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Australia’s defence spending is on the rise. The future defence budget has already been increased to 2.4% of GDP. There is pressure from the new Trump administration in the United States to raise this further to at least 3%.

The Albanese government has brought forward A$1 billion in defence spending for the 2025 federal budget. The Coalition in turn has promised to spend even more if elected.

However, it is unclear whether the money will be spent wisely. Our recent research found that current defence planning may leave the Australian Defence Force (ADF) poorly prepared for future conflicts.

To keep up, Australia must develop capabilities for contemporary “grey zone” operations (coercive statecraft activities that blur the line between peace and war, or fall short of war), as well as future 21st-century conflicts. Priority areas are cyber, information and space technologies.

Positive signs and missteps

In the past two years, we have seen a slew of announcements about the current and future capabilities of the ADF.

Some have been positive. A new Defence Space Command has been set up. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review and 2024 Defence Industry Development Strategy were both promising.

There have also been missteps. The MRH90 helicopters have been stood down. A $7 billion military satellite project was cancelled. And the Collins class submarines face ongoing problems.

Defence experts have complained of “a lack of clear purpose and intent, a lack of direct connection between strategic objectives and industry policy, and a continuing project-by-project approach”.

The ADF acknowledges the need for advanced technological capabilities. However, in practice it is still too focused on platforms and hardware suited more for the conflicts of the past.

The current context and challenges

Several Defence reviews over the past 50 years have found that the ADF procurement and acquisition system lacks the agility and resources to adapt to changes in the strategic environment.

Defence spending as a share of GDP has been declining in Australia since the end of the Vietnam War. Notably, the ADF has focused on reducing costs, lowering errors in defence procurement, outsourcing to industry, and speeding up acquisition.

Read more:
FactCheck: is Defence spending down to 1938 levels?

Despite the recent plans to increase defence budgets, critics argue the strategy is too little, too late. It delays the acquisition of most new capabilities to beyond five years from now.

On October 30 2024, Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy announced a major acquisition of missiles, other guided weapons and explosive ordnance. Many of these acquisitions were simply plugging existing gaps, and would not be ready until at least 2029.

Many of the acquisitions (such as missiles, 155mm ammunition and submarines) did not quite align with the government’s Defence Innovation, Science and Technology Strategy (DISTS) launched the previous month.

The hard task of planning ahead

Making plans for defence procurement is a difficult task. The strategic environment changes quickly, and technology can move even faster. As a result, planned acquisitions may be irrelevant by the time they arrive.

However, there are ways to get better at forecasting. These include horizon scanning, to spot potentially important developments early, and systemic design for a big-picture approach. These approaches can also be combined with AI-supported analysis tools including scientometrics (which analyses the amount of research in different areas and how it is all linked) and natural language processing.

We used these tools in recent research funded by the Australian Defence Department to explore the impact of emerging technologies on ADF capabilities.

Scanning the horizon

In our first project, we conducted a comprehensive horizon scan of emerging technologies, focusing on cyber, internet of things (or networked smart devices), AI, and autonomous systems.

We used scientometric research methods, which provide a bird’s-eye view of research into disruptive and converging technologies.

This was supplemented by a survey asking industry professionals and experts to evaluate emerging technologies. In particular, we asked about their potential impact, likelihood of deployment or utilisation, extensiveness of use, and novelty of use in future conflicts.

The survey data was analysed using a qualitative, machine-driven, AI-based, data analysis tool. We used it for text mining, thematic and content analyses.

We found the likelihood of deployment and utilisation of cyber technologies in conflict is very high in the near term, reflecting the growing challenges in this area. Similarly, AI technologies were also singled out for their immediate potential and urgency.

We concluded that to maintain a competitive edge, the ADF must invest significantly in these priority areas, particularly cyber, network communications, AI and smart sensors.

Designing better systems

Our second project was a systemic design study evaluating Australia’s opportunities and barriers for achieving a technological advantage in light of regional military technological advancement.

The study highlighted ten specific technologies or trends as potential force multipliers for the ADF. We found three areas with immediate potential and urgency: cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, optimisation and other algorithmic technologies, followed by space technologies.

These findings were reinforced in further research supported by the Army Research Scheme. It found the ADF’s capabilities for operating effectively in the “grey zone” will be strongly facilitated by ensuring it is maintaining its technological edge in the integration of its cyber capabilities and information operations.

A widespread challenge

The ADF is not alone in these challenges. For example, successive UK governments have also identified persistent challenges in defence acquisition. These have included issues with budgetary planning due to limited competition, significant barriers to entry for new enterprises, and the constantly evolving geopolitical landscape.

However, this should not be an excuse. Instead, in line with the Defence Innovation, Science and Technology Strategy, and as our research has found, it should serve as a catalyst for action.

The ADF should focus on fostering emerging technologies and enabling the development of disruptive military capabilities to deliver asymmetric advantage for the ADF. As Australia’s Chief Defence Scientist notes, this will help get emerging technologies into the hands of our war fighters faster.

