’s relatively small advantage in the Senate meant that Republicans needed at least eight Democratic votes to break a filibuster. Nine Democrats ultimately voted to advance the bill to final passage.

Majority party troubles

In addition to opposition from Democrats in Congress, Trump and other Republican leaders have continued to confront internal divisions within their own party.

In a closely divided House or Senate, there are plenty of tools that Democrats, even as the minority party, can use to stymie Trump’s agenda. This most notably includes the filibuster, which would have forced Republicans to garner 60 votes for their short-term spending bill. A small proportion of Democrats ultimately bailed out Senate Republicans in this case; but any major defections within the GOP would have required even more Democratic support, which Republicans were unlikely to get.

Even dominant legislative trifectas, again like the one former President Barack Obama enjoyed when he took office in 2009, can’t prevent divisions within political parties, as different politicians jockey for control of the party’s agenda.

Despite entering office with a 17-vote advantage in the Senate, 11 more than Trump enjoys now, Obama’s signature legislative achievement – the Affordable Care Act, also sometimes known as Obamacare – had to be watered down significantly to win a simple majority after backlash from conservative Democrats.

Obama’s trifecta was bigger in size; but in a polarized America, a large majority also means an ideologically diverse one.

Just as Republican leaders did in the last Congress, Trump has faced similar pushback behind the scenes and in public from members of his own party in his second term. For the past two years, the Republican-led House has been repeatedly riven by leadership struggles and an often aimless legislative agenda, thanks to a lack of cooperation from the the party’s far-right flank.

This group of ideologically driven lawmakers remains large enough to stall any party-line vote that Speaker Mike Johnson hopes to pass, and the spending bill very nearly fell victim to this kind of defection.

Even though the GOP squeaked out a win on this spending bill, the potential for continued chaos is monumental, especially if Trump pursues more major reform to policy areas such as immigration.

Competing pressures

Despite Congress’ reputation as a polarized partisan body, members of Congress ultimately serve multiple masters. The lingering Republican divisions that made it so difficult to pass this resolution reflect the competing pressures of national party leaders in Washington and the local politics of each member’s district, which often cut against what party leaders want.

For example, some Republicans represent heavily Republican districts and will be happy to go along with Trump’s agenda, regardless of how extreme it is. Others represent districts won by Kamala Harris in 2024 and might be more inclined to moderate their positions to keep their seats in 2026 and beyond. There admittedly aren’t many of this latter group; but likely enough to sink any party-line legislation Speaker Johnson has in mind.

What’s next?

Republicans managed to pass a hurried, stopgap spending bill on March 14, 2025 only by the skin of their teeth. Failing to do so would have driven the federal government into shutdown mode. Small margins, internal divisions and conflicting electoral pressures will continue to make legislating difficult over the next two years or more.

Thanks to these complications, it may be that congressional Republicans will continue to rely on the executive branch, including Elon Musk and the efforts at the Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, to do the policymaking for them, even if it means handing over their own legislative power to Trump.

This is an updated version of a story first published on Nov. 19, 2024. Läs mer…

Facing a threat of imminent government shutdown, nine Democrats joined GOP Senate colleagues to defeat a filibuster, moving a six-month government funding bill to final passage in a late-day vote on March 14, 2025.

Since January 2025, Republicans in Washington have enjoyed what’s commonly known as a governing “trifecta”: control over the executive branch via the president, combined with majorities for their party in both the House and the Senate.

You might think that a trifecta, which is also referred to as “unified government” by political scientists, is a clear recipe for easy legislative success. In theory, when political parties have unified control over the House, the Senate and the presidency, there should be less conflict between them. Because these politicians are part of the same political party and have the same broad goals, it seems like they should be able to get their agenda approved, and the opposing minority party can do little to stop them.

But not all trifectas are created equal, and not all are dominant. And several weaknesses in the Republicans’ trifecta made passing their six-month stopgap spending bill so difficult, and they help explain why the federal government came so close to shutting down completely.

Research shows that political gridlock can still happen even under a unified government for reasons that have been on display ever since Republicans assumed leadership of Congress and the presidency in January.

With a slim majority, will GOP House Speaker Mike Johnson, left, be able to pass Donald Trump’s priorities?
Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

Majority size matters

A unified government clearly makes President Donald Trump’s ability to enact his agenda much easier than if, for example, Democrats controlled the U.S. House, as they did during the second half of his first term, from 2021-2022. But tight margins in both congressional chambers have meant that, even with a trifecta, it hasn’t been an easy.

Trump was the sixth consecutive president with a trifecta on Day 1 of his second term. But history – and simple math – show that presidents with trifectas have an easier time passing partisan legislation with bigger majorities. Bigger majorities mean majority-party defections won’t easily sink controversial or partisan legislation. A bigger majority also means that individual members of Congress from either party have less leverage to water down the president’s policy requests.

Trump also held a trifecta during the beginning of his first term in office; in particular, a big Republican majority in the House, which passed major legislation with relative ease and put pressure on Senate colleagues to comply. Trump signed a major tax reform package in 2017 that was the signature legislative achievement of his first term.

But Trump has a much smaller advantage this time.

Every president since Bill Clinton has entered office with a trifecta, but Trump’s seat advantage in the House on Day 1 of his second term was the smallest of all of them. This slim House margin meant that Republicans could afford to lose only a handful of their party’s votes on their spending bill in order for it to pass over unanimous Democratic opposition.

And Trump’s relatively small advantage in the Senate meant that Republicans needed at least eight Democratic votes to break a filibuster. Nine Democrats ultimately voted to advance the bill to final passage.

Majority party troubles

In addition to opposition from Democrats in Congress, Trump and other Republican leaders have continued to confront internal divisions within their own party.

In a closely divided House or Senate, there are plenty of tools that Democrats, even as the minority party, can use to stymie Trump’s agenda. This most notably includes the filibuster, which would have forced Republicans to garner 60 votes for their short-term spending bill. A small proportion of Democrats ultimately bailed out Senate Republicans in this case; but any major defections within the GOP would have required even more Democratic support, which Republicans were unlikely to get.**

Even dominant legislative trifectas, again like the one former President Barack Obama enjoyed when he took office in 2009, can’t prevent divisions within political parties, as different politicians jockey for control of the party’s agenda.

Despite entering office with a 17-vote advantage in the Senate, 11 more than Trump enjoys now, Obama’s signature legislative achievement – the Affordable Care Act, also sometimes known as Obamacare – had to be watered down significantly to win a simple majority after backlash from conservative Democrats.

Obama’s trifecta was bigger in size; but in a polarized America, a large majority also means an ideologically diverse one.

Just as Republican leaders did in the last Congress, Trump has faced similar pushback behind the scenes and in public from members of his own party in his second term. For the past two years, the Republican-led House has been repeatedly riven by leadership struggles and an often aimless legislative agenda, thanks to a lack of cooperation from the the party’s far-right flank.

This group of ideologically driven lawmakers remains large enough to stall any party-line vote that Speaker Mike Johnson hopes to pass, and the spending bill very nearly fell victim to this kind of defection.

Even though the GOP squeaked out a win on this spending bill, the potential for continued chaos is monumental, especially if Trump pursues more major reform to policy areas such as immigration.

Competing pressures

Despite Congress’ reputation as a polarized partisan body, members of Congress ultimately serve multiple masters. The lingering Republican divisions that made it so difficult to pass this resolution reflect the competing pressures of national party leaders in Washington and the local politics of each member’s district, which often cut against what party leaders want.

For example, some Republicans represent heavily Republican districts and will be happy to go along with Trump’s agenda, regardless of how extreme it is. Others represent districts won by Kamala Harris in 2024 and might be more inclined to moderate their positions to keep their seats in 2026 and beyond. There admittedly aren’t many of this latter group; but likely enough to sink any party-line legislation Speaker Johnson has in mind.

What’s next?

Republicans managed to pass a hurried, stopgap spending bill on March 14, 2025 only by the skin of their teeth. Failing to do so would have driven the federal government into shutdown mode. Small margins, internal divisions and conflicting electoral pressures will continue to make legislating difficult over the next two years or more.

Thanks to these complications, it may be that congressional Republicans will continue to rely on the executive branch, including Elon Musk and the efforts at the Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, to do the policymaking for them, even if it means handing over their own legislative power to Trump.

This is an updated version of a story first published on Nov. 19, 2024. Läs mer…

Saudi Arabia is 2,000 miles from Ukraine and even more politically distant, so at first glance it might seem like it has nothing to do with the ongoing war there. But the Gulf state has emerged as a key intermediary in the most serious ceasefire negotiations since Russia invaded its neighbor three years ago.

While it is U.S. officials who are undoubtedly leading the efforts for an agreement, it is the Saudi capital of Riyadh that has been staging the crucial talks.

In a flurry of diplomatic activity on March 10, 2025, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the country’s top political authority, hosted separate meetings with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and a U.S. delegation led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and national security adviser Mike Waltz.

The following day, senior Saudi officials facilitated face-to-face meetings between U.S. and Ukrainian delegations.

The resulting agreement, which is now being mulled in Moscow, is all the more notable given that it followed a diplomatic breakdown just weeks before at the Oval Office between Zelenskyy, President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance.

Whether the proposed interim 30-day ceasefire materializes is still uncertain. On March 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin said he agreed with the proposal in principle, but he added that a lot of the details needed to be sorted out.

Should a deal be reached, there is every reason to believe it will be inked in Saudi Arabia, which has hosted not only the latest U.S.-Ukrainian talks but earlier rounds of high-level Russian-U.S. meetings.

But why is a Gulf nation playing mediator in a conflict in Eastern Europe? As an expert on Saudi politics, I believe the answer to that lies in the kingdom’s diplomatic ambitions and its desire to present a more positive image to the world. And in the background is the goal of better positioning the nation in the event of diplomatic maneuvers in its own region, notably in regards to any talks between U.S. and Iran.

The diplomatic convertion of MBS

Saudi Arabia’s growing diplomatic role has been a feature of the kingdom’s foreign policy since 2022.

Crown Prince Mohammed, who that year succeeded his father as prime minister, views Saudi Arabia as the convening power in the Arab and Islamic world.

Accordingly, officials in the kingdom have been directed to lead regional diplomacy over a number of pressing issues, including the conflicts in Gaza and Sudan.

At the same time, Saudis have started the process of reconciliation with Iran, which has long been perceived as the chief regional rival to Saudi influence.

This turn to diplomacy marks a shift away from the confrontational policies adopted by the crown prince during his rise to power in Saudi Arabia between 2015 and 2018. Policies such as Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen, its blockade of Qatar, the detention of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Saad Hariri and the conversion of the Ritz-Carlton hotel in Riyadh into a makeshift prison all fed an image of the young prince as an impulsive decision-maker. Then in 2018 came the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul.

This approach brought little in the way of stability. Rather, it left the country ensnared in an unwinnable war in Yemen, a fruitless row with Qatar, and diplomatic isolation by Western officials.

A friend to Ukraine and Russia

In regards to the war in Ukraine, Saudi Arabia’s intermediary role is helped by a perception of the kingdom as a neutral nation on the conflict.

Saudi officials, in common with their counterparts in the other Gulf states, have long sought to avoid taking sides in the emerging era of great power competition and strategic rivalry. As such, the kingdom has maintained working relations with both Russia and pro-Western Ukraine since the outbreak of war in Europe.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman meet in Riyadh on Dec. 6, 2023.
Alexey Nikolsky/AFP via Getty Images

In 2022, for example, Saudi Arabia and Russia – both leaders of OPEC+ – coordinated oil production cuts to cushion Moscow from the effects of global sanctions the West imposed after it invaded Ukraine. Yet just months later, Saudi Arabia invited Zelenskyy to address an Arab League summit in the Saudi city of Jeddah.

It was a prelude to a 2023 international summit, also in Jeddah, which brought together representatives from 40 countries to discuss the ongoing war.

Despite failing to produce a breakthrough, the meeting illustrated the convening reach of the crown prince and his intention to act as a diplomatic go-between in the Ukraine-Russia war.

Saudi Arabia and neighboring United Arab Emirates later facilitated occasional prisoner exchanges between the two countries – rare diplomatic successes in three years of conflict.

Staging ground for diplomacy

Direct engagement in high-stakes international diplomacy over the largest war in Europe since 1945 is undoubtedly a step up in Saudi ambitions. But the country’s efforts aren’t purely altruistic. Riyadh believes there’s mileage to be gained in such diplomatic endeavors.

The advent of a Trump presidency has fit Saudi desires. Trump has made his desire to be seen as a dealmaker and peacemaker clear, but he needs a neutral venue in which the hard work of diplomacy can flourish.

Just weeks into the new U.S. administration, the Saudi capital hosted the first meeting between a U.S. secretary of state and Russian foreign minister since Russia invaded in 2022.

It yielded an agreement to “re-establish the bilateral relationship” and establish a consultation mechanism to “address irritants” in ties.

The two rounds of dialogue in Riyadh – first with Russia, then Ukraine – have positioned the Saudi leadership firmly in the diplomatic process. It has also gone some way to rehabilitate Mohammed bin Salman’s image.

The sight of the crown prince warmly greeting Zelenskyy contrasted sharply with the images from a fractious White House meeting that went around the world, presenting the crown prince as a statesmanlike figure.

Turning to Tehran

Such positive optics would have seemed inconceivable as recently as 2019, when the crown prince was shunned and then presidential candidate Joe Biden labeled the country a “pariah” state.

Changing this negative global perception of Saudi Arabia is crucial if the kingdom is to attract the tens of millions of visitors that are pivotal to the success of the “giga-projects” – sports, culture and tourism events that the Saudis hope will drive its economy and allow the kingdom to be less economically dependent on fossil fuel exports.

Whereas easing tensions with Iran and supporting Yemen’s fragile truce are about derisking the kingdom’s vulnerability to regional volatility, facilitating diplomacy over Ukraine is a relatively cost-free way to reinforce the changing narratives about Saudi Arabia.

After all, any breakdown in the Russia-U.S.-Ukraine negotiations is unlikely to be blamed on the Saudis.

Indeed, Saudi officials may view their engagement with U.S. officials over Ukraine as the prelude to further diplomatic cooperation. And this will be especially true if Crown Prince Mohammed is able to establish himself as an indispensable partner in the eyes of Trump.

Saudi officials were excluded from the last major talks between Iran and the U.S., which also involved several other major world powers and led to the 2016 Iran nuclear deal. Trump withdrew from the deal shortly after assuming office for the first time in 2017, and U.S.-Iranian relations have been moribund since then.

The U.S. administration has already mooted the idea of a resumption of negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear capabilities.

Placing Saudi Arabia in the middle of any attempts to secure a new nuclear agreement that would replace or supersede that earlier deal would be a high-risk move, given the intensity of feeling on both the U.S. and Iranian sides and the uneasy coexistence between Tehran and Riyadh.

But doing so would give the kingdom what it most desires: a seat at the table. Läs mer…

The recently appointed White House press secretary, Karoline Leavitt, has begun her tenure combatively, aggressively defending the Trump administration’s policies and, at times, mimicking Donald Trump’s methods of dealing with the mainstream news media.

Faced recently with a legitimate question by an Associated Press (AP) reporter who challenged Trump’s introduction of tariffs against several countries, she accused the reporter of doubting her knowledge of economics. She then dismissed him, saying: “I now regret giving a question to the Associated Press.”

AP is one of the key media organisations reporting on the White House. The largest news agency in the US, its stories are carried by news groups around the world. But recently, AP was ejected from the “press pool” that covers White House business

It was excluded in mid-February for refusing to call the Gulf of Mexico “the Gulf of America”, after Trump changed its name by executive order. This was followed by an announcement that the White House would take greater control of the press pool and choose which outlets would be given most access to the president. This is likely to be based on favourable coverage rather than quality of reporting.

To appreciate how significant this is, it is important to first state the fundamental purpose of journalism in a democratic society, which is to hold the powerful to account. This is known as its “watchdog” function.

The work of Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein in exposing the Watergate scandal during the 1970s is often held up as the gold standard of watchdog journalism. It ultimately led to the resignation of Richard Nixon as president and the imprisonment of his lawyer, John Dean.

“Pooling” describes the process by which a prominent organisation or individual attempts to oversee journalistic scrutiny by managing access. King Charles, for example, also operates a press pool.

It works in two stages. First, news organisations or individual journalists apply to be members of the pool. Then, a handful of journalists from the pool are selected each day or week for access. These journalists – through their pool contract – are required to share the information they gather with the other journalists in the pool, which often leads to a genericisation of the content.

Thus, while political organisations or elite individuals might claim the pooling system is used as a benign and fair tool to manage consistent press interest, in reality it is a weapon of communications control.

The White House’s press pool was first established under President Dwight Eisenhower as a reflection of the growing number of journalists based in Washington. But in the modern era, the use of pooling was most controversial during and after the first Gulf War of the early 1990s.

Rather than roaming the battlefields of Iraq and Kuwait, most western reporters spent the conflict at the media centre in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, some 250 miles from the Kuwait border. Here they were fed the information that the US military wanted the public to know. A small number of pooled journalists were then occasionally accompanied by US troops to the battlefield in what was a clear case of censorship by access and perspective limitation.

This military-media power dynamic – and the subsequent mismatch between the actuality of the war and the reporting of it – led the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard to declare in a 1991 essay, published by Liberation and The Guardian, that “The Gulf war did not take place”.

General “Stormin” Norman Schwarzkopf’s famous “luckiest man in Iraq” briefing is indicative of the close relationship that developed between military and media professionals during the conflict. Schwarzkopf showed journalists footage taken through the crosshairs of a US bomber of an Iraqi private car driving over a bridge moments before a US airstrike destroys it. You can hear the journalists laughing with Schwarzkopf as they watch this lucky escape.

Legacy of Vietnam

Despite widespread understanding that scrutiny is an important part of public officialdom, the legacy of the Vietnam War – a conflict the US was perceived both at home and around the world to have lost – led to a significant amount of distrust of journalists. US media analyst Daniel Hallin referred to Vietnam as the “uncensored war”. By this he meant that journalists enjoyed an unprecedented amount of freedom – exacerbated by the relatively new medium of television, which brought stark images of war directly into people’s living rooms.

Controlling the message: US secretary of defense Robert McNamara delivers a press briefing at the Pentagon in 1965.
Zuma Press/Alamy Stock Photo

By February 1968, the US military’s daily briefings from the Rex Hotel in Saigon had become known as the “five o’clock follies”, on account of the gulf between official claims of the war’s “progress” and what was being reported by journalists who had ventured into the field. The military consistently presented a positive narrative – in stark contrast to the esteemed CBS reporter Walter Cronkite’s analysis that: “To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion.”

Vietnam could have been an opportunity for governments to think about their obligation to truth and the requirement to be more ethical in their approach. Instead, the feeling in Washington was that unfavourable press coverage had lost the war, and that journalists needed to be curtailed.

Controlling the message

The recent decision by the Trump administration to take over selection of pool journalists from the notionally independent White House Correspondents’ Association is unsurprising. The approach is consistent with the first Trump presidency’s refusal to answer questions from journalists who tried to carry out the press’s watchdog function.

It also fits with Trump’s electioneering approach during 2024 when he shunned traditional news outlets, focusing instead on social media and appearing on the podcasts of Joe Rogan and Andrew Schulz, for example.

To this end, the White House’s decision amounts to a power grab against the institution of modern journalism – even if much of the US media has been in thrall to the powerful ever since Vietnam. Läs mer…

Pakistan’s army has freed hundreds of hostages from a passenger train that was seized by armed militants in the south-western province of Balochistan on Tuesday, March 11. A number of those on board were military officials and police personnel travelling from Balochistan’s capital, Quetta, to Peshawar further north.

The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) quickly claimed responsibility for the hijacking. In a written statement sent to the Guardian, the group said its actions were “a direct response to Pakistan’s decades-long colonial occupation of Balochistan and the relentless war crimes committed against the Baloch people”.

Ever since 1948, when Balochistan became a province of Pakistan months after partition from India, this territory has been marginalised by the Pakistani state. The authorities have struggled to accommodate the diverse ethnic and linguistic groups within Balochistan, leading to several rounds of insurgency.

During the recent hijack, the BLA demanded that Pakistan’s military release Baloch activists, missing people and political prisoners, and threatened to kill many of the hostages if the authorities did not comply. The subsequent military operation, which lasted two days, resulted in the deaths of all 33 militants, as well as 21 hostages and four army personnel.

The brazen nature and scale of the attack has raised difficult questions for the Pakistani state about how it addresses escalating discontent and militancy in Balochistan.

People in Hyderabad, Pakistan, attend a rally in solidarity with the armed forces after the train hijacking incident.
Nadeem Khawer / EPA

Who are the BLA?

The BLA is a separatist group that emerged in the early 2000s. It is considered a terrorist organisation by the Pakistani authorities and several western countries.

Unlike more moderate Baloch nationalist groups, which are committed to remaining part of the Pakistani state despite longstanding grievances with it, the BLA aims to achieve an independent Balochistan.

Some of the grievances expressed by the Baloch include a lack of representation both in the federal government and the armed forces. Baloch nationalists also allege the Pakistani state has exploited the province’s coal, gold, copper and gas resources while providing very little for the Baloch people in return.

Revenues from the Saindak gold and copper mine, for example, are largely shared between the Chinese company that operates it and the Pakistani government. The Balochistan provincial government only receives around 5% of the mine’s revenue.

Chaghi, the mineral-rich district of Balochistan that hosts the Saindak mine, remains one of the most underdeveloped areas of the country. Local people employed at the mine claim they are only offered menial jobs and work in unsafe conditions.

Balochistan’s persistent underdevelopment means a poor quality of life for its citizens. It consistently ranks as the Pakistani province with the lowest human development index (HDI) rating, scoring 0.421 in 2017. This index is a summary rating between 0 (low) and 1 (high) based on measures of health, education and standard of living. Punjab has the highest HDI rating at 0.732.

Balochistan is located in south-west Pakistan.
Calligraphy786 / Shutterstock

The separatist movement in Balochistan intensified after Nawab Akbar Bugti, a prominent Baloch nationalist leader, was killed in a military operation in 2006. The BLA was soon banned by the Pakistani government, and the military’s operations intensified in the province.

Baloch human rights defenders and activists have persistently accused Pakistan’s security forces of harassment and relying on excessive force. Protesters believe there have been thousands of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, which the Pakistani authorities have denied.

The issue has been raised by human rights organisations both in Pakistan and abroad. Families of missing people have filed cases against the government with the Pakistan Supreme Court, and disappearances have been investigated through special commissions of inquiry.

Supreme Court rulings have held the state responsible for enforced disappearances. While some missing people have been traced as a result of these rulings and inquiries, the International Commission of Jurists notes that “there has been no apparent effort made to fix responsibility for this heinous crime”.

Attacking foreign investments

The BLA’s tactics have typically involved carrying out attacks against state installations. However, in recent years, attacks against Chinese citizens and infrastructure have become the group’s focus.

Balochistan has a strategically important coastline, providing access to the Indian Ocean. China has invested heavily in the region as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, including in a deep-sea port at Gwadar. But these investments have failed to benefit local people, fuelling accusations by many in the province that the Pakistani state is systematically neglecting their needs.

The BLA’s suicide squad was responsible for an attack that injured three Chinese engineers working in the Balochistan city of Dalbandin in 2018. Later that year, BLA militants attacked the Chinese consulate in Karachi – though Chinese nationals remained safe in that attack.

The group seems to have no difficulty attracting young and well-educated Baloch people, who see the state’s actions and Chinese presence in Balochistan as exploitative. In 2022, a female graduate student carried out a suicide attack on behalf of the BLA that killed three Chinese teachers at the University of Karachi.

Pakistani security officials inspect a suicide bomb blast at a railway station in Quetta in November 2024.
Fayyaz Ahmad / EPA

The BLA’s activities have expanded substantially in recent years. It has conducted more than 150 attacks in the past year alone, including on Quetta railway station and on a convoy carrying Chinese workers near Karachi airport.

However, experts have noted that the train hijacking was unprecedented in scale. It represents a significant escalation by the BLA in terms of the planning, resources and intelligence required to execute such an operation.

The Pakistani government and military appear to have mishandled Balochistan’s security situation. But they have also failed to address the growing resentment and alienation that is driving people to groups like the BLA.

According to Farzana Sheikh, an associate fellow at Chatham House, Pakistan’s military continues to favour “a heavy-handed security response to deal with what is widely judged to be a political crisis”.

Accusations of state exploitation and neglect will not go away until the Pakistani state radically alters its stance on Balochistan, starting by ensuring accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations. Only then can trust be rebuilt with the people of this province who, according to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, live in “a climate of fear”. Läs mer…