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The Nuer are a large pastoralist community living in western Ethiopia and South Sudan in east Africa. They rely on livestock keeping and have special beliefs and customs about how to live with nature. These are passed down from parents to children through the telling of stories.

Uncommonly for east African pastoralists, the Nuer live in an expansive, low-lying floodplain. This Gambella region is shaped by the convergence of several rivers originating in the Ethiopian highlands. Its wetlands and lush greenery offer a unique habitat that supports both the Nuer and a wide variety of birds and other wildlife. The people have a centuries-old cultural connection with the local biodiversity.

The Nuer are cattle herders who live in a region with many rivers.
Peter Martell/AFP/Getty Images

Our collaborative study involved Ethiopian and European scientists from diverse fields (such as ornithology, ethno-ornithology, biodiversity and nature conservation). We conducted interviews and 15 group discussions with Nuer people to understand their interaction with and knowledge of birds. The study included two districts and 400 households. We found a significant and seldom studied relationship with birds, which serve a range of purposes in Nuer life.

Our study not only highlights the deep spiritual and cultural ties between the Nuer people and the avian world. It also underscores the importance of incorporating traditional ecological knowledge into contemporary conservation efforts.

The Nuer’s relationship to birds can be a valuable model for sustainable human-wildlife interactions. It can contribute to the conservation of bird diversity and promote a more harmonious coexistence between humans and nature.

The role of birds in Nuer life

Ethiopia, known for its rich biodiversity, is home to 821 bird species and over 80 indigenous ethnic groups. Among these, the Nuer community stands out for its unique admiration of birds, viewing them as sacred beings.

The Nuer use three interchangeable names for birds: gaatkuoth (sacred children of God), kuoth (bearers of spirit), and diit (symbols of human twins). These terms reflect spiritual beliefs and also influence cultural practices, such as naming twins after birds. This Nuer tradition connects the prolific nature of birds to human fertility.

In our study, participants recognised 71 bird species as having unique cultural roles. The birds that live near Nuer villages have seven distinct uses. Ten species are used as bushmeat. Five are for traditional medicine. Eight are fish indicators – by meticulously observing species like the African fish eagle, African pygmy kingfisher, pied kingfisher or malachite kingfisher, people can identify areas with high fish populations.

A flock of birds fly from the branches of trees in South Sudan.
Ashraf Shazly/AFP/Getty Images

Seven birds serve as omens – they signal potential dangers like the presence of wild animals. Three are used to create protective amulets. Three are used to indicate the change of seasons – for instance the return of migratory western yellow wagtails is a reliable sign that the sunny, dry season will be replacing the rainy, wet season. And 45 are hailed for their aesthetic beauty, often linked with a sense of place. The vibrant plumage, melodious songs and elegant flight patterns of birds like the black-crowned crane, blue-naped mousebird and purple heron create a spectacle that significantly enhances Nuer life.

This intricate knowledge of birds is communal: over 90% of participants agreed on the uses of these bird species.

Indigenous knowledge and sustainability

One of the most striking things about the Nuer community is the sustainable practice embedded within their traditional systems. When birds are used as amulets, for example, only small, non-invasive parts of the bird, like feathers, are utilised. These are fashioned into necklaces or bracelets believed to offer protection from dangers like diseases. The birds are not killed or significantly harmed, which preserves their populations.

A Nuer village.
fabio lamanna/Getty

There are strict limits on when and how birds can be used in Nuer society. The use of birds as bushmeat or for making traditional medicine is carefully controlled by elders and within family structures. Hunting is typically allowed only during severe food shortages. It’s often restricted to those in dire need, such as impoverished households. Families with a history of twins, who hold birds in special reverence, are not allowed to hunt them.

These cultural practices help prevent overexploitation of bird species, conserving them for future generations. They ensure that the use of natural resources remains sustainable.

It’s important to raise awareness about the conservation of birds, which are used for various purposes across Africa. Traditional medicine, bushmeat and the making of amulets has a direct impact on bird populations.

Nuer traditions balance human needs with the preservation of bird life. Our study therefore offers a compelling case and model for the conservation of avian and indigenous cultural diversity in Africa.

Why this matters

It is, however, essential to acknowledge that the Nuer’s cultural practices are not immune to the pressures of modern society. As globalisation and development continue to encroach on traditional lands, the Nuer people will face increasing challenges in maintaining their sustainable practices.

Threats such as habitat loss, climate change and illegal wildlife trading could jeopardise bird populations. In recent decades, the expansion of large-scale agriculture in the Gambella region has emerged as a driver of habitat loss and wildlife decline.

A Nuer boy watches a flock of migrating birds.
Peter Martell/AFP/Getty Images

This makes the Nuer people’s traditional conservation practices even more relevant to future generations. By recognising and valuing their knowledge and practices, we can learn valuable lessons for broader conservation efforts.

Indigenous territories, despite their relatively small size, often harbour extraordinary biodiversity. Recognising this, the United Nations’ Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework places indigenous-occupied areas among conservation priority areas at the forefront of biodiversity preservation strategies.

It is crucial to help the Nuer community adapt to changing circumstances while preserving their cultural heritage and ensuring the sustainability of bird biodiversity.

Changkuoth Puok Diet, a lecturer at Gambella University in Ethiopia, contributed to this article. Läs mer…

The incoming president of Mozambique faces an array of interconnected problems deeply rooted in historical, socioeconomic and political dynamics. He must balance meeting immediate needs with long-term structural change.

The 9 October 2024 general election was Mozambique’s seventh since multiparty elections were introduced in 1994. The results are expected to be announced within two weeks from the poll date. International media reports indicate that the ruling Frelimo and its presidential candidate Daniel Chapo are poised for a landslide victory.

This is likely to be confirmed by the electoral commission even though local media have pointed to widespread and brazen ballot stuffing and fake observers, among other irregularities, in favour of Frelimo.

Frelimo has been in power since independence in 1975.

Can the resource-rich but impoverished nation of 35 million expect a redirection of policies and strategies under Chapo to address its multifaceted crises?

Chapo (47) was born after independence and promises to act with integrity. But the old guard placed him in power to protect and promote their interests.

Mozambique’s crises stem largely from systemic corruption under Frelimo. It has prioritised political elites over national welfare. Its decades of mismanagement, embezzlement and patronage have left institutions weak and unable to address pressing social and economic issues.

The country is fragmented. The government has neglected the development of inclusive, accountable governance and equitable infrastructure. Regional disparities are the result. This is especially so in Cabo Delgado province, where disenfranchised citizens have become vulnerable to extremist groups.

This lack of unity and long-term planning has created a fragile state unable to withstand mounting internal and external pressures.

As a Mozambican social scientist and human rights specialist, I have spent my adult life wrestling with my country’s complex economic, social, cultural and political dynamics.

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Mozambique stands at a critical point. The new president must confront the deep-rooted challenges with determination and comprehensive reforms.

In my view, the new leader faces nine key challenges. These are a deep economic crisis, an Islamic insurgency in the north, climate change, drug trafficking, unemployment, corruption, poor infrastructure, kidnappings and unpaid public sector salaries.

Economic crisis

Mozambique’s economy has deteriorated, primarily because of structural imbalances and a dependence on extractive industries. GDP growth has declined sharply, from 7% in 2014 to 1.8% in 2023.

Slower growth has resulted in over 62% of Mozambicans living in poverty.

A public debt crisis was worsened by the “hidden debt scandal”: the discovery in 2016 of US$2 billion in previously undisclosed debts the government had guaranteed without the knowledge of parliament.

This has limited the state’s capacity to invest in education, health and sanitation.

Economic revival must be accompanied by targeted interventions to promote inclusive growth. All Mozambicans must benefit from economic activities to alleviate poverty.

Insurgency

Since 2017, extremist groups have used local grievances and regional disenfranchisement to destabilise northern Mozambique. Over 4,000 people have died. Nearly a million have been displaced.

The conflict is rooted in socio-economic inequalities, made worse by the extraction of natural gas and rubies. Global and local actors compete for control.

The new president’s role in mediating this crisis requires nuance. He must address the historical marginalisation of Cabo Delgado while balancing military and developmental responses.

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He must also write a new chapter in the country’s deplorable human rights record. This is marked by widespread violations of the right to life, physical integrity, freedom from arbitrary detention, and freedoms of expression, assembly and the press.

Climate change crisis

Climate change intersects with Mozambique’s vulnerabilities. The country has been repeatedly struck by increasingly devastating severe cyclones, such as Idai and Kenneth in 2019.

Deforestation has made it more fragile, reducing its capacity to mitigate flood and erosion risks.

The new president will need to put in place policies that incorporate mitigation and adaptation strategies. He will also need to secure multilateral cooperation.

Drug trafficking

Drug trafficking networks have entrenched themselves. Porous borders, weak governance structures and endemic corruption have made Mozambique a corridor for heroin and cocaine trafficking.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that US$100 million worth of heroin passes through Mozambique annually. This fuels informal economies that sustain political patronage networks.

Tackling the problem requires stronger state institutions. It also requires regional and global collaboration to disrupt the transnational flow of narcotics.

Unemployment

Joblessness stands at over 70%, affecting youth in particular. Youth disenfranchisement risks perpetuating cycles of poverty, social instability and potential radicalisation.

Policies promoting vocational training and entrepreneurship are essential. So is investment in labour-intensive sectors, such as agriculture and manufacturing.

Corruption

Pervasive corruption erodes public trust and stifles economic innovation. New efforts to combat corruption must go beyond superficial reforms. They must uproot the power structures that sustain these systems.

Poor infrastructure

Infrastructure is in disrepair. Urban roads are crumbling, public services are inadequate and electricity blackouts are frequent. Rural regions lack basic services such as clean water and healthcare.

The next president will need to launch an ambitious infrastructure overhaul to improve living conditions and stimulate economic growth.

Kidnappings

Kidnappings, especially targeting the wealthy and business people, have created widespread fear and instability. The crime disrupts business operations and deters foreign investment, further harming economic growth.

The high-profile nature of kidnappings suggests collusion between criminal networks and law enforcement as well as inefficiencies in the justice system.

The persistence of kidnappings reflects broader governance issues. These include limited state capacity to respond effectively to organised crime.

Unpaid public servants

Delays in salary payments for public servants have worsened economic and social problems. The delays reduce public workers’ purchasing power. This has affected household consumption and local economies.

Morale among employees is sapped, harming productivity and eroding trust in government institutions.

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The new president must make public sector reforms. This includes auditing finances, improving revenue collection, enforcing fiscal discipline, promoting merit-based appointments, implementing probity laws, strengthening anti-corruption bodies, and diversifying the economy.

The future of Mozambique rests on the ability of its next leader to address these profound and intertwined crises. It’s a huge task.

Whoever it is will have to break from the Frelimo mould, reverse the damage done and set the country on a new path of clean governance, peace and inclusive economic growth. Läs mer…

Nigerians took to the streets in August 2024 to voice their frustration at a series of government policies. These policies had been ostensibly designed to make Nigeria more attractive for outside investment.

The removal of fuel subsidies and the removal of the economic peg between the Nigerian naira and the US dollar have sent the Nigerian economy into a tailspin.

Many Nigerians rely on government subsidies to make ends meet. The economic policy changes have resulted in a big rise in inflation, adding to the challenges for ordinary Nigerians.

As economic conditions have worsened, the prominence of government corruption has risen. Protests and riots have exploded in the streets across the country in the form of #EndBadGovernance protests that call out government graft and poor governance.

Does government corruption drive protests and social movements? While some scholars have argued that it does, others have argued that corruption is often a catch-all term for frustration over broad economic and democratic grievances. Others have noted that in some cases, increased perceptions of corruption correlate with less protest.

These contradictory results reveal an important puzzle: why does corruption only sometimes seem to generate mass uprisings? If, for example, corruption is enough to generate citizen uprisings, then why do we only rarely see unified anti-police protests in countries like Nigeria, where police corruption is rampant?

I argue that one key to this puzzle is the way different types of corruption are associated with increased or decreased protest mobilisation.

I am a political scientist whose work focuses in part on African social movements and issues of corruption. I approach this by merging large statistical models with political psychological approaches.

I conducted research in 2021 on different types of corruption shaping protests. I found that elite corruption had the power to mobilise protest. But that other forms of corruption – such as corruption in the police force – were less likely to lead people to take protest action.

The implication of my findings is that anti-corruption protests are an imperfect signal for understanding everyday corruption experiences. The fact that people aren’t protesting doesn’t mean there’s nothing to complain about.

Why elite corruption sparks protest

To explain why corruption sometimes corresponds with protest movements and other times does not, I think it is useful to consider two types of corruption. Elite corruption refers to forms of graft and venality performed by political elites who seek to either enrich themselves or reshape the political system to their advantage.

Police corruption refers to acts of self-enrichment or abuse perpetrated by police officers, often during traffic stops or in the process of police procedure.

My findings show that citizens are generally more likely to mobilise in response to elite corruption than police corruption. Why?

First, elite corruption tends to be intertwined with macro-level economic crises and scandals.

Second, elite corruption provides a universal point of focus for protesters across an entire nation, rather than the highly localised experiences of police and bureaucratic graft.

Finally, anger over police corruption may be suppressed by the safety concerns associated with demonstrating against armed security forces.

I tested this argument using two methods. First, drawing from a 2017 household survey experiment that I conducted in five Nigerian states, I examined whether exposure to vignettes describing either elite corruption or police corruption shaped a respondent’s self-reported willingness to participate in a protest.

The elite corruption vignettes included self-dealing and system-changing forms of corruption perpetrated by political elites. The police corruption vignette focused on the solicitation of bribes and unfair detention of citizens by the police. I then asked respondents:

Many Nigerians join groups that engage in protests, strikes, or demonstrations. Now I would like to ask you about how willing you would be to join a protest or demonstration.

Respondents were able to select a response between 1 (“not at all willing”) to 5 (“very willing / I already do”).

I found that individuals who received the elite corruption vignette were statistically more likely to state that they would join a protest or demonstration.

I then expanded this analysis via a statistical regression that measured whether perceptions of elite and police corruption (sourced from the Afrobarometer dataset) correlated with different levels of observed conflict (sourced from the Social Conflict Analysis Database).

I thought it was best to test whether the results of my survey experiment, which capture a moment in time, reflected a broader reality, or whether it was just a fluke.

Using the Afrobarometer data, I identified regions where citizens expressed particularly high or low perceptions of elite and police corruption. Then, using the social conflict analysis data, I measured the number of protest events in those regions.

I found that while elite corruption perceptions were positively correlated with an increased number of observed protest events, police corruption perceptions were not.

Together, these methods suggest that it is not enough to argue that citizens will rise up against corrupt governments. Rather, the ways in which a government is corrupt matter.

Turning back to the August 2024 protests, one might ask: why now? Why did Nigerians spend ten days protesting against corruption when there had been rampant corruption for so long?

My research suggests that the nature of the corruption claims – specifically, anger over large-scale government graft – is what counts.

Recent developments seem to support this.

What’s changed

First, corruption perceptions have spiked. In 2021, Afrobarometer polled 1,600 Nigerians, asking them whether levels of corruption had risen, stayed the same, or decreased in the past year. At the time, just over 35% stated that corruption had “increased a lot”. One year later, that number had nearly doubled, jumping to just under 65%.

This drastic increase in perceived corruption reveals a broader lack of faith in the government and concern over the future of the country.

Second, tipping points help with mobilisation. The protests in early August arose as the financial crisis crystallised and as a series of economic policies brought into sharp relief the economic disparities between the rich and the poor.

The removal of fuel subsidies is a particularly touchy subject in Nigerian politics. In 2012, Nigerians took to the streets over the same issue, leading to a week-long “occupation” of major Nigerian cities by protesters.

Implications

Protests are a highly visible signal that citizens are frustrated; however, it is easy to overlook the possibility that citizens may be widely upset about a broad array of issues, but only willing to speak out in response to some of those issues.

There is a knock-on consequence to this; namely, that police corruption has a more direct effect on the lives of Nigerians than elite corruption, but often goes unaddressed. Läs mer…

Gangs and gang members arguably constitute fundamental lenses through which to think about and consider the world we live in. They need to be understood in a balanced and nuanced manner, however, that goes beyond stereotyping and vilification. For the past five years, the GANGS project, a European Research Council-funded project led by Dennis Rodgers, has been studying global gang dynamics.

Among the project’s various activities, researchers collected 31 gang member life histories from 23 countries around the world, to help us better understand the motivations, drivers, and events that can shape gang members’ choices and trajectories. Taken together, the stories offer a panorama of triumph and defeat, of ruin and redemption, of discrimination and emancipation, and highlight the frequent persistence of human beings, even in the most difficult of circumstances. The 31 stories will be published in different forms – including as an Open Access edited volume with Bloomsbury Press, and in two journal special issues – over the coming years. In the meantime, this special series for The Conversation offers a preliminary selection, each illustrating a key issue that has emerged from GANGS project research.

Kieran Mitton tells us about the life of Gaz, a former Sierra Leonean gang member who became a poet and then a farmer. His remarkable trajectory is a testament to the way that gangster lives are by no means deterministic and that opportunities to leave the gang and change can present themselves in all sorts of ways at different moments in time.

Ellen Van Damme offers us a portrait of Jennifer, the first female Honduran gang leader. Her story illustrates the frequently gendered nature of gangs, and the way that machismo and patriarchy constrain Jennifer’s life, even as a gang leader, highlighting the frequently fundamentally masculine essence of street gangs.

Sally Atkinson-Sheppard worked closely with Sharif, who 10 years ago was her research assistant, to write the story of his journey from gang member in war-torn Bangladesh to human rights worker and advocate for street children’s rights today. His story is one of overcoming exceptional adversity and drawing on his past experiences to do good in the world today.

Steffen Jensen recounts the story of Marwan, whose life is in many ways a reflection of contemporary South African history, as he has had to navigate the violence of apartheid, prison, the Cape Flat drug wars, and more. Central to his narrative are the binary notions of damnation and redemption, with gangs frequently the sources of both at different points in his life, highlighting the different ways in which they can influence life trajectories.

Alistair Fraser and Angela Bartie present a portrait of 70-year-old Danny, a retired Glaswegian businessman who was a gang member in his youth, and that is based, uniquely, on interviews carried out over a 50-year period, in 1969, 2011, and 2022. They trace his changing self-reflexion about his past, highlighting how this mirrors the broader transformation of Glasgow from a “Mean City” in the 1950s to a thriving metropolis that was Europe’s Capital of Culture in 1990.

From a very young age, Soraya was involved in drug trafficking in the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, a poor neighbourhood in Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, where Dennis Rodgers has worked for over 20 years. Known locally as “la Reina del Sur” (“the Queen of the South”), her story shows how rather than being empowering, her participation in the drugs trade reinforced forms of macho violence and patriarchal dynamics of domination. Läs mer…

It may sound far-fetched, but the future of global technology supremacy could hinge on a video game.

Black Myth: Wukong, China’s latest blockbuster, isn’t just breaking gaming records – it could be driving a critical shift in the global balance of technological power. What seems like just another action-packed video game is, in reality, a vital component in Beijing’s larger strategy to challenge Western dominance in the tech industry.

The game, released by Chinese company Game Science on Aug. 19, 2024, is based on the legendary 16th century Chinese novel “Journey to the West.” The novel tells the story of a monk, Xuanzang, who journeys to India in search of Buddhist scrolls. The monkey Sun Wukong protects the monk by confronting and battling various demons and spirits.

Black Myth: Wukong has captivated millions with its stunning visuals and storytelling. It quickly became a cultural sensation in China and abroad, attracting widespread attention and praise for its graphic fidelity and technological sophistication.

As global affairs scholars, we see that the game’s success goes beyond the number of downloads or accolades. It’s what this success is driving within China’s technology sector that has far-reaching consequences.

Video games and global power

For years, China has been playing catch-up in the tech race, particularly in the production of semiconductors – the tiny microchips that power everything from smartphones to advanced artificial intelligence systems. The United States has maintained its dominance in this field by limiting China’s access to the most advanced chip-making technology.

As of 2024, China has shifted away from its aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomacy to a more cooperative approach in order to rebuild international ties. The government has also issued mandates for companies like Huawei to develop domestic chips. However, China’s success in boosting semiconductor development and production using these approaches has been limited.

Historically, video games have played a significant role in driving technological innovation in the semiconductor industry. From the early days of the 8-bit Nintendo Entertainment System to the modern PlayStation 5, gaming has always pushed chipmakers to develop faster, more efficient processors and graphics processing units, or GPUs. The intense graphical requirements of modern games – high resolutions, faster frame rates and real-time rendering – demand the most advanced semiconductor technology. The development of advanced GPUs by companies like NVIDIA was directly influenced by the gaming industry’s needs.

Gamers require advanced processors to enjoy Black Myth: Wukong’s high-end visual and gameplay experience. Built using the state-of-the-art Unreal Engine 5 video game development tool, the game is a visual spectacle featuring lifelike graphics, seamless open-world environments and complex combat systems. The game is available for PlayStation 5 and PCs, and Game Science plans to release an Xbox version.

Black Myth: Wukong features rich visuals and intricate gameplay.
Courtesy of Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC

As Black Myth: Wukong sweeps across gaming platforms, it not only puts pressure on China’s semiconductor makers to build more and better chips, but it also reveals the vast market potential for high-performance hardware, especially for gaming PCs equipped with powerful GPUs. The game’s success showcases just how big the demand is.

Market analysts expect the Chinese video game industry to reach revenues of US$66.13 billion in 2024, compared with $78.01 billion in the U.S. Analysts predict the game will have annual sales of 30 million to 40 million copies in 2024.

China’s gaming industry has surged into a global powerhouse, yet it remains dependent on foreign-made chips. Coupled with the West’s restrictions on chip exports, Wukong has become a key catalyst for China’s semiconductor development, and domestic companies now face growing pressure to innovate.

This pressure aligns with Beijing’s broader technological ambitions. The government’s “Made in China 2025” plan calls for technological self-reliance, particularly in sectors like semiconductors, where China lags behind. And advanced GPUs haven’t been confined to the entertainment industry. They have become integral to advances in AI, including deep learning and autonomous systems.

Flexing China’s cultural muscle

While it might seem strange to link video games with geopolitics, Black Myth: Wukong is more than just entertainment. It’s a tool in China’s soft power arsenal. Soft power is nations influencing each other through cultural exports. For decades, the West, particularly the U.S., dominated global culture through Hollywood, music and video games.

Now, China is flexing its cultural muscle. The success of Black Myth: Wukong abroad, where it has been hailed as a game-changing title, is part of Beijing’s strategy to export its culture and technological prowess. Millions of gamers around the world are now being exposed to Chinese mythology, art and storytelling through a highly sophisticated digital medium.

‘China Stay Winning’ American YouTubers react enthusiastically to Black Myth: Wukong. (Audio NSFW)

But Black Myth: Wukong isn’t just a cultural triumph for China; it’s a warning shot. The country is taking advantage of its booming gaming industry to drive advances in a field that will define the future of technology. This game not only exports Chinese culture but also strengthens its tech base by accelerating the demand for domestic semiconductors.

While Black Myth: Wukong entertains millions, it also shows China’s growing influence in the digital realm. In the future, we might not look back at Black Myth: Wukong as just a successful video game, but as a catalyst that helped China close the technological gap with the West. Beijing is playing a long game, and video games like Black Myth: Wukong are turning out to be effective weapons. Läs mer…

If you live anywhere near New York – or anywhere in the world, really – you may have seen a picture of Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson. Yellow posters of the rabbi’s face are stuck to lampposts or streetlights: an elderly man with a long white beard and black hat.

For tens of thousands of ultra-Orthodox Jews, Schneerson is simply “the rebbe”: the leader of the Chabad-Lubavitch movement, even though he died in 1994. The name “Chabad” is familiar to many Americans, but the actual beliefs of this Hasidic group rarely are.

As someone who was raised in a Lubavitch community and became a scholar of sociology and Jewish studies, I am often asked what sets it apart from other Orthodox streams of Judaism.

Mystic teachings, joyful prayer

Hasidism began under the leadership of the 18th-century mystic and healer Israel ben Eliezer, known as the Baal Shem Tov. Instead of focusing on the Bible and Jewish law, the movement prioritized attaching oneself to God through joyful prayer and passionate devotion.

The Lubavitch sect of Hasidism was founded in the late 1700s by Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi, the author of the Tanya – a theological text and self-improvement manual still studied daily by Lubavitchers. For over a hundred years, the movement was based in the rural town of Lyubavichi, Russia, from which it derives its name.

Lubavitch headquarters in Brooklyn, which many followers call ‘770.’
Sagtkd/Wikimedia Commons

Since 1940, however, Lubavitch has been based in Crown Heights, Brooklyn. The headquarters there at 770 Eastern Parkway are simply referred to as “770” by Lubavitchers the world over, who imbue the red brick building with mystical symbolism.

Lubavitch, also known by the name “Chabad,” is one of the largest Hasidic groups today, with an estimated 90,000 members.

Lubavitch shares many things in common with all streams of Orthodox Judaism, including a commitment to strictly abiding by “halacha” – Jewish law and customs. The group also shares a great deal with other ultra-Orthodox communities, such as opposition to providing their children with secular education.

Yet there are key features of Lubavitch that distinguish it – particularly how much it engages with non-Orthodox Jews.

The rebbe

All Hasidic sects have a leader, a “rebbe,” who is believed to possess unique spiritual gifts and connect his followers to the divine. Still, Lubavitch is distinct in terms of the extent to which the rebbe is central to the lives of every single member of the community.

In 1951, Schneerson accepted leadership of the Lubavitchers after the passing of his father-in-law and grew the movement exponentially until his passing in 1994. Rather than naming a successor, however, Lubavitchers have continued to regard Schneerson as “the rebbe.”

With his piercing blue eyes, full white beard, black fedora and silk coat, images of Schneerson are ubiquitous among Lubavitchers. Photos and paintings of him adorn walls, key chains, clocks and charity boxes wherever they live.

A baby clutches a photo of Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson during a holiday celebration in front of the Chabad Lubavitch headquarters in Brooklyn.
AP Photo/Mark Lennihan

While the rebbe was alive, his followers would ask him for advice and blessings regarding all spiritual matters, as well as questions about health, business and marriage. Since his passing, followers continue to seek his blessings by placing notes at his gravesite and searching his printed works for guidance.

Even among Lubavitchers who have left the fold, many still feel attached to its leader.

Jewish outreach

One expression of Lubavitchers’ devotion is their commitment to creating Jewish outreach centers all over the world.

The ethos of sharing Hasidic thought was present from the founding of the Lubavitch movement. This drive became much more developed, however, during and after the Holocaust and continued under Schneerson’s leadership.

Today, Lubavitch has established Jewish outposts, called “Chabad Houses,” from Melbourne to Hong Kong and Buenos Aires to Cape Town. These emissaries endeavor to reach out to secular Jews and inspire them to become more religiously observant.

Members of Chabad participate in a Fourth of July parade in Santa Monica, Calif.
AP Photo/Richard Vogel

The language surrounding Lubavitch outreach often has a militaristic flavor – for example, its youth movement is named the “Army of God”: Tzivos Ha-Shem, in Hebrew. However, outreach is rooted in the commandment to love one’s fellow Jew and a desire to help them enjoy the Jewish tradition. It is also motivated by a belief that these efforts will help fulfill the biblical prophecy of a Jewish messiah, who will usher in a time of global peace.

These two motivations fortify the nearly 5,000 emissaries sent to far-flung communities around the world, notwithstanding profound obstacles. These include being separated from their families, who tend to live in established Hasidic communities, and being vulnerable to antisemitic attacks.

Messianism

The most distinct aspect of contemporary Lubavitch is its enthusiasm for the coming of the messiah and its assertion that Schneerson is that long-awaited messiah, despite his death.

Messianic hopes and people claiming to be the messiah have appeared at various points throughout Jewish history, often during periods of crisis. In the wake of the devastation of the Holocaust, however, Schneerson made the idea of the messiah’s coming integral to every aspect of Jewish life.

Eventually, most followers came to believe that Schneerson was the righteous redeemer sent by God to usher in the messianic age. While Schneerson did not embrace these proclamations, he insisted that through additional acts of goodness and kindness it was possible to bring about the messianic redemption.

While some outsiders criticized this emphasis, especially claims about the rebbe, the situation became much more fraught after he passed away in 1994. In response to this trauma, a split developed in Lubavitch.

Praying men leave notes seeking guidance and blessings at the grave site of Menachem Mendel Schneerson.
Bentzi Sasson via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

One camp, composed largely of those involved in outreach work and members of long-standing Lubavitch families, argued Lubavitch should stop publicly talking about Schneerson being the messiah since it scared away outsiders. The other camp, largely composed of those who joined the community as adults, claimed that he was still the messiah and was about to return, and that it was vital to tell the world.

To some other Jews, this belief seemed suspiciously close to Christian faith in the second coming of Jesus. Still, many Lubavitchers persist in their messianic beliefs.

The future

This issue still divides some Lubavitchers. Nonetheless, since Schneerson’s passing three decades ago, the movement has increased in size and strength.

The group’s cohesiveness has been aided by creative uses of technology to foster a sense of the rebbe’s continued presence in their lives. For example, the Jewish Educational Media organization regularly produces videos that splice footage of his talks with current visuals to make him feel present in the moment. Lubavitchers have reinterpreted Hasidic texts to fit their current predicament, helping them feel grounded despite his physical absence.

While the precise future of Lubavitch is unknown, the fact that it has managed to weather the storm of the rebbe’s passing and emerged stronger gives his followers hope for the future. Läs mer…

The escalation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah since September 2024, and Israel’s bombing of civilian areas across Lebanon, have unleashed a profound humanitarian disaster.

The mass displacement of over 1 million people, including Lebanese citizens, migrant workers and Syrian and Palestinian refugees, has created a crisis within Lebanon. Yet an equally significant phenomenon is occurring away from Lebanon’s southern border with Israel: the movement of people who have been displaced within Lebanon into Syria.

An estimated 400,000 Lebanese and Syrians have reportedly fled into Syria through overcrowded border crossings.

Not to be confused with return, this movement represents a reversal of the refugee flow that followed the descent of Syria into civil war in 2011. It is also emblematic of a broader pattern of cyclical displacement crises in the region.

The complex and intertwined histories of Lebanon and Syria – where each has at various points been a refuge for citizens of the other – challenge the simple binaries often associated with the refugee experience.

The exchange of roles between Lebanon and Syria highlights not only the fragility of regional stability but the fluidity of displacement – and the deeper implications that cross-border movement has on the sociopolitical dynamics of both countries.

A history of reciprocal refuge

The relationship between Lebanon and Syria has long been complex, oscillating between cooperation and tension. Despite Syria’s official withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 after decades as an occupying force, the two countries remain connected due to shared borders, economic ties and security concerns. Cooperation exists in areas such as trade, but there is significant tension, especially over the presence of over 1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

Yet, throughout their modern histories, one of the most enduring bonds has been the shared experiences of displacement and refuge, dating back to Lebanon’s civil war. From 1975 to 1990, thousands of Lebanese fled to Syria to escape the sectarian-driven conflict that engulfed their homeland.

The post-war period, however, was marked by a shift in the dynamics between the two countries. The 2005 withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon marked a new chapter in their relations.

Tensions rose as Lebanon sought to rebuild and assert its sovereignty after nearly 30 years of Syrian occupation. Yet, the region’s tendency for upheaval soon saw the roles reversed again decades later, when an estimated 180,000 Lebanese took refuge in Syria during the 2006 July war.

With the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011, it was Lebanon’s turn to serve as a refuge. By 2015, 1 million Syrians fleeing violence made the journey into Lebanon.

Despite being one of the 44 countries never to have signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, Lebanon is the country hosting the largest number of refugees per capita globally.

Because Lebanon didn’t sign the convention, it doesn’t formally recognize refugee status, which gives the country what it views as more control over its refugee policies. While Lebanon receives humanitarian support from the United Nations’ refugee agency, refugees remain in a precarious legal status, with limited rights.

For many Lebanese, this most recent influx of fleeing Syrian refugees has rekindled memories of their own displacement, while for others, it has fueled anti-refugee sentiments.

Bouncing between 2 war-torn countries

With the latest escalation of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, history is again repeating itself. Lebanese citizens, primarily from Hezbollah strongholds in South Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley, are seeking refuge in Syria, a country still grappling with its own economic collapse, violence and internal strife.

While the conflict on Lebanese territory has gone on for more than a year, movements into Syria only picked up in late September 2024 as people have become more desperate to flee.

As one displaced person forced to flee from Beirut explained to me: “Syria was certainly not a ‘better’ option than Lebanon six months ago, but in the last week, since the attacks on Beirut and political assassinations, Syria is safer – despite everything it is going through. That’s how unsafe we feel in Beirut – we are bouncing between one war-torn country and another.”

Implications for refugee-host dynamics

The cyclical nature of displacement between Lebanon and Syria overturns the prevailing political narrative of host-refugee dynamics being fixed and unidirectional.

Syrian displacement to Lebanon has been portrayed by some Lebanese politicians as one-directional. This appears to be in order to frame Syrian refugees as the sole recipients of aid – as opposed to Lebanese citizens – as well as burdens on Lebanon.

When displacement occurs in both directions, however, this narrative begins to break down.

Syrian refugees who once sought safety in Lebanon now see their home country as a safer haven – albeit a fragile and temporary one. Meanwhile, Lebanese citizens face the same kinds of vulnerability and desperation that their Syrian counterparts experienced over the past decade.

Importantly, testimonies from those who are making the trip from their ‘temporary’ home in Lebanon back to Syria highlight that these movements should not be mistaken for return. Rather, they are in themselves a temporary solution.

As one Syrian who had fled his Lebanese home explained to me: “No, I am not returning. I am rather leaving one foot in Lebanon and one in Syria. Syria is in no way a safe place. As men, we are at risk of arrest and forced conscription. However, Lebanon is momentarily, at this point in history, much less safe. We do this assessment week by week. I sent my wife and my children first. I will follow.”

For their part, internally displaced Lebanese entering into Syria insist that these movements are “absolutely temporary.” One told me: “Syria is not foreign to us. It feels close and familiar. But most importantly, it feels temporary and is the right proximity to Lebanon. As soon as things calm down we will come back to our homes. Many of us have nothing to go back to, but even in this case, we will not remain in Syria.”

The strain of displacement

Both Lebanon and Syria are, in many ways, ill-equipped to handle the new wave of displacement.

Syrian children at a refugee camp in Lebanon’s frontier town of Arsal on Feb. 18, 2014.
Ratib Al Safadi/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

By 2023, Lebanon’s economic collapse had driven 80% of its population into poverty, making it nearly impossible to absorb the additional strain of mass internal displacement.

Government paralysis, compounded by political deadlock, leaves internally displaced people with little to no state support, mostly relying on aid and community networks to survive.

Syria, though in the position of “host” in this current migratory flow, is similarly constrained. The country’s infrastructure remains devastated from more than a decade of civil war. Basic services are stretched thin, and the economy has not recovered. Humanitarian organizations coordinating the response are working amid overextended resources and dwindling support.

A region in perpetual chaos

As the armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah escalates, the displacement crisis in Lebanon and Syria will, I fear, likely worsen.

The recent wave of Syrian refugees and Lebanese into Syria reveals the cyclical nature of refuge in the region. Ultimately, the ongoing displacement crisis in Lebanon and Syria serves as a reminder that refuge is often temporary, contingent on the shifting geopolitics of the region.

The histories of these two countries, where both have served as havens for the other’s displaced populations, underscore the complexity of displacement in the Middle East.

The fact that Lebanese citizens are now seeking shelter in Syria, a country from which over 1 million refugees fled just over a decade ago, underscores the volatility of regional displacement patterns. It also raises critical questions about the sustainability of international refugee systems that too often rely on static, one-directional models of migration and don’t account for the fluid and often reversible nature of displacement. Läs mer…

When you’re a manager, delivering feedback can feel like walking a tightrope. Whether you’re praising an employee’s accomplishments or addressing a shortfall, how you communicate can have a big impact on how your words are received and acted upon.

As business school professors, we’ve done research into how to make the assessment process as painless as possible. And we’ve found three essential strategies for delivering feedback that’s both effective and constructive.

Using these strategies will help you elevate the feedback process, fostering a more positive and productive work environment:

1. Keep your emotions out of it

Have you ever noticed that saying things like “I’m disappointed” or “I’m proud of you” can change a feedback conversation completely? That’s because the language you use – particularly emotionally charged words – can shift how employees interpret the feedback.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, our research shows that using negative emotional language – like “I’m disappointed” – can reduce employee motivation and effort. This happens because employees shift their focus away from their performance and toward how you, the manager, see them as a person.

At the same time, using positive emotional language such as “I’m pleased” can sometimes backfire. That’s because it can make employees feel complacent.

The key takeaway here is that using emotionally neutral language, especially when giving negative feedback, helps employees stay focused on their tasks without getting sidetracked by what the feedback says about them personally.

Instead of saying, “I’m disappointed with your sales numbers,” try a more neutral approach, like “The sales numbers are below the target we set. Let’s discuss some strategies for improvement.”

By keeping a lid on the emotions in your language, you keep the conversation focused on performance. That helps employees better understand what they need to work on, without the additional emotional burden.

2. Let workers customize their experience

Not all employees want the same type of feedback, and that’s perfectly OK. Giving employees the ability to choose the type and frequency of evaluations can boost performance.

Workers who have a say in how often they are evaluated are more likely to use the process productively and feel less micromanaged, our research has found.

Consider creating a feedback menu where employees can select areas for assessment, such as communication skills, leadership development or project management. An additional strategy is to let workers set the frequency of feedback sessions – whether they be weekly check-ins or more comprehensive quarterly reviews.

When employees have ownership over the evaluation they receive, they are more open to it, perceive it as more valuable and are more likely to act on it.

3. Choose the right messenger

Who delivers the feedback can be just as important as the information itself. Our research has shown that some employees respond better to feedback from their peers, while others respond better when it’s from a manager.

Specifically, we found that people with a greater sense of entitlement do better with feedback from a supervisor, while less entitled people respond better to peer feedback.

Some workers respond best to evaluations from their peers, research shows.
Fiordaliso/Getty Images

That’s why it can be a good idea to use personality profiles to determine the best messenger for feedback. For instance, consider situations where a co-worker’s feedback could be reasonably delivered and from whom, like a peer mentor or team lead.

By aligning the feedback source with the content and context, you ensure that the feedback resonates more deeply and is perceived as constructive rather than critical.

Applying the principles in real life

Managers may find that using these three strategies might require adjusting their current feedback approach, but the benefits are worth it. Here’s a quick example of how to apply these strategies:

Imagine you have an employee, Mark, whose performance has recently dropped. In your feedback conversation, you might start with a neutral statement like “Mark, I’ve noticed that your recent projects have been missing their deadlines. Let’s discuss why this might be happening.” This language will help Mark focus on the issue without taking it as a personal attack.

Next, offer Mark the option to set up regular biweekly check-ins or monthly reviews to see what works best for him. Finally, if Mark has a strong rapport with a team member who excels at time management, consider arranging a peer feedback session where they can share tips and strategies.

The result? Mark feels supported rather than scrutinized, and the feedback is framed as an opportunity for growth rather than a reprimand.

As researchers who’ve studied management communication and feedback strategies for years, we know that these approaches can transform the way people interact with their teams. By being intentional about giving feedback, managers can create environments where employees feel respected, valued and motivated to succeed. Läs mer…

Unimaginable pain and restlessness. Vomiting so frequent and forceful that it can perforate the esophagus. Blood pressure and heart rate so high that they damage the heart. Sweating that drenches clothing and sheets. Nerve sensitivity that makes even the softest touch agonizing. A prolonged panic attack that is provoked and worsened by even mundane activities and conversations.

The withdrawal symptoms from “tranq dope” – the combination of the synthetic opioid fentanyl and the animal tranquilizer xylazine that dominates Philadelphia’s street opioids supply – tend to be far worse than those experienced by even the most severe heroin users of the past.

So it’s no surprise that people will do whatever they can to forestall them. That includes walking out of the hospital before their care is complete.

I’m an associate professor of emergency medicine who has spent a decade as an emergency physician working in Center City and South Philadelphia. I’ve spent most of that time directing projects to improve care for people who use drugs.

Beginning in 2022, our team – a group of emergency and addiction physicians – began experimenting with new approaches to treating tranq dope withdrawal.

We were able to reduce the likelihood of these patients leaving the hospital before treatment was complete by more than half – from 10% to just under 4%.

We also reduced the severity of their suffering, lowering their withdrawal scores – or how they rate their pain and other symptoms – by more than half.

Traditional treatments don’t work

Before tranq dope, treating opioid withdrawal in the emergency department was relatively straightforward, with well-studied, conventional protocols.

For patients without chronic pain, health care providers started buprenorphine, known by its brand name Suboxone, when patients showed signs of withdrawal.

Buprenorphine works by partially, rather than fully, stimulating opioid receptors in the body. This subtle difference relieves symptoms of withdrawal but reduces the risk of overdose if patients continue to use other opioids. It quite literally saves lives.

Tranq dope, however, created a much larger set of challenges.

Fentanyl and other synthetic opioids are dozens to hundreds of times more powerful than heroin. Xylazine, meanwhile, adds symptoms of sedative withdrawal to the mix: restlessness, adrenaline activation and agitation.

As synthetic opioids became pervasive in Philadelphia’s drug supply over the past decade, overdose deaths in the city tripled. Those numbers are beginning to decline, for reasons that remain unclear.

Fear of withdrawal can even prevent people with serious medical conditions from going to the hospital.
Jeff Fusco/The Conversation US, CC BY-ND

Meanwhile, tranq users started to share buprenorphine horror stories. They refused the medication due to a phenomenon called “precipitated withdrawal.” Precipitated withdrawal is a condition in which taking buprenorphine paradoxically makes withdrawal symptoms worse, rather than improving them. Due to the severity of their symptoms, some patients who precipitate severely even require treatment in the intensive care unit.

Furthermore, when patients did accept buprenorphine, their withdrawal symptoms were no longer being effectively controlled, even with very high doses. We were adrift.

Patients demand discharge

When people with severe substance use disorders are hospitalized, even compassionate staff members sometimes lose patience.

Being confined to a stretcher in a loud, chaotic environment, in withdrawal, with prior traumatic health care experiences, can lead patients to act out. They might repeatedly hit call bells, use inappropriate language, make impulsive decisions or sneak drugs into the hospital.

This creates a lot of stress for nurses and staff, and distracts from the care of others.

So when patients demand to leave before treatments are complete, exhausted care teams often quickly acquiesce. Traditionally, this was termed leaving “against medical advice,” but is now called “patient-directed discharge.”

Patient-directed discharge is associated with higher rates of mortality, permanent disability and rehospitalization.

Rates of patient-directed discharge can be 10 to 50 times higher in people with an opioid use disorder compared with the general public.

A cycle of mistrust can also form, where the expectation that a patient may leave again leads to a less engaged care team, which in turn can make patients more likely to leave.

At staff meetings, some compared the challenges of caring for these individuals to those experienced in the hardest parts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

New approach needed

Many physicians have been reticent to consider other options for treating opioid withdrawal. I believe there are two key reasons for this. One is the lack of Food and Drug Administration approval for alternative treatments. The other is that federal regulations consider addiction a behavioral rather than medical condition, effectively separating most doctors from the addiction care of these individuals.

As fentanyl and xylazine became ubiquitous in Philadelphia’s street dope, local hospitals reported astronomical rates of patient-directed discharge among these patients. This was happening despite the best efforts of hospital staffs that are deeply experienced in conventional opioid withdrawal treatment.

In 2021, an editorial in the Annals of Internal Medicine journal advocated for the use of short-acting opioids for some patients’ opioid withdrawal – which is already common practice in Canada. Short-acting opioids are medications doctors traditionally use to treat acute pain.

Philadelphia hospitals started experimenting with using these previously verboten medications. That included our team at Jefferson Health.

Overdose deaths in Philadelphia spiked as fentanyl and xylazine became more prevalent.
Jeff Fusco/The Conversation US, CC BY-ND

Oxycodone, hydromorphone and ketamine

By using short-acting opioids such as oxycodone or hydromorphone, combined with a low-dose version of buprenorphine, we prevented precipitated withdrawal and treated opioid withdrawal and pain in our patients.

The low-dose bupenorphine can be increased over time to steady doses. This shows patients that the medication is safe and provides them a bridge to long-term treatment.

The short-acting opioids replace the opioids that their bodies are frantically searching for. They reduce their pain and misery, and are decreased when their symptoms are controlled.

Patients with opioid use disorder will often do whatever they can to stay out of the hospital due to fear of withdrawal. Asking how withdrawal symptoms are managed, therefore, is often their first priority when hospitalized. We see this even when they have conditions that require complicated and time-sensitive treatments.

Owing to the vast amounts of opioids many of our patients use, we also give them additional strong medications, or “adjunctive therapies,” to supplement the effects of the short-acting opioids and low-dose buprenorphine. One is ketamine, an anesthetic that affects nerve impulses and is increasingly being used to treat depression, post-traumatic stress discorder and substance use disorders.

Ketamine is also an effective pain medication that can extend the effects of opioids and reduce the number of doses needed.

We additionally add muscle relaxants – which work similarly to xylazine – along with nausea medications and IV fluids, to help give patients a chance at healing.

Side effects and future problems

In patients who received our medications, the risks of serious side effects were minimal. The few patients who suffered serious adverse effects had other acute medical problems that could have contributed to the side effects. Almost all the side effects we saw were mild and resolved on their own.

As powerful synthetic opioids and other contaminants become pervasive in more U.S. cities, more emergency departments will need to figure out how to care for patients in withdrawal so that they don’t leave treatment.

It is our hope that this work will inspire others to do a better job of providing relief to patients suffering from this complicated and severe condition. Läs mer…

One group of American voters is being largely ignored in the closely watched polling leading up to the Nov. 5 elections: U.S. citizens living abroad, whether as civilians or as members of the military. We know from governmental data that the number of ballots cast by overseas Americans has been greater than the margin of victory in races in the past – and may be again in 2024.

But that one potentially crucial group of American voters – U.S. citizens living abroad – does not get much attention, from pollsters or campaigns.

We are scholars of political science whose research shows that overseas voters can make a difference in elections – and that there is potential for campaigns to mobilize these voters, despite a more complex process of voting than for domestic voters.

Who are overseas Americans?

Though there is not an exact count of American citizens living abroad, we do know they number in the millions. Estimates from the Federal Voter Assistance Program and the Association of Americans Resident Overseas placed this number between 4.4 million and 5.3 million in 2023.

But those are likely undercounts. It’s almost impossible to account fully for dual citizens, naturalized U.S. citizens who have returned to the country of their birth or people who split their time between the U.S. and other countries.

Research that we and others have conducted indicates that Mexico and Canada are home to the largest numbers of Americans outside the U.S., followed by the U.K., France, Israel and Germany. The three most common reasons Americans move abroad are family connections, employment and quality of life, although there are others.

Overseas Americans tend to be highly educated: More than three-quarters have a college degree, double the percentage within the U.S. Most overseas Americans do not move from country to country but rather stay in one country, often for a decade or more. But our surveys have found they remain interested in U.S. politics – not least because they pay U.S. income taxes, whether they work for a U.S. or foreign employer. IRS data shows that the vast majority are not ultra-wealthy.

Voting from abroad

Military members and U.S. citizens living abroad have had the right to vote in federal elections since 1976. This right was further consolidated in the 1986 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, while the right for Americans living abroad to vote in local and state elections depends on state law.

Some people have recently expressed concern that overseas voting could be used to cast fraudulent ballots, but there is no evidence of illegal voting by noncitizens abroad.

Overseas voters’ absentee ballot requests and their returned ballots are carefully scrutinized by local officials in the state where they last lived in the U.S., making abuse very unlikely. But it is complex for overseas voters to vote: The paperwork is complicated, and there is comparatively little outreach from political parties and candidates.

Barriers to voting from overseas

In 2020, the Federal Voting Assistance Program, which is supposed to help overseas voters exercise their voting rights, estimated that just shy of 8% of eligible American voters overseas cast ballots in that year’s presidential election. Using program numbers to calculate a percentage another way finds that no more than 20% of overseas Americans cast ballots in the 2020 election.

That’s far lower than the 67% national turnout rate that year.

Federal law requires local election officials in the U.S. to mail absentee ballots 45 days before an election to overseas Americans who request them. Poor mail service in the U.S. and elsewhere can mean that voters don’t always get the ballots in time, and the ballots mailed back to election officials face similar delays.

Some states allow voters to receive or return their ballots electronically, which is faster; an overseas voter casting a ballot in Massachusetts can request a ballot, receive a blank ballot and return it all by email, while an overseas voter from Pennsylvania must return it by mail or courier, following exact procedures for enclosing their ballot in multiple envelopes.

In 2023, the Federal Voting Assistance Program estimated that as many as 150,000 U.S. citizens overseas did not cast ballots in the 2022 elections because of administrative hurdles, such as slow or irregular mail service and difficulties in communicating procedural changes to prospective voters abroad.

Interest in US politics

Another possible reason Americans abroad don’t vote is that they have lost interest in U.S. politics. But our own research, and the work of others, finds that not to be true.

Even given the logistical challenges, U.S. citizens living in Canada, as one example, have very similar levels of interest in American politics compared with citizens back home.

During the 2020 and 2022 campaign seasons, two of us surveyed American citizens who had moved north of the border. In 2020, 55% indicated they were very interested in American politics, as did 44% in the midterm year of 2022. This is comparable with levels of attention to politics within the U.S. during those campaigns, as gauged by the Cooperative Election Study.

So although Americans in Canada indicated interest levels as high as those in the U.S. during the past two national election cycles, the vast majority of them did not cast a vote. Administrative barriers play a role, but they’re not enough to explain such low turnout among citizens overseas.

Ignored by campaigns

Another key factor driving low turnout from abroad is a lack of communication from campaigns and parties. Research demonstrates that contacts by campaigns and parties significantly increase a person’s likelihood of voting.

In the U.S., parties and campaign organizations can help streamline the voter registration process, reinforce the stakes of an election and bolster a sense of camaraderie among citizens.

U.S. citizens living abroad are unlikely to hear from campaigns, even in nearby Canada. When asked in 2020 or 2022 whether they had been contacted by American political campaigns, most potential voters in the U.S. had. But our surveys of Americans living in Canada show less than one-third reported contact from parties or candidates.

Because overseas citizens vote in their last state of residence in the U.S. but are not physically resident there, campaigns find it harder to identify them as swing-state residents or members of favorable demographic groups.

Overall, Americans living overseas are as eligible to vote as citizens in the U.S. They are as attentive to politics as Americans living in the U.S. On the other hand, they face major administrative hurdles and are generally not contacted by American parties or campaigns. Läs mer…