The authors would like to acknowledge the following people from Edith Cowan University who contributed to the research: Helen Cripps, Jalleh Sharafizad, Stephanie Meek, Summer O’Brien, David Suter and Tony Marceddo. Läs mer…

Jason, a 42-year-old father of two, has been battling back pain for weeks. Scrolling through his phone, he sees ad after ad promising relief: chiropractic alignments, acupuncture, back braces, vibrating massage guns and herbal patches.

His GP told him to “stay active”, but what does that even mean when every movement hurts? Jason wants to avoid strong painkillers and surgery, but with so many options (and opinions), it’s hard to know what works and what’s just marketing hype.

If Jason’s experience sounds familiar, you’re not alone. Back pain is one of the most common reasons people visit a doctor. It can be challenging to manage, mainly due to widespread misunderstandings and the overwhelming number of ineffective and uncertain treatments promoted.

We assessed the best available evidence of non-drug and non-surgical treatments to alleviate low back pain. Our review – published today by the independent, international group the Cochrane Collaboration – includes 31 Cochrane systematic reviews, covering 97,000 people with back pain.

It shows bed rest doesn’t work for back pain. Some of the treatments that do work can depend on how long you’ve been in pain.

Is back pain likely to be serious?

There are different types of low back pain. It can:

be short-lived, lasting less than six weeks (acute back pain)
linger for a bit longer, for six to twelve weeks (sub-acute)
stick around for months and even years (chronic, defined as more than 12 weeks).

In most cases (90-95%), back pain is non-specific and cannot be reliably linked to a specific cause or underlying disease. This includes common structural changes seen in x-rays and MRIs of the spine.

For this reason, imaging of the back is only recommended in rare situations – typically when there’s a clear suspicion of serious back issues, such as after physical trauma or when there is numbness or loss of sensation in the groin or legs.

Many people expect to receive painkillers for their back pain or even surgery, but these are no longer the front-line treatment options due to limited benefits and the high risk of harm.

International clinical guidelines recommend people choose non-drug and non-surgical treatments to relieve their pain, improve function and reduce the distress commonly associated with back pain.

So what works for different types of pain? Here’s what our review found when researchers compared these treatments with standard care (the typical treatment patients usually receive) or no treatment.

What helps for short-term back pain

1. Stay active – don’t rest in bed

If your back pain is new, the best advice is also one of the simplest: keep moving despite the pain.

Changing the way you move and use your body to protect it, or resting in bed, can seem like to right way to respond to pain – and may have even been recommended in the past. But we know know this excessive protective behaviour can make it harder to return to meaningful activities.

This doesn’t mean pushing through pain or hitting the gym, but instead, trying to maintain your usual routines as much as possible. Evidence suggests that doing so won’t make your pain worse, and may improve it.

2. Multidisciplinary care, if pain lingers

For pain lasting six to 12 weeks, multidisciplinary treatment is likely to reduce pain compared to standard care.

This involves a coordinated team of doctors, physiotherapists and psychologists working together to address the many factors contributing to your back pain persisting:

neurophysiological influences refer to how your nervous system is currently processing pain. It can make you more sensitive to signals from movements, thoughts, feelings and environment
psychological factors include how your thoughts, feelings and behaviours affect your pain system and, ultimately, the experience of pain you have
occupational factors include the physical demands of your job and how well you can manage them, as well as aspects like low job satisfaction, all of which can contribute to ongoing pain.

It’s important to keep up your normal routines when you have low back pain.
Raychan/Unsplash

What works for chronic back pain

Once pain has been around for more than 12 weeks, it can become more difficult to treat. But relief is still possible.

Exercise therapy

Exercise – especially programs tailored to your needs and preferences – is likely to reduce pain and help you move better. This could include aerobic activity, strength training or Pilates-based movements.

It doesn’t seem to matter what type of exercise you do – it matters more that you are consistent and have the right level of supervision, especially early on.

Multidisciplinary treatment

As with short-term pain, coordinated care involving a mix of physical, occupational and psychological approaches likely works better than usual care alone.

Psychological therapies

Psychological therapies for chronic pain include approaches to help people change thinking, feelings, behaviours and reactions that might sustain persistent pain.

These approaches are likely to reduce pain, though they may not be as effective in improving physical function.

Acupuncture

Acupuncture probably reduces pain and improves how well you can function compared to placebo or no treatment.

While some debate remains about how it works, the evidence suggests potential benefits for some people with chronic back pain.

Some people may find relief from accupuncture.
Katherine Hanlon/Unsplash

What doesn’t work or still raises uncertainty?

The review found that many commonly advertised treatments still have uncertain benefits or probably do not benefit people with back pain.

Spinal manipulation, for example, has uncertain benefits in acute and chronic back pain, and it likely does not improve how well you function if you have acute back pain.

Traction, which involves stretching the spine using weights or pulleys, probably doesn’t help with chronic back pain. Despite its popularity in some circles, there’s little evidence that it works.

There isn’t enough reliable data to determine whether advertised treatments – such back braces, vibrating massage guns and herbal patches – are effective.

How can you use the findings?

If you have back pain, start by considering how long you’ve had it. Then explore treatment options that research supports and discuss them with your GP, psychologist or physiotherapist.

Your health provider should reassure you about the importance of gradually increasing your activity to resume meaningful work, social and life activities. They should also support you in making informed decisions about which treatments are most appropriate for you at this stage. Läs mer…

In January, the Trump administration ordered a broad pause on all US funding for foreign aid.

Among other issues, this has significant effects on US funding for HIV. The United States has been the world’s biggest donor to international HIV assistance, providing 73% of funding in 2023.

A large part of this is the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which oversees programs in low- and middle-income countries to prevent, diagnose and treat the virus. These programs have been significantly disrupted.

What’s more, recent funding cuts for international HIV assistance go beyond the US. Five countries that provide the largest amount of foreign aid for HIV – the US, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Netherlands – have announced cuts of between 8% and 70% to international aid in 2025 and 2026.

Together, this may mean a 24% reduction in international HIV spending, in addition to the US foreign aid pause.

We wanted to know how these cuts might affect HIV infections and deaths in the years to come. In a new study, we found the worst-case scenario could see more than 10 million extra infections than what we’d otherwise anticipate in the next five years, and almost 3 million additional deaths.

What is HIV?

HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) is a virus that attacks the body’s immune system. HIV can be transmitted at birth, during unprotected sex or thorough blood-to-blood contact such as shared needles.

If left untreated, HIV can progress to AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome), a condition in which the immune system is severely damaged, and which can be fatal.

HIV was the world’s deadliest infectious disease in the early 1990s. There’s still no cure for HIV, but modern treatments allow the virus to be suppressed with a daily pill. People with HIV who continue treatment can live without symptoms and don’t risk infecting others.

A sustained global effort towards awareness, prevention, testing and treatment has reduced annual new HIV infections by 39% (from 2.1 million in 2010 to 1.3 million in 2023), and annual deaths by 51% (from 1.3 million to 630,000).

Most of that drop happened in sub-Saharan Africa, where the epidemic was worst. Today, nearly two-thirds of people with HIV live in sub-Saharan Africa, and nearly all live in low- and middle-income countries.

HIV can be diagnosed with a simple blood test.
MaryBeth Semosky/Shutterstock

Our study

We wanted to estimate the impact of recent funding cuts from the US, UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands on HIV infections and deaths. To do this, we used our mathematical model for 26 low- and middle-income countries. The model includes data on international HIV spending as well as data on HIV cases and deaths.

These 26 countries represent roughly half of all people living with HIV in low- and middle income countries, and half of international HIV spending. We set up each country model in collaboration with national HIV/AIDS teams, so the data sources reflected the best available local knowledge. We then extrapolated our findings from the 26 countries we modelled to all low- and middle-income countries.

For each country, we first projected the number of new HIV infections and deaths that would occur if HIV spending stayed the same.

Second, we modelled scenarios for anticipated cuts based on a 24% reduction in international HIV funding for each country.

Finally, we modelled scenarios for the possible immediate discontinuation of PEPFAR in addition to other anticipated cuts.

With the 24% cuts and PEPFAR discontinued, we estimated there could be 4.43 million to 10.75 million additional HIV infections between 2025 and 2030, and 770,000 to 2.93 million extra HIV-related deaths. Most of these would be because of cuts to treatment. For children, there could be up to an additional 882,400 infections and 119,000 deaths.

In the more optimistic scenario in which PEPFAR continues but 24% is still cut from international HIV funding, we estimated there could be 70,000 to 1.73 million extra new HIV infections and 5,000 to 61,000 additional deaths between 2025 and 2030. This would still be 50% higher than if current spending were to continue.

The wide range in our estimates reflects low- and middle-income countries committing to far more domestic funding for HIV in the best case, or broader health system dysfunction and a sustained gap in funding for HIV treatment in the worst case.

Some funding for HIV treatment may be saved by taking that money from HIV prevention efforts, but this would have other consequences.

The range also reflects limitations in the available data, and uncertainty within our analysis. But most of our assumptions were cautious, so these results likely underestimate the true impacts of funding cuts to HIV programs globally.

Sending progress backwards

If funding cuts continue, the world could face higher rates of annual new HIV infections by 2030 (up to 3.4 million) than at the peak of the global epidemic in 1995 (3.3 million).

Sub-Saharan Africa will experience by far the greatest effects due to the high proportion of HIV treatment that has relied on international funding.

In other regions, we estimate vulnerable groups such as people who inject drugs, sex workers, men who have sex with men, and trans and gender diverse people may experience increases in new HIV infections that are 1.3 to 6 times greater than the general population.

Cuts to HIV funding have attracted protests in the US.
Will Oliver/EPA

The Asia-Pacific received US$591 million in international funding for HIV in 2023, which is the second highest after sub-Saharan Africa. So this region would likely experience a substantial rise in HIV as a result of anticipated funding cuts.

Notably, more than 10% of new HIV infections among people born in Australia are estimated to have been acquired overseas. More HIV in the region is likely to mean more HIV in Australia.

But concern is greatest for countries that are most acutely affected by HIV and AIDS, many of which will be most affected by international funding cuts. Läs mer…

With the government’s Sentencing (Reform) Amendment Bill about to become law within days, New Zealand’s already high incarceration rate will almost certainly climb even higher.

The new legislation essentially limits how much judges can reduce a prison sentence for mitigating factors (such as a guilty plea, young age or mental ability). A regulatory impact statement from the Ministry of Justice estimated it would result in 1,350 more people in prison.

This and other law changes are effectively putting more people in prison for longer. By 2035, imprisonment numbers are expected to increase by 40% from their current levels, with significant cost implications. Last year, the Corrections budget was NZ$1.94 billion, up $150 million from the previous year.

In sheer numbers, the Ministry of Justice projects the prison population will increase from 9,900 to 11,500 prisoners over the next decade. But Minister of Corrections Mark Mitchell recently said government policies could see a peak of 13,900 prisoners over that period.

New Zealand’s imprisonment rate is already high at 187 per 100,000 people. That’s double the rate of Canada (90 per 100,000), and well above Australia (163 per 100,000) and England (141 per 100,000).

Accounting for imprisonment and population projections, New Zealand’s prisoner ratio could be between 238 and 263 per 100,000 by 2035. That is higher than the current imprisonment rate in Iran (228 per 100,000).

The role of remand

Much of this increase is driven by the number of people awaiting trial or sentencing on remand. This has risen substantially in the past ten years and is expected to keep rising.

Remand prisoner numbers are projected to nearly equal sentenced prisoners in 2034. Among women and young people, remand numbers are already higher than for sentenced prisoners.

In October 2024, 89% of imprisoned youth were on remand, a 15% increase in seven years. In December 2024, 53% of women prisoners were on remand, more than double the 24% rate a decade ago. Men on remand comprise 41% of prisoners, nearly double the 21% rate a decade ago.

Māori are affected most by these increases, making up 81% of imprisoned youth, 67% of imprisoned women and 53% of imprisoned men.

Some 30% of those on remand are not convicted. Of those who are, data released to RNZ last year showed 2,138 people (15% of remand prisoners) were not convicted of their most serious change, almost double the 2014 figure of 1,075 people.

Significant court delays can mean people are remanded for a long time. By 2034, it is projected the average remand time will be 99 days, compared with 83 days in February 2024. As well as being a human rights concern, this is very expensive.

Minister of Corrections Mark Mitchell: prisoner numbers could reach 13,900 over the next decade.
Getty Images

Putting more people away for longer

Crime and imprisonment rates fluctuate independently of each other, as the former Chief Science Advisor acknowledged in a 2018 report. Increasing imprisonment rates are the result of political decisions, not simple arithmetic.

The Bail Amendment Act 2013 reversed the onus of proof in certain cases, meaning the default rule is that an accused person will not be granted bail. This results in more people being sent to prison while awaiting a hearing, trial or sentencing.

When this week’s changes to the Sentencing Act come into effect, they will further constrain judges’ discretion, capping sentence reductions for mitigating factors at 40% (unless it would be “manifestly unjust”).

At the same time, it has become more difficult for prisoners to return to the community. For example, some are kept in prison or recalled because they do not have stable housing. (Dean Wickliffe, currently on a hunger strike over an alleged assault by prison staff, was arrested for breaching parole by living in his car.)

Last year, Corrections received $1.94 billion in operating and capital budget, a $150 million increase to account for rising imprisonment numbers and prison expansion. There was no meaningful increase in funding for rehabilitation programmes or investment in legal aid.

Imprisoning people is expensive. The cost of a person on custodial remand has almost doubled since 2015, from $239 a day to $437. For sentenced prisoners, it is $562 per day. This comes to between $159,505 and $205,130 per year to confine one person.

The Waikeria expansion and beyond

Corrections has developed a Long-Term Network Configuration Plan to meet anticipated prison population growth. This year’s budget in May will fund 240 high-security beds and 52 health centre beds at Christchurch men’s prison, at a cost of approximately $700-800 million.

Those 240 beds will fit within 160 cells, meaning “double-bunking”. This is known to have a significant impact to prisoner health and rehabilitation, and can also add to staffing costs.

Former corrections minister Kelvin Davis acknowledged this before the first 600-bed expansion of Waikeria prison, costed at $750 million in 2018. By June 2023, that had increased by 22% to $916 million.

The second Waikeria expansion will deliver another 810 beds for an estimated $890 million, although the exact budget has been unclear. These projects will involve public private partnership, a model known for not always delivering the cost savings and service quality initially promised.

There will be other costs for facilities maintenance, asset management services and financing. And there can be unanticipated costs, too. For example, the government’s partner in the Waikeria expansion, Cornerstone, claimed $430 million against Corrections in 2022 for “time and productivity losses” due to COVID-19.

These overall trends are happening while the government is also cutting funding for important social services. Shifting resources to improve social supports would be a better option – and one that has worked in Finland – than pouring more money into expanding prisons. Läs mer…

The year 2000 marked an inflection point for many Western countries, including Australia, in their outlook towards the world.

The focus began to shift away from the peacekeeping interventions that had dominated the previous decade to one shaped by counter-terrorism operations and deployments to the Middle East.

The threat of terrorism hasn’t gone away. But Australia is much more preoccupied by threats of a different nature 25 years later, largely emanating from China. These include cyber attacks, economic coercion, political interference, and the harassment of Australian Defence Force (ADF) ships, aircraft and personnel.

Though our international outlook has changed a lot over the past quarter century, Australia’s alliance with the US has remained a constant throughout.

However, as our militaries have grown closer, the US-China competition has also intensified. Combined with the array of unpredictable and destabilising decisions coming from the second Trump administration, this closeness has caused some unease in Australia.

A People’s Liberation Army-Navy frigate off Australia’s coast last month.
HOGP/Royal Australian Navy/ADF/AP

Evolving threats and challenges

In December 2000, the Howard government released its first Defence White Paper. This marked the beginning of a period of major change in Australia’s international outlook and presence.

It emphasised that “two interrelated trends seem likely to shape our strategic environment most strongly – globalisation and US strategic primacy”. It also noted that “military operations other than conventional war [were] becoming more common.”

The paper was prescient in respect to China’s rise, as well. It said:

The United States is central to the Asia-Pacific security system […] It will be in Asia that the United States is likely to face the toughest issues in shaping its future strategic role – especially in its relationship with China.

There is a small but still significant possibility of growing and sustained confrontation between the major powers in Asia, and even of outright conflict. Australia’s interests could be deeply engaged in such a conflict, especially if it involved the United States.

Yet, nine months after that document’s release, the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, followed by the Bali bombings of 2002, began to dramatically reshape the global security outlook.

A few days after the September 11 attack, Howard invoked the ANZUS Treaty for the first and only time, joinging US President George W. Bush’s “war on terror”. Australian forces then deployed to Afghanistan as part of the US-led invasion in October 2001.

A ceremony for a slain Australian soldier in Afghanistan’s Oruzgan province in 2007.
Capt Al Green/PR handout/Department of Defence

By the time the 2003 Foreign Policy White Paper was released, it highlighted “terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional disorder and transnational crimes such as people smuggling” as the key features of Australia’s “more complex security environment”.

A month later, Australia joined the US-led “coalition of the willing” to invade Iraq to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein and locate and destroy stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction believed to be there. (It later emerged that evidence of the existence of these weapons was erroneous.)

Australia contributed 2,000 troops to the mission. Our soldiers remained actively engaged in training, reconstruction and rehabilitation work in Iraq until July 2009.

Australian soldiers helped train new Iraqi conscripts at a base in southern Iraq in 2007.
Dean Lewins/AAP

Both of these events tied Australia’s foreign policy interests to the US to a greater degree than any time since the Vietnam War.

Although the relationship with the US had been critical to Australian defence and foreign policy for decades, it had become less prominent in Australia’s strategic planning in the years following the end of the Cold War.

US support – and diplomatic pressure on Indonesia – had been vital in securing the post-referendum presence of Australian peacekeepers in East Timor in 1999. However, it was the “war on terror” that really re-centred the relationship as core to Australian foreign policy.

In fact, Australia was even referred to as the US’ “deputy sheriff” in the Asia-Pacific – a nickname used by Bush in 2003 that caused some unease at home and in the region.

This image has since gone on to have significant staying power, and it’s proved difficult for Australia to dislodge.

History repeating?

Though the accusations of war crimes levelled against Australian special forces in Afghanistan continue to reverberate, our foreign policy focus has shifted firmly back to our own region.

This change was driven in large part by the perceived threat posed by a rising China. While the need to focus more on China was acknowledged as early as the 2009 Defence White Paper, this emphasis became most pronounced under Scott Morrison’s leadership.

The 2024 National Defence Strategy portrayed Australia as facing “its most challenging strategic environment since the Second World War”.

It advocated for a significant change in the ADF’s strategic objectives and structure, noting the optimism of the 1990s had been “replaced by the uncertainty and tensions of entrenched and increasing strategic competition between the US and China”.

Today, the military ties between the US and Australia are arguably as close as they have ever been.

The ADF operates top-tier US platforms like the F-35 combat aircraft, P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, M1 Abrams tanks, and AH-64 Apache helicopters. Defence Minister Richard Marles has gone so far as to say the ADF should not only interoperable with the US, but interchangeable.

If all goes to plan, Australia will also build and operate its own fleet of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS partnership in the coming decades.

US President Joe Biden (centre) and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese (left) unveiling the AUKUS partnership at a naval base in the US in 2023.
Denis Poroy/AP

At the same time, US President Donald Trump’s “America First” positioning has made the US’ closest allies nervous.

His early moves have put paid to the notion that globalisation is the goal all major states are pursuing. In fact, some argue that deglobalisation may be taking hold as the US aggressively enacts tariffs against its allies, pursues economic onshoring and withdraws from key international bodies.

These actions have led to many to question whether Australia has become too dependent on its major ally and if we need to emphasise a more self-reliant defence posture. However, this is much easier said than done.

Looking back, the year 2000 represented the beginning of a period of major change for Australian foreign policy. Such is the pace of change now, we may view 2025 in the same light in another quarter century.

Whether Australia’s alliance with the US will face long-term harm is yet to be seen. No matter how the bilateral relationship may change, the Indo-Pacific region will continue to be at the core of Australia’s foreign policy outlook, much as it was at the turn of the century.

This piece is part of a series on how Australia has changed since the year 2000. You can read other pieces in the series here. Läs mer…

The year 2000 marked an inflection point for many Western countries, including Australia, in their outlook towards the world.

The focus began to shift away from the peacekeeping interventions that had dominated the previous decade to one shaped by counter-terrorism operations and deployments to the Middle East.

The threat of terrorism hasn’t gone away. But Australia is much more preoccupied by threats of a different nature 25 years later, largely emanating from China. These include cyber attacks, economic coercion, political interference, and the harassment of Australian Defence Force (ADF) ships, aircraft and personnel.

Though our international outlook has changed a lot over the past quarter century, Australia’s alliance with the US has remained a constant throughout.

However, as our militaries have grown closer, the US-China competition has also intensified. Combined with the array of unpredictable and destabilising decisions coming from the second Trump administration, this closeness has caused some unease in Australia.

A People’s Liberation Army-Navy frigate off Australia’s coast last month.
HOGP/Royal Australian Navy/ADF/AP

Evolving threats and challenges

In December 2000, the Howard government released its first Defence White Paper. This marked the beginning of a period of major change in Australia’s international outlook and presence.

It emphasised that “two interrelated trends seem likely to shape our strategic environment most strongly – globalisation and US strategic primacy”. It also noted that “military operations other than conventional war [were] becoming more common.”

The paper was prescient in respect to China’s rise, as well. It said:

The United States is central to the Asia-Pacific security system […] It will be in Asia that the United States is likely to face the toughest issues in shaping its future strategic role – especially in its relationship with China.

There is a small but still significant possibility of growing and sustained confrontation between the major powers in Asia, and even of outright conflict. Australia’s interests could be deeply engaged in such a conflict, especially if it involved the United States.

Yet, nine months after that document’s release, the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, followed by the Bali bombings of 2002, began to dramatically reshape the global security outlook.

A few days after the September 11 attack, Howard invoked the ANZUS Treaty for the first and only time, joinging US President George W. Bush’s “war on terror”. Australian forces then deployed to Afghanistan as part of the US-led invasion in October 2001.

A ceremony for a slain Australian soldier in Afghanistan’s Oruzgan province in 2007.
Capt Al Green/PR handout/Department of Defence

By the time the 2003 Foreign Policy White Paper was released, it highlighted “terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional disorder and transnational crimes such as people smuggling” as the key features of Australia’s “more complex security environment”.

A month later, Australia joined the US-led “coalition of the willing” to invade Iraq to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein and locate and destroy stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction believed to be there. (It later emerged that evidence of the existence of these weapons was erroneous.)

Australia contributed 2,000 troops to the mission. Our soldiers remained actively engaged in training, reconstruction and rehabilitation work in Iraq until July 2009.

Australian soldiers helped train new Iraqi conscripts at a base in southern Iraq in 2007.
Dean Lewins/AAP

Both of these events tied Australia’s foreign policy interests to the US to a greater degree than any time since the Vietnam War.

Although the relationship with the US had been critical to Australian defence and foreign policy for decades, it had become less prominent in Australia’s strategic planning in the years following the end of the Cold War.

US support – and diplomatic pressure on Indonesia – had been vital in securing the post-referendum presence of Australian peacekeepers in East Timor in 1999. However, it was the “war on terror” that really re-centred the relationship as core to Australian foreign policy.

In fact, Australia was even referred to as the US’ “deputy sheriff” in the Asia-Pacific – a nickname used by Bush in 2003 that caused some unease at home and in the region.

This image has since gone on to have significant staying power, and it’s proved difficult for Australia to dislodge.

History repeating?

Though the accusations of war crimes levelled against Australian special forces in Afghanistan continue to reverberate, our foreign policy focus has shifted firmly back to our own region.

This change was driven in large part by the perceived threat posed by a rising China. While the need to focus more on China was acknowledged as early as the 2009 Defence White Paper, this emphasis became most pronounced under Scott Morrison’s leadership.

The 2024 National Defence Strategy portrayed Australia as facing “its most challenging strategic environment since the Second World War”.

It advocated for a significant change in the ADF’s strategic objectives and structure, noting the optimism of the 1990s had been “replaced by the uncertainty and tensions of entrenched and increasing strategic competition between the US and China”.

Today, the military ties between the US and Australia are arguably as close as they have ever been.

The ADF operates top-tier US platforms like the F-35 combat aircraft, P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, M1 Abrams tanks, and AH-64 Apache helicopters. Defence Minister Richard Marles has gone so far as to say the ADF should not only interoperable with the US, but interchangeable.

If all goes to plan, Australia will also build and operate its own fleet of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS partnership in the coming decades.

US President Joe Biden (centre) and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese (left) unveiling the AUKUS partnership at a naval base in the US in 2023.
Denis Poroy/AP

At the same time, US President Donald Trump’s “America First” positioning has made the US’ closest allies nervous.

His early moves have put paid to the notion that globalisation is the goal all major states are pursuing. In fact, some argue that deglobalisation may be taking hold as the US aggressively enacts tariffs against its allies, pursues economic onshoring and withdraws from key international bodies.

These actions have led to many to question whether Australia has become too dependent on its major ally and if we need to emphasise a more self-reliant defence posture. However, this is much easier said than done.

Looking back, the year 2000 represented the beginning of a period of major change for Australian foreign policy. Such is the pace of change now, we may view 2025 in the same light in another quarter century.

Whether Australia’s alliance with the US will face long-term harm is yet to be seen. No matter how the bilateral relationship may change, the Indo-Pacific region will continue to be at the core of Australia’s foreign policy outlook, much as it was at the turn of the century.

This piece is part of a series on how Australia has changed since the year 2000. You can read other pieces in the series here. Läs mer…

In the wild, dogs spend a lot of their time chewing on bones, carcasses, sticks and kernels. For example, Australian dingoes can feed for up to 108 minutes in a single session.

But most domestic dogs chew far less than their free-roaming counterparts. This is largely because of the introduction of easy-to-eat, processed pet foods such as kibble, which now comprises the majority of domestic dogs’ diet.

This is a problem because although chewing carries some risks, overall it has significant benefits for dogs.

As our new review, published in Frontiers in Veterinary Science, demonstrates, it enriches the physical, psychological and emotional health of dogs in many interconnected ways.

1. Food acquisition and nourishment

Dogs chew primarily to nourish themselves.

Their large canine, premolar and molar teeth and wide gape help them to capture and dismember prey. Chewing whole carcasses provides them access to marrow, fibre and minerals that would otherwise be inaccessible.

When they are not chowing down on body parts, free-ranging dogs forage on nuts, berries, and insects – a portion of which are also hidden in kernels, shells or exoskeletons and require chewing.

Wild dogs such as dingoes can feed for up to 108 minutes in a single session.
Cynthia A Jackson/Shutterstock

2. Clean teeth and oral hygiene

Dental disease is one of the most common health issues in companion and kennelled dogs. It is more common in smaller and older dogs.

The abrasive action of chewing on hard and fibrous materials helps to remove and prevent the formation of plaque.

This reduces bad breath, gum disease, tooth loss and therefore the requirement for dental procedures at the vet clinic.

Of course, dogs with existing dental issues might find it impossible to chew. And it is recognised that some dental fractures may arise from chewing.

3. Gastrointestinal health

Chewing between meals can help facilitate digestion in all mammals.

It can also prevent stomach inflammation and stimulate peristalsis (waves of contractions) in the gastrointestinal tract.

This helps maintain regular bowel movements and stool consistency.

4. Healthy microbiome

The action of chewing promotes resident bugs that comprise a healthy microbiome and reduces harmful microbes, both in the oral cavity and in the lower intestine.

The microbes of the microbiome work for their own survival and also for that of their dog host, for whom they help maintain healthy oral hygiene and gut health.

5. Stress management

Chewing stimulates the rest-and-digest elements of a dog’s life and can reduce acute stress.

This gives dogs a potential mechanism to manage some of the challenges of both boredom and over-arousal.

In this way, providing long-lasting chewables can help to alleviate anxiety associated with challenging situations such as being home alone.

6. Bone density

Stress is common to all mammals. It causes a release of cortisol, a hormone that can reduce bone density and, over time, lead to osteoporosis.

Because chewing makes dogs less stressed, it can help to prevent some forms of osteoporosis by reducing corticosteroid concentrations in the blood.

Chewing helps dogs destress and relax – especially when they’re at home alone.
Olga Popko/Shutterstock

7. Performance and focus

Dogs can moderate their own arousal levels if they have the opportunity to chew.

This appears to be bidirectional in that chewing can be stimulating for a bored dog or calming for an unsettled dog.

As such, chewing may be a unique means of bringing dogs into the Goldilocks zone of arousal, also known as “eustress”. This zone improves a dog’s ability to focus, learn and perform complex tasks.

8. Ageing well

Dogs are living longer than they have in the past. Because of this, more are experiencing cognitive decline.

Chewing on a bone or even a stick can help facilitate digestion in dogs and other mammals.
Drew Rooke, CC BY-NC

Research has shown that in other mammals, such as humans and rodents, chewing can protect cognitive function.

For dogs already suffering some loss of cognitive function, chewing, with its variety and manipulative challenges, may be a valuable management tool to help sustain quality of life.

9. Positive welfare

The pet industry supplies myriad chewable products ranging from toys, dried or fresh animal products and commercially made chews.

They are meeting the market populated by carers who’ve noticed their dogs relish chewing.

Dogs usually become enlivened when offered chews, seeking them out and playing with them.

Some even find a chew so highly valuable that they risk breaking bonds with dog or human family members by exhibiting resource-guarding behaviours.

When we fail to provide chewables, dogs will instead select other less appropriate articles to serve their purpose. In the smorgasbord of potential targets in our homes, leather shoes are often toward the top of the menu.

Providing dogs with healthy chewables will help stop them chewing on our shoes instead.
Reddogs/Shutterstock

10. Happy dogs make happy humans

The very latest study on dog-human relationships has revealed a correlation between dogs’ cardiac responses to positive interactions and those of their human guardians.

Although this study focussed on co-operative breed types, such as herding dogs, known to be highly responsive to humans, it demonstrated that cardiac activity of dogs and their owners mirrored each other. It also indicated cross-species connections comparable to those found in attachment relationships between humans.

So, providing your dog with a way to de-stress can have the same benefits for your own emotional and physiological state.

Incorporating chewing into the daily lives of our dogs may be one simple yet important way to ensure they are living happy and healthy lives. Note that chewing ability is individual and advice on the type of chew and its suitability for your dog should be sought from your veterinarian.

We would like to acknowledge the enormous contribution of Rimini Quinn to this article. Läs mer…

In our guides to the classics, experts explain key literary works.

Ask someone when they first read Jane Eyre, and they will no doubt remember: the voice of its protagonist leaps off the page as if to grab you by the forearm, pulsating with life.

Passionate, determined, and fiercely protective of her claim to happiness, Jane possesses a strength of character that utterly belies the plainness and penury of her beginnings.

Even those who haven’t read this novel, first published in 1847, are likely to associate it with popular representations of governesses and madwomen, which Jane Eyre helped enshrine as icons of the Victorian era.

Narrated from the first-person point of view, Charlotte Brontë’s masterpiece is a landmark in the novel of interiority, the history of feminism, and the representation of religion and race.

Brontë’s early life

Jane Eyre is subtitled, “An Autobiography,” and the events of the novel – at once domestic and strange, familiar and fantastical – are deeply shaped by the experiences of its author. Born in Yorkshire to a prickly curate father, Charlotte Brontë was surrounded by death as a child. She lost her mother at the age of five, followed by two older sisters when a typhoid outbreak swept through their boarding school.

Charlotte Brontë: portrait by George Richmond (1850)
Wikimedia Commons

From then on, Charlotte remained at home with her other siblings – Anne and Emily, and her ne’er-do-well brother Branwell. Together, they lost themselves in the creation of a fictional world called “Glass Town,” which they catalogued meticulously in tiny paper booklets.

After failing disastrously as a schoolteacher and governess (which Charlotte relates in trenchant letters to family and friends), she and her sisters sought to make a career out of their childhood passion.

In the space of two years, they would publish Wuthering Heights, Jane Eyre, and The Tenant of Wildfell Hall, three undeniable classics in what one critic has dubbed a second “Northumbrian Renaissance.”

A child’s eye

The early chapters of Charlotte’s novel take us deep into the mind of Jane Eyre, an orphan who has been reluctantly accepted into the household of a wealthy aunt. Though only ten years old, Jane is treated worse than a servant, abused by her cousins and constantly reminded her existence is an unwanted burden.

The family nicknames her “Madame Mope,” but Jane is anything but sullen. On the contrary, she harbours within her the spirit of a “rebel slave,” desperately seeking love but unwilling to abase herself in pursuit of her aunt’s (or indeed anyone’s) approval.

When Jane is wrongfully accused of attacking her vicious cousin, she is locked in the “red-room,” the bedchamber of her dead uncle. She burns with fear and resentment, and the room becomes a potent allegory for the psychological misery inflicted upon children.

Hope seems to arrive in the prospect of a charity school for orphans, but Jane’s restless spirit stands poised to chafe against its gospel of Christian meekness. In her interview for admission, the director recounts for Jane’s edification the example of

a little boy, younger than you, who knows six Psalms by heart: and when you ask him which he would rather have, a gingerbread-nut to eat, or a verse of a Psalm to learn he says: ‘Oh! The verse of a Psalm!’[… and] gets two nuts in recompense for his infant piety.

Unimpressed by the child’s craven obeisance, Jane remarks simply, “Psalms are not interesting.”

Jane’s restless spirit chafes against the gospel of Christian meekness.
joshimerbin/Shutterstock

The scenes at Lowood School, an institution for the poor, are drawn from Charlotte’s own knowledge of the boarding school that killed her sisters. The children are half-starved and beaten while their zealous benