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Communities across the world are facing two worsening crises: a climate crisis and a care crisis.

The evidence and urgency on the climate crisis has been expertly illustrated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The root cause of this crisis is the increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. This is due to excessive exploitation of fossil fuels, deforestation and industrial processes. In short, it is a result of development processes that have not been based on caring for the environment.

Less discussed is the care crisis. This refers to a society’s capacity to maintain livelihoods in households, raise children and sustain communities. In short, the care crisis is a result of not investing enough in caring for each other.

Addressing these crises requires acknowledgement of the interdependency of people, other species and the physical environment. Our failure to invest sufficiently in caring for each other, other species and our environment is a root cause of climate change. We refer to this as the “care-climate nexus”. As the effects of climate change intensify, we will need to care for each other more than ever before, and we need systems to enable better care of our environment.

There is a growing discussion linking gender and climate change. However, the links between climate change and care have been largely under-researched.

The climate crisis stems, similarly to the care crisis, from an economic paradigm that undervalues care – both for each other and for our physical environment. The concept of care therefore can serve as a powerful focal point for understanding the climate challenge and for policies towards a sustainable and equitable future.

This is the gap that the “care-climate nexus” project led by the Southern Centre for Inequality studies, in collaboration with the International Development Research Centre and a group of feminist economists and climate scientists from across the world, plans to fill.

The research project has two main objectives. First, to map the conceptual links between climate change and care.

Second, to inform and support policymakers to include care in climate policy. For example, significant investments in quality care that supports climate adaptation are as important as building resilient infrastructure and can reduce the burden on those who carry out care work. Climate policy that does not centre care risks replicating or even exacerbating structural inequalities.

Undervaluing care and nature

The climate and care crises have resulted from the undervaluing of two things – nature and care work.

Indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP) place value on – and reward – unsustainable exploitation of natural resources. Too little – or no – value is placed on the natural environment. The consequences are proving dire. Continued exploitation of raw materials and natural resources has come at the expense of the environment. The undervaluing of nature has caused pollution, loss of habitats, extinction of species and declining biodiversity.

Similarly, no value is placed on unpaid care work. What is measured and “valuable” in the calculations of GDP in an economy excludes unpaid care work, even though it is essential for sustaining livelihoods and therefore economic activity.

Care work has been cast as “women’s work”, although men do it too. On average, women and girls in the global south undertake over three times more unpaid care work than men.

The disproportionate responsibility for this work restricts women and girls’ opportunities to pursue education or employment. The undervaluation of care work reflects gender norms that regard women’s work as inherently less valuable and as something that is endless and free.

Climate change poses threats to food security, water accessibility, health and livelihoods, among many other impacts. Unpaid or under-paid tasks like providing food, collecting water and caring for the young, ill and elderly will be made more difficult by the impacts of climate change.

As we have shown above, these tasks are often, but not exclusively, carried out by women. There is also a growing trend in the global North for this work to be outsourced to women immigrants and the working class.

Anchoring care in climate policy

It is possible for humans to contribute to the regeneration of the environment instead of its depletion. But this calls for a rethink: what we value and whether this is represented in our current economic systems and policies.

The care-climate nexus conceptual framework makes two key arguments:

One is for an expansive view of care that goes beyond person-to-person care to include caring for the environment. Centering care in responding to the climate crisis requires understanding diverse meanings and articulations of care, that include understandings of care in different contexts from the global South.
Second, care is not only a practical concern but also an ethical and political one. It involves recognising that everything we do to maintain, continue, and repair our world is significant and crucial for life on Earth.

A focus on care and climate change means understanding and addressing interconnected socio-economic challenges. These include:

the impact of climate change on the provision of care. Climate change adds to the unequal burden of unpaid caregiving and care work, which carries substantial economic and social repercussions.
the conditions of care work. The labour that goes into maintaining households, raising and birthing children and sustaining communities more broadly is being undermined by an economic and social system that systematically undervalues care.
the protection of farm workers’ rights. Many in rural communities in the global South work on farms, where their agricultural labour is seen as an extension of their domestic care duties and is often precarious. Yet rural communities often do more than their share of environmental care. These forms of work should be protected and valued.
the impact of the privatisation of public and social services on the provision of care. The growing privatisation of care services globally, like healthcare, and cuts in public expenditure on these vital services, has made it difficult for the majority to obtain proper care. Quality healthcare, for example, is out of reach for many.
addressing the fact that care work extends beyond domestic work and includes caring for nature, land and animals.

The central theme of the upcoming annual Conference of the Parties (COP) in November is climate finance. COP is a multilateral forum that deliberates on global climate policy: this is a crucial space to emphasise and put forward proposals for better resourced caring economies as a way to build climate resilience.

This article is part of a series of articles initiated through a project led by the Southern Centre for Inequality studies, in collaboration with the International Development Research Centre and a group of feminist economists and climate scientists across the world. Läs mer…

Extreme climate events — floods, droughts and heatwaves — are not just becoming more frequent; they are also more severe.

It’s important to understand how communities can recover from these events in ways that also build resilience to future events.

In a recent study, we analysed how communities affected by the extreme flood events of 2021 in Germany’s Ahr Valley and in Lagos, Nigeria, grappled with recovery from floods.

Our aim was to identify the factors – and combinations of factors – that served as barriers (or enablers) to recovery from disasters.

We found that financial limitations, political interests and administrative hurdles led to prioritising immediate relief and reconstruction over long-term sustainable recovery.

In both cases immediate and long-term recovery efforts were siloed, underfunded and focused on reconstruction to pre-disaster conditions.

We concluded from our findings that the success of recovery efforts lies in balancing short-term relief and a long-term vision. While immediate aid is essential after a disaster, true resilience hinges on proactive measures that address systemic challenges and empower communities to build a better future.

Recovery should not be merely action-oriented and building back infrastructure (engineering). It should also include insights in other areas, like governance and psychology, helping people to deal with losses and to heal.

What worked

To understand the recovery pathways of the two regions, we reviewed relevant literature, newspaper articles and government documents. We also interviewed government agencies, NGO representatives, volunteers and local residents in the communities where these floods occurred.

We found that in the Ahr Valley, recovery wasn’t just about rebuilding structures, it was about empowering individuals.

Through initiatives like mental health and first aid courses, residents learned to support one another. This fostered a sense of community and resilience that was essential for meeting the emotional challenges posed by the disaster.

The focus on rebuilding with a sustainable vision also included environmental initiatives. For example, a type of heating system was put in place that didn’t rely on fossil fuels.

Not only did this reduce carbon emissions, it also served as a symbol of hope. It showed there was an opportunity to create a more sustainable and environmentally friendly community.

In Lagos, too, residents found strength in community and innovation. Grassroots efforts using sustainable materials like bamboo and palm wood highlighted the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the people. Faith-based organisations provided material aid as well as emotional and spiritual support. This reinforced the bonds that held the community together.

Each community faced unique challenges. But they shared a common thread: the importance of adaptive governance – flexible decision-making and strong community ties.

For example, established building codes in the Ahr Valley provided a framework for reconstruction, ensuring that new structures were resilient and safe.

In Lagos, the absence of strong government support highlighted the critical role of community organisations in providing services and fostering a sense of shared responsibility.

What needs improvment

In both the Ahr Valley and Lagos, the journey towards recovery has been fraught with obstacles as well.

In the Ahr Valley, bureaucratic red tape has become a formidable barrier. Residents, eager to rebuild their lives, find themselves entangled in a complex web of regulations and lengthy approval processes. This has delayed their access to insurance and recovery funds. Waiting for months or even years has eroded hope and fuelled a sense of abandonment.

Meanwhile, in Lagos, insufficient government support has left communities to fend for themselves, creating a breeding ground for uncertainty and conflict.

Land tenure disputes, fuelled by a lack of clear property rights, sow seeds of distrust and hinder resettlement efforts. Political disagreements complicate the picture, as competing interests divert attention and resources away from those who need them most.

In Lagos, none of the respondents reported having insurance to help them to recover from disaster-related losses.

While some residents in the Ahr Valley did have insurance, many were under-insured.

The Ahr Valley’s building codes offer a framework for reconstruction. But it’s clear that processes should be streamlined so communities can take ownership of their recovery.

In Lagos, the importance of robust social safety nets is clear. Partnerships between communities and authorities are also needed.

A different approach

Recovery isn’t a separate process that occurs after disasters only. It should be seen as an essential part of managing risks. It’s important to understand what recovery involves and what resources are needed.

This will help reduce future risks and increase resilience after extreme events.

Governments should encourage flexible governance structures that value community voices and local knowledge to enable recovery. A good example is the New Orleans Recovery Authority, established after Hurricane Katrina. It involved local residents and city officials in planning and rebuilding efforts.

Grassroots efforts in Lagos demonstrated the power of sustainable materials and community-led initiatives. Seeing things from the community’s point of view can help tailor solutions that fit the situation and adapt to evolving challenges.

Training and capacity-building programmes empower communities to be active in their own recovery.

Mental health and first aid courses were successful in the Ahr Valley. Equipping individuals with skills in sustainable practices and disaster preparedness helps weave a social fabric capable of weathering future storms. Läs mer…

In a speech to the New South Wales and South Australian government social media summit today, Federal Minister for Communications Michelle Rowland announced more details of how the federal government’s proposed social media ban would actually work.

The government first announced the ban last month, shortly after SA said it will ban children under 14 from social media. But experts have heavily criticised the idea, and this week more than 120 experts from Australia and overseas wrote an open letter to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and state and territory premiers urging a rethink.

Despite this, the government appears to be ploughing ahead with the proposed ban. The details Rowland announced today do not meaningfully address many of the criticisms made over the past few weeks.

In fact, they actually raise new problems.

What are the details of the social media ban?

In her speech, Rowland said the government will amend the Online Safety Act to “place the onus on platforms, not parents or young people” to enforce the proposed social media ban.

The changes will be implemented over 12 months to give industry and the regulator time to implement key processes.

The government says it “will set parameters to guide platforms in designing social media that allows connections, but not harms, to flourish”. These parameters could address some of the “addictive” features of these platforms, for instance by limiting potential harms by prioritising content feeds from accounts people follow, or making age-appropriate versions of their apps.

The government is also considering an:

exemption framework to accommodate access for social media services that demonstrate a low risk of harm to children.

NSW Premier Chris Minns (right) and SA Premier Peter Malinauskas organised the two-day social media summit.
Bianca De Marchi/AAP

The problem with “low risk”

But allowing young people to access social media platforms that have a demonstrated “low risk of harm” is fraught with issues.

Risk is difficult to define – especially when it comes to social media.

As I explained earlier this year around potential harms of artificial intelligence, risk “sits on a spectrum and is not absolute”. Risk cannot be determined simply by considering a social media platform itself, or by knowing the age of the person using it. What’s risky for one person may not be risky for someone else.

How, then, will the government determine which social media platforms have a “low risk of harm”?

Simply focusing on technical changes to social media platform design in determining what constitutes “low risk” will not address key areas of potential harm. This may give parents a false sense of security when it comes to the “low-risk” solutions technology companies offer.

Let’s assume for a moment that Meta’s new “teen-friendly” Instagram accounts qualify as having a “low risk of harm” and young people would still be allowed to use them.

The teen version of Instagram will be set to private by default and have stronger content restrictions in place than regular accounts. It will also allow parents to see the categories of content children are accessing, and the accounts they follow, but will still require parental oversight.

But this doesn’t solve the risk problem.

There will still be harmful content on social media. And young people will still be exposed to it when they are old enough to have an unrestricted account, potentially without the support and guidance they need to safely engage with it. If children don’t gain necessary skills for navigating social media at an early age, potential harms may be deferred, rather than addressed and safely negotiated with parental support.

A better approach

The harmful content on social media platforms doesn’t just pose a risk to young people. It poses a risk to everybody – adults included. For this reason, the government’s heavy focus on encouraging platforms to demonstrate a “low risk of harm” only to young people seems a little misguided.

A better approach would be to strive to ensure social media platforms are safe for all users, regardless of their age. Ensuring platforms have mechanisms for users to report potentially harmful content – and for platforms to remove inappropriate content – is crucial for keeping people safe.

Platforms should also ensure users can block accounts, such as when a person is being bullied or harassed, with consequences for account holders found to engage in such harmful behaviour.

It is important that government requirements for “low-risk” accounts include these and other mechanisms to identify and limit harmful content at source. Tough penalties for tech companies that fail to comply with legislation are also needed.

The federal government could also provide extra resources for parents and children, to help them to navigate social media content safely.

A report released this week by the New South Wales government showed 91% of parents with children aged 5–17 believe “more should be done to teach young people and their parents about the possible harms of social media”.

The SA government appears to be heeding this message. Today it also announced a plan for more social media education in schools.

Providing more proactive support like this, rather than pursuing social media bans, would go a long way to protecting young Australians while also ensuring they have access to helpful and supportive social media content. Läs mer…

Developing countries like Indonesia use foreign high-skilled and high-wage workers to drive economic growth and innovation. However, protection of their legal rights is often neglected, affecting these workers’ productivity and well-being and Indonesia’s reputation as a destination country for employment.

My research delves into the flaws of Indonesia’s labour market institutions, such as the national labour dispute settlement system, revealing that current mechanisms are inadequate in protecting the rights of high-skilled foreign workers.

The study

My findings show the national dispute settlement system exhibits significant systemic shortcomings, such as processing cases slowly and siding with employers, which limit its capacity to protect all workers effectively. But disputes involving foreign workers are further complicated by the fact that immigration law allows employers to cancel residence permits, meaning that the government requires the workers to leave the country even though the workers may have been unfairly dismissed.

Foreign workers are mainly from Northeast Asia (China, Japan and Korea), and their use on investment-tied projects coupled with Indonesia’s downstreaming programme will ensure their numbers continue to grow. In 2023, the Indonesian government issued 168,048 permits for foreigners to work in Indonesia with the top three destinations being Central Sulawesi (18,678), Jakarta (13,862) and West Java (10,807). By July 2024, the government had already issued more than 14% more permits than by the same time the previous year.

My study examined 92 labour disputes involving foreign workers between 2006 (when the new national dispute settlement system was implemented) and 2022, which were settled by the Industrial Relations Court. One additional dispute was filed in 2023, but the Industrial Relations Court has not yet published the settlement despite a legal requirement to do so.

I complemented these court settlements with 98 qualitative interviews with other stakeholders, including policymakers, labour rights activists, legal professionals, and other foreign workers, such as foreign spouses, remote workers and digital nomads.

As in other countries too, the number of registered labour disputes is only the tip of the iceberg, as workers tend to cut their losses and move on rather than invest time, energy and limited financial resources in challenging their better-resourced employers.

Employers were all Indonesian companies, so no foreign workers who filed a lawsuit worked for a multinational company, and those who did so had at least 20 nationalities.

CC BY

In terms of geographical distribution, the studied disputes were settled in 13 local jurisdictions, and were mostly lodged by workers rather than employers.

The nature of the disputes mostly involved claims that an employment contract had been terminated prematurely (87 cases), while a much smaller number involved resignation (4 cases) or were unknown (1 case). Of the 92 claims, 83 were initiated by workers, and eight by an employer. In one case, the lodging party was not recorded in the final decision.

Hiring a private lawyer

Employers used the Immigration Law to undermine the protective role of the Manpower Law – as it stands foreign workers are only entitled to employment protection if they hold a valid residence permit, which employers can and do shorten. Doing so shows that the Indonesian government prioritizes the flexibility of employers at the expense of employment protection for foreign workers.

In at least 92% cases, foreign workers used paid assistance of a private lawyer to represent themselves at formal meetings and hearings required by the Disputes Settlement Law, the cost of which could be hefty.

As one foreign worker explained:

It’s always in the back of your mind, to do whatever to make employers happy if you want to stay. No matter what the work permit and contract say, they can ask immigration to kick us out within a week!“

A retired government official responsible for designing policy regarding foreign workers was surprised when he heard this, explaining that:

I thought they could look after themselves because they earn such high wages. Well, higher than the average Indonesian worker, that is.

Hiring a private lawyer is the only way to represent themselves throughout the dispute resolution process because they need to leave Indonesia once they are fired. Not having the legal right to remain in Indonesia makes it very difficult – even impossible – to do it without them.

Addressing institutional failures

Engaging a private lawyer served as an ‘institutional fix’ that enabled most foreign workers to engage with Indonesia’s labour dispute settlement system by attending formal meetings and hearings, as well as filling out required paperwork and sending essential letters and replies.

Addressing this institutional failure requires a shift in law and policy. Firstly, legal reforms are essential to ensure that immigration and employment laws are integrated to enable foreign workers to have access to legal processes intended to help protect labour rights. At a minimum, this would involve amending policy to prevent employers from cancelling residence permits so that foreign workers need to leave the country prematurely.

Alternatively, the Directorate-General of Immigration could still permit employers to do so, but then provide the affected foreign workers with a limited-stay visa so that they can remain in Indonesia to engage with the legal process. The Hong Kong Immigration Department does this for Indonesian migrant workers.

Secondly, there is a need for enhanced support systems that provide immediate and effective assistance to foreign workers. Government agencies tasked with settling labour disputes, such as local manpower offices and the Industrial Relations Court, should be equipped with adequate resources and trained personnel to handle migrant labour issues. Doing so would decrease the reliance of foreign workers on private lawyers.

Failure to protect the employment rights of foreign workers has the potential to damage Indonesia’s reputation as a destination country for employment. Such damage could undermine Indonesia’s ambitious plans to build a new capital city (Ibu Kota Nusantara) with the assistance of foreign workers, and undermine the government’s downstreaming programme, which helps Indonesia earn more from the export of raw minerals. Läs mer…

As a urogynaecologist I care exclusively for women with pelvic floor problems. These are the women with leaking bladders and weak supporting tissues allowing the vaginal walls to bulge outside.

Pelvic organ prolapse can be distressing or embarrassing and interfere with everyday activities. But it’s also common. For many women treatment is simple, effective and doesn’t involve surgery.

What is it pelvic organ prolapse?

Pelvic organ prolapse occurs when the supporting muscles and ligaments holding up the vagina are weakened, allowing the vaginal tissues to sag or stretch. The pelvic organs behind the vaginal walls – such as the bladder, bowel and uterus – can then drop out of position.

One or more organ may be involved. But other than being out of position, there is not necessarily any problem with how these organs function.

Prolapse is usually described according to which organ has dropped, for example “bladder prolapse” (cystocele). Severity is graded according to extent the vaginal wall has descended from its previous position.

Prolapse can occur when the pelvic muscles holding organs in place are weakened.
Pepermpron/Shutterstock

What does it feel like?

Most women don’t know an organ or organs have prolapsed until they notice a protrusion from the vaginal opening. They may feel a soft lump bulging in the vagina when they’re washing.

Many simply feel aware “something is coming down”.

Other women may notice they can’t trust their bladder not to leak when they’re jumping on a trampoline or running at the gym. Or perhaps they find it harder to keep a tampon in position than it was before children.

How common is it?

Prolapse is very common and its likelihood increases with age. Based on routine vaginal examination (for example, for cervical screening), easily 50% of women in developed countries will be classified as having prolapse. Most of these will have no symptoms at all.

When defined by symptoms such as a vaginal bulge or difficulty passing urine, around 5% will have specific symptoms.

What causes pelvic organ prolapse?

Pregnancy and vaginal birth generally cause physical changes, such as relaxation of the vaginal tissues. For most women these are minor, but for some, prolapse can seriously impact quality of life.

After pregnancy some women may find they need to adjust physical activities – particularly high impact exercise or repetitive heavy lifting – as this can make prolapse symptoms more noticeable.

Women who give birth via caesarean section are less likely to experience prolapse and incontinence. However as caesareans have their own risk of serious complications, they can’t be recommended purely to avoid pelvic floor issues.

After vaginal delivery, ageing is the second-most common cause of prolapse. This is because the strength of the pelvic floor deteriorates as we age and especially after menopause.

Excessive weight lifting and high-impact exercise can also weaken these muscles.

Chronic lung problems, diabetes, high cholesterol, constipation and obesity further increase the severity of prolapse and incontinence.

Some women also have genetically poorer quality connective tissues, making them more at risk.

How is it treated?

Severe prolapse, which persistently extends through the vagina and causes significant discomfort, is often managed with surgery.

But it is not always required. In developed countries, only 6-18% of those diagnosed with pelvic prolapse will have surgery.

For milder cases, a clinician will usually recommend pelvic floor therapy.

Specific exercises can help strengthen the pelvic floor during pregnancy and after child birth.
Cerrotalavan/Shutterstock

Structured pelvic floor muscle exercises (generally working with a therapist over time) are effective as an initial treatment when prolapse has occurred. Pelvic floor training during late pregnancy can also be used to treat and prevent further prolapse or urinary incontinence.

Read more:
Men have pelvic floors too – and can benefit when they exercise them regularly

Interestingly, general body strength and fitness does not translate into strong pelvic floor muscles – only specific exercises do this. But keeping your weight under control and managing other health conditions can help reduce symptoms.

Intravaginal support devices, called pessaries, can also substantially reduce symptoms. These are usually silicone rings or discs to help support the vaginal walls. They can be fitted by doctors, nurses or physiotherapists and can often be managed by women themselves.

Pessaries are often made of silicone.
Pepermpron/Shutterstock

Prolapse can also cause mental health distress. Some women may find their body image suffers, and they may experience anxiety or depression which needs specific management.

What does surgery involve?

In severe cases, a clinician might recommend surgery if conservative management (such as pelvic floor muscle training) has been ineffective.

Surgery can also be necessary in those uncommon cases where the prolapse is affecting kidney or bowel function. In these situations surgery can restore quality of life.

Surgery for prolapse can be performed through the abdomen (usually keyhole approach) or vaginally. For most women, mesh is not required and the surgery involves reshaping and reattaching the stretched tissues to strong ligaments.

Unfortunately this is not always successful, particularly when the tissues are very weak. Approximately 25% of women will need further surgery.

In 2017, the Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration withdrew their approval for vaginal mesh products for prolapse, after safety concerns. There has since been a marked reduction in surgery for prolapse and urinary incontinence.

However we have not seen a corresponding increase in non-surgical treatments, so we can only assume many women are simply not seeking treatment at all.

We do need to continue working towards better and safer products to improve the durability of our pelvic floor repairs. But in the meantime we must also continue to provide individualised care for every affected woman.

For many, maintaining pelvic floor strength and a healthy lifestyle will be enough to return to and enjoy their normal activities. The first step is to talk to your GP, who can explain what options will work best for you. Läs mer…

Tropical cyclones, known as hurricanes and typhoons in other parts of the world, have caused huge damage in many places recently. The United States has just been hit by Hurricane Milton, within two weeks of Hurricane Helene. Climate change likely made their impacts worse.

In Australia, the tropical cyclone season (November to April) is approaching. The Bureau of Meteorology this week released its long-range forecast for this season.

It predicts an average number of tropical cyclones, 11, are likely to form in the region. Four are expected to cross the Australian coast. However, the risk of severe cyclones is higher than average.

So what does an average number actually mean in our rapidly changing climate? And why is there a higher risk of intense cyclones?

The bureau’s forecast is consistent with scientific evidence suggesting climate change is likely to result in fewer but more severe tropical cyclones. They are now more likely to bring stronger winds and more intense rain and flooding.

Climate change is making prediction harder

Our knowledge of tropical cyclones and climate change is based on multiple lines of evidence globally and for the Australian region. This work includes our studies based on observations and modelling.

The bureau’s seasonal outlook in recent years has assumed an average of 11 tropical cyclones occurring in our region (covering an area of the southern tropics between longitudes 90°E and 160°E). It’s based on the average value for all years back to 1969.

However, for the past couple of decades the annual average is below nine tropical cyclones. In earlier decades, it was over 12. This long-term downward trend adds to the challenge of seasonal predictions.

The most recent above-average season (assuming an average of 11) was almost 20 years ago, in the 2005–06 summer with 12 tropical cyclones. Since then, any prediction of above-average tropical cyclone seasons has not eventuated.

Parts of Brisbane were flooded following Cyclone Kirrily, one of half-a-dozen severe tropical cyclones in the 2023-24 season.
Darren England/AAP

El Niño and La Niña influences may be changing too

Historical observations suggest more tropical cyclones tend to occur near Australia during La Niña events. This is a result of warm, moist water and air near Australia, compared with El Niño events. The shifting between El Niño and La Niña states in the Pacific region is known as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO).

Such events can be predicted with a useful degree of accuracy several months ahead in some cases. For example, the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has forecast:

La Niña is favored to emerge in September–November (71% chance) and is expected to persist through January–March 2025.

Based on that, one might expect a higher-than-average number of tropical cyclones for the Australian region. However, the ENSO influence on tropical cyclones has weakened in our region. It’s another factor that’s making long-range predictions harder.

The bureau’s ENSO outlook is somewhat closer to neutral ENSO conditions, based on its modelling, compared to NOAA’s leaning more toward La Niña. The bureau says:

Should La Niña form in the coming months, it is forecast to be relatively weak and short-lived.

The bureau’s prediction of an average number of tropical cyclones this season is broadly consistent with its prediction of close-to-average ENSO conditions.

So what does this all mean for this cyclone season?

If we end up getting an average Australian season for the current climate, this might actually mean fewer tropical cyclones than the historical average. The number might be closer to eight or nine rather than 11 or 12. (Higher or lower values than this range are still possible.)

However, those that do occur could have an increased chance of being category 4 or 5 tropical cyclones. These have stronger winds, with gusts typically exceeding 225km per hour, and are more likely to cause severe floods and coastal damage.

If we end up getting more than the recent average of eight to nine tropical cyclones, which could happen if NOAA predictions of La Niña conditions eventuate, that increases the risk of impacts. However, there is one partially good news story from climate change relating to this, if the influence of La Niña is less than it used to be on increasing tropical cyclone activity.

Another factor is that the world’s oceans are much warmer than usual. Warm ocean water is one of several factors that provide the energy needed for a tropical cyclone to form.

Many ocean heat records have been set recently. This means we have been in “uncharted waters” from a temperature perspective. It adds further uncertainty if relying on what occurred in the past when making predictions for the current climate.

Up-to-date evidence is vital as climate changes

The science makes it clear we need to plan for tropical cyclone impacts in a different way from what might have worked in the past. This includes being prepared for potentially fewer tropical cyclones overall, but with those that do occur being more likely to cause more damage. This means there are higher risks of damaging winds, flooding and coastal erosion.

Seasonal prediction guidance can be part of improved planning. There’s also a need for enhanced design standards and other climate change adaptation activities. All can be updated regularly to stay consistent with the best available scientific knowledge.

Increased preparedness is more important than ever to help reduce the potential for disasters caused by tropical cyclones in the current and future climate.

The authors acknowledge the contribution of CSIRO researcher Hamish Ramsay during the writing of this article. Läs mer…

This year’s local elections in India’s northern-most territory of Jammu and Kashmir were the first since the national government controversially stripped the region of its semi-autonomous status in 2019. It’s also the first local election in Muslim-majority Kashmir since 2014.

It was a significant moment for the region. The election will restore, at least partially, some degree of self-rule five years after Prime Minister Narendra Modi took it away.

Modi’s Bharatiya Janata party (BJP) was delivered a resounding defeat when the official results were released this week. The Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (JKNC) and Congress alliance won 48 seats in the 90-seat regional legislature. The BJP won 29, mostly in the Hindu-majority Jammu region.

The former chief minister, Omar Abdullah, was also reinstated as leader. This was a surprising turn given he lost his race for a seat in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of parliament, in the national elections a few months ago.

Supporters of the National Conference party shout slogans as they celebrate in Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir.
Dar Yasin/AP

What’s changed?

Elections in Jammu and Kashmir have been affected in the past by boycotts and low voter turnout, due largely to public mistrust of the government.

There was also a sense of betrayal after Modi’s government revoked Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. This had granted special privileges to local residents and gave the region its own constitution and ability to make its own laws.

However, voter turnout in this year’s election reached 64%. And the participation of separatists and independent candidates suggested a change in attitude toward the political process.

For the BJP, the elections are evidence that normalcy has returned to Kashmir after years of ongoing violence. Modi said in a tweet: “Many people claimed that the Jammu and Kashmir would burn if Article 370 was abrogated. However, it didn’t burn, it blossomed.”

Modi had promised during the campaign that “statehood” would be restored, though he suggested this would be realised only if the BJP was victorious.

With Modi’s opposition winning, some believed the election to be a de-facto referendum on the territory’s special status.

The JKNC has always opposed the revocation of Article 370 and the stripping of Kashmir’s autonomy. The party has promised to work towards restoring that special status, as well as repealing the draconian Public Safety Act, which allows for the detention of people for up to two years without charge, and seeking amnesty for prisoners.

In reality, however, the result won’t undo the revocation of Article 370. The new local assembly will have the power to make and amend laws, debate local issues and approve decisions for the territory, particularly in education and culture. But Abdullah will still need to seek the federally appointed lieutenant governor’s approval on any major decisions.

Even if many Kashmiris would like to prevent the BJP from extending its reach into the region, the party still maintains some control from New Delhi.

The BJP expanded the lieutenant governor’s powers over public order and policing. The lieutenant governor also has control over the regional anti-corruption bureau and the Directorate of Public Prosecutions.

These powers were heavily criticised by the opposition parties in the region.

Future of democracy?

In recent years, Indian security forces have cracked down on the news media, social media and other forms of communication throughout the region, particularly any forms of Kashmiri solidarity with Palestine.

Human rights advocates say abuses and repression continue in the region, and the climate of fear has had a detrimental impact on Kashmiri life.

Statehood remains one of the biggest grievances for Kashmiri residents. Abdullah said himself that “restoration of full, undiluted statehood for [Jammu and Kashmir] is a prerequisite for these elections”.

Only time will tell if these demands can be addressed, but there is hope a new local government might begin to change the bleak situation in Kashmir.

As I spoke about in a recent podcast, there is optimism the new government will go a long way towards restoring some level of autonomy in Kashmir, as long as it is not obstructed by the lieutenant governor’s new powers. Läs mer…

As Israel continues its assault on Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran appears increasingly backed into a corner.

Israel’s efforts to weaken Iran’s proxy network have focused on a number of objectives: eliminating key Hezbollah leaders, destroying their weapons and other military sites, and targeting large numbers of fighters and sympathisers.

Hezbollah has undoubtedly been weakened over the past few weeks, which presents a dilemma for Iran. Could this sustained pressure on its main militant proxy group push Iran towards finally acquiring a nuclear weapon?

Iran’s deterrence strategy

The use of armed proxy networks as a deterrence strategy is a well-known approach employed by countries worldwide.

Iran has successfully adopted this strategy for decades, starting with Hezbollah in Lebanon and extending to Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, various Iraqi militant factions, and Houthi rebels in Yemen.

This strategy has allowed Iran to project power in the region and counter pressure from the United States, Israel and their allies, while deterring any direct military confrontation from its adversaries.

Both Iran and Israel have until recently appeared reluctant to engage in a full-scale war. Instead, they have adhered to certain rules of engagement in which they apply pressure on each other without escalating to all-out conflict. This is something neither side can afford.

Iran has long avoided direct confrontation with Israel, even when Israel has targeted its groups in Syria and assassinated several Iranian nuclear scientists over the past few decades.

Recently, however, this strategy has shifted. Feeling the impact of Israel’s prolonged assaults on its proxy network, Iran has responded by launching two direct missile attacks against Israel in the past six months.

This indicates that as pressure on Iran’s proxies intensifies, Tehran may increasingly resort to alternative strategies to reestablish effective deterrence against Israel and its Western allies.

Some analysts believe Israel may now be gaining what is called “escalation dominance” over Iran. As one group of experts has explained, this happens when one combatant escalates a conflict

in ways that will be disadvantageous or costly to the adversary while the adversary cannot do the same in return, either because it has no escalation options or because the available options would not improve the adversary’s situation.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed a “harsh response” to Iran’s latest missile attack against Israel in early October. This could push Iran further towards changing its deterrence strategy, particularly if Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Calls for a new nuclear strategy

With pressure growing on Iran’s leaders, the regime is now openly discussing whether to declare a military nuclear program.

This would represent a major shift in Iranian policy. Iran has long maintained that its nuclear program is strictly for civilian purposes, with no intention of developing a military component. The US and its allies have contested this assertion.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei visiting an exhibition on Iran’s nuclear industry achievements in 2023.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Office handout/EPA

On October 8, the Iranian parliament announced it had received draft legislation for the “expansion of Iran’s nuclear industry”, which will be discussed in parliament. The nature of this expansion is not yet known – it’s unclear whether it will include a military program. However, recent statements by Iranian officials suggest such an agenda.

Kamal Kharrazi, a senior politician and member of the Expediency Discernment Council, a high-ranking administrative assembly appointed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, forewarned of a reconsideration of Iran’s nuclear program. In an interview in May, he said:

Iran’s level of deterrence will be different if the existence of Iran is threatened. We have no decision to produce a nuclear bomb, but we will have to change our nuclear doctrine if such threat occurs.

Calls in Iran for a revision of the country’s defence doctrine are growing louder. This week, nearly 40 lawmakers wrote a letter to the Supreme National Security Council, which decides on Iran’s general security policy. They demanded the council reconsider the current nuclear policy, noting that Khamenei’s fatwa forbidding the production of a nuclear bomb could be subject to change due to current developments.

In the same vein, Ayatollah Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the founder of the Islamic revolution and former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini, called last week for “enhancing the level of deterrence” against Israel. Iranian media interpreted this as referring to nuclear weapons.

There have also been reports speculating that an earthquake in Iran last week could actually have been a nuclear bomb test.

However, the US has said there is no evidence yet that Iran is moving towards building a nuclear weapon.

Revived nuclear deal increasingly unlikely

In 2015, Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany and the European Union. This deal allowed it to pursue a civilian nuclear program with certain restrictions on its critical nuclear facilities. In exchange, the US and its allies agreed to lift sanctions on Iran.

However, the US withdrew from the deal under then president Donald Trump in 2018 and reimposed sanctions on Iran. Since then, Iran has barred several international inspectors from monitoring some of its nuclear sites.

It is now believed to be just weeks away from producing enough weapons-grade material to build a bomb.

In this 2019 file photo, then-President Donald Trump holds up a signed executive order to increase sanctions on Iran.
Alex Brandon/AP

Efforts to revive the nuclear negotiations have not gone far in recent years, though Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has suggested his government would be willing to engage again with the West and resume the talks.

Yet, if Israel carries out an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities in retaliation for last week’s missile attack, as has been speculated, Iran may deem it necessary to opt for the weaponisation of its nuclear program instead.

If Iran declares a military nuclear program, it would do so with the expressed intention of restoring a deterrence balance with Israel that could prevent a full-scale war. Israel is believed to possess nuclear weapons, but has never confirmed it.

However, such a decision is likely to have dire implications for both Iran and the region.

It would undoubtedly lead to more international pressure and US sanctions on Iran, making it even more isolated. And it could spark a nuclear arms race in the region, as Saudi Arabia has already pledged to pursue a nuclear arsenal if Iran develops one. Läs mer…

As Israel continues its assault on Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran appears increasingly backed into a corner.

Israel’s efforts to weaken Iran’s proxy network have focused on a number of objectives: eliminating key Hezbollah leaders, destroying their weapons and other military sites, and targeting large numbers of fighters and sympathisers.

Hezbollah has undoubtedly been weakened over the past few weeks, which presents a dilemma for Iran. Could this sustained pressure on its main militant proxy group push Iran towards finally acquiring a nuclear weapon?

Iran’s deterrence strategy

The use of armed proxy networks as a deterrence strategy is a well-known approach employed by countries worldwide.

Iran has successfully adopted this strategy for decades, starting with Hezbollah in Lebanon and extending to Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, various Iraqi militant factions, and Houthi rebels in Yemen.

This strategy has allowed Iran to project power in the region and counter pressure from the United States, Israel and their allies, while deterring any direct military confrontation from its adversaries.

Both Iran and Israel have until recently appeared reluctant to engage in a full-scale war. Instead, they have adhered to certain rules of engagement in which they apply pressure on each other without escalating to all-out conflict. This is something neither side can afford.

Iran has long avoided direct confrontation with Israel, even when Israel has targeted its groups in Syria and assassinated several Iranian nuclear scientists over the past few decades.

Recently, however, this strategy has shifted. Feeling the impact of Israel’s prolonged assaults on its proxy network, Iran has responded by launching two direct missile attacks against Israel in the past six months.

This indicates that as pressure on Iran’s proxies intensifies, Tehran may increasingly resort to alternative strategies to reestablish effective deterrence against Israel and its Western allies.

Some analysts believe Israel may now be gaining what is called “escalation dominance” over Iran. As one group of experts has explained, this happens when one combatant escalates a conflict

in ways that will be disadvantageous or costly to the adversary while the adversary cannot do the same in return, either because it has no escalation options or because the available options would not improve the adversary’s situation.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed a “harsh response” to Iran’s latest missile attack against Israel in early October. This could push Iran further towards changing its deterrence strategy, particularly if Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Calls for a new nuclear strategy

With pressure growing on Iran’s leaders, the regime is now openly discussing whether to declare a military nuclear program.

This would represent a major shift in Iranian policy. Iran has long maintained that its nuclear program is strictly for civilian purposes, with no intention of developing a military component. The US and its allies have contested this assertion.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei visiting an exhibition on Iran’s nuclear industry achievements in 2023.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Office handout/EPA

On October 8, the Iranian parliament announced it had received draft legislation for the “expansion of Iran’s nuclear industry”, which will be discussed in parliament. The nature of this expansion is not yet known – it’s unclear whether it will include a military program. However, recent statements by Iranian officials suggest such an agenda.

Kamal Kharrazi, a senior politician and member of the Expediency Discernment Council, a high-ranking administrative assembly appointed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, forewarned of a reconsideration of Iran’s nuclear program. In an interview in May, he said:

Iran’s level of deterrence will be different if the existence of Iran is threatened. We have no decision to produce a nuclear bomb, but we will have to change our nuclear doctrine if such threat occurs.

Calls in Iran for a revision of the country’s defence doctrine are growing louder. This week, nearly 40 lawmakers wrote a letter to the Supreme National Security Council, which decides on Iran’s general security policy. They demanded the council reconsider the current nuclear policy, noting that Khamenei’s fatwa forbidding the production of a nuclear bomb could be subject to change due to current developments.

In the same vein, Ayatollah Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the founder of the Islamic revolution and former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini, called last week for “enhancing the level of deterrence” against Israel. Iranian media interpreted this as referring to nuclear weapons.

There have also been reports speculating that an earthquake in Iran last week could actually have been a nuclear bomb test.

However, the US has said there is no evidence yet that Iran is moving towards building a nuclear weapon.

Revived nuclear deal increasingly unlikely

In 2015, Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany and the European Union. This deal allowed it to pursue a civilian nuclear program with certain restrictions on its critical nuclear facilities. In exchange, the US and its allies agreed to lift sanctions on Iran.

However, the US withdrew from the deal under then president Donald Trump in 2018 and reimposed sanctions on Iran. Since then, Iran has barred several international inspectors from monitoring some of its nuclear sites.

It is now believed to be just weeks away from producing enough weapons-grade material to build a bomb.

In this 2019 file photo, then-President Donald Trump holds up a signed executive order to increase sanctions on Iran.
Alex Brandon/AP

Efforts to revive the nuclear negotiations have not gone far in recent years, though Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has suggested his government would be willing to engage again with the West and resume the talks.

Yet, if Israel carries out an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities in retaliation for last week’s missile attack, as has been speculated, Iran may deem it necessary to opt for the weaponisation of its nuclear program instead.

If Iran declares a military nuclear program, it would do so with the expressed intention of restoring a deterrence balance with Israel that could prevent a full-scale war. Israel is believed to possess nuclear weapons, but has never confirmed it.

However, such a decision is likely to have dire implications for both Iran and the region.

It would undoubtedly lead to more international pressure and US sanctions on Iran, making it even more isolated. And it could spark a nuclear arms race in the region, as Saudi Arabia has already pledged to pursue a nuclear arsenal if Iran develops one. Läs mer…

As Israel continues its assault on Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran appears increasingly backed into a corner.

Israel’s efforts to weaken Iran’s proxy network have focused on a number of objectives: eliminating key Hezbollah leaders, destroying their weapons and other military sites, and targeting large numbers of fighters and sympathisers.

Hezbollah has undoubtedly been weakened over the past few weeks, which presents a dilemma for Iran. Could this sustained pressure on its main militant proxy group push Iran towards finally acquiring a nuclear weapon?

Iran’s deterrence strategy

The use of armed proxy networks as a deterrence strategy is a well-known approach employed by countries worldwide.

Iran has successfully adopted this strategy for decades, starting with Hezbollah in Lebanon and extending to Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, various Iraqi militant factions, and Houthi rebels in Yemen.

This strategy has allowed Iran to project power in the region and counter pressure from the United States, Israel and their allies, while deterring any direct military confrontation from its adversaries.

Both Iran and Israel have until recently appeared reluctant to engage in a full-scale war. Instead, they have adhered to certain rules of engagement in which they apply pressure on each other without escalating to all-out conflict. This is something neither side can afford.

Iran has long avoided direct confrontation with Israel, even when Israel has targeted its groups in Syria and assassinated several Iranian nuclear scientists over the past few decades.

Recently, however, this strategy has shifted. Feeling the impact of Israel’s prolonged assaults on its proxy network, Iran has responded by launching two direct missile attacks against Israel in the past six months.

This indicates that as pressure on Iran’s proxies intensifies, Tehran may increasingly resort to alternative strategies to reestablish effective deterrence against Israel and its Western allies.

Some analysts believe Israel may now be gaining what is called “escalation dominance” over Iran. As one group of experts has explained, this happens when one combatant escalates a conflict

in ways that will be disadvantageous or costly to the adversary while the adversary cannot do the same in return, either because it has no escalation options or because the available options would not improve the adversary’s situation.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed a “harsh response” to Iran’s latest missile attack against Israel in early October. This could push Iran further towards changing its deterrence strategy, particularly if Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Calls for a new nuclear strategy

With pressure growing on Iran’s leaders, the regime is now openly discussing whether to declare a military nuclear program.

This would represent a major shift in Iranian policy. Iran has long maintained that its nuclear program is strictly for civilian purposes, with no intention of developing a military component. The US and its allies have contested this assertion.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei visiting an exhibition on Iran’s nuclear industry achievements in 2023.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Office handout/EPA

On October 8, the Iranian parliament announced it had received draft legislation for the “expansion of Iran’s nuclear industry”, which will be discussed in parliament. The nature of this expansion is not yet known – it’s unclear whether it will include a military program. However, recent statements by Iranian officials suggest such an agenda.

Kamal Kharrazi, a senior politician and member of the Expediency Discernment Council, a high-ranking administrative assembly appointed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, forewarned of a reconsideration of Iran’s nuclear program. In an interview in May, he said:

Iran’s level of deterrence will be different if the existence of Iran is threatened. We have no decision to produce a nuclear bomb, but we will have to change our nuclear doctrine if such threat occurs.

Calls in Iran for a revision of the country’s defence doctrine are growing louder. This week, nearly 40 lawmakers wrote a letter to the Supreme National Security Council, which decides on Iran’s general security policy. They demanded the council reconsider the current nuclear policy, noting that Khamenei’s fatwa forbidding the production of a nuclear bomb could be subject to change due to current developments.

In the same vein, Ayatollah Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the founder of the Islamic revolution and former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini, called last week for “enhancing the level of deterrence” against Israel. Iranian media interpreted this as referring to nuclear weapons.

There have also been reports speculating that an earthquake in Iran last week could actually have been a nuclear bomb test.

However, the US has said there is no evidence yet that Iran is moving towards building a nuclear weapon.

Revived nuclear deal increasingly unlikely

In 2015, Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany and the European Union. This deal allowed it to pursue a civilian nuclear program with certain restrictions on its critical nuclear facilities. In exchange, the US and its allies agreed to lift sanctions on Iran.

However, the US withdrew from the deal under then president Donald Trump in 2018 and reimposed sanctions on Iran. Since then, Iran has barred several international inspectors from monitoring some of its nuclear sites.

It is now believed to be just weeks away from producing enough weapons-grade material to build a bomb.

In this 2019 file photo, then-President Donald Trump holds up a signed executive order to increase sanctions on Iran.
Alex Brandon/AP

Efforts to revive the nuclear negotiations have not gone far in recent years, though Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has suggested his government would be willing to engage again with the West and resume the talks.

Yet, if Israel carries out an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities in retaliation for last week’s missile attack, as has been speculated, Iran may deem it necessary to opt for the weaponisation of its nuclear program instead.

If Iran declares a military nuclear program, it would do so with the expressed intention of restoring a deterrence balance with Israel that could prevent a full-scale war. Israel is believed to possess nuclear weapons, but has never confirmed it.

However, such a decision is likely to have dire implications for both Iran and the region.

It would undoubtedly lead to more international pressure and US sanctions on Iran, making it even more isolated. And it could spark a nuclear arms race in the region, as Saudi Arabia has already pledged to pursue a nuclear arsenal if Iran develops one. Läs mer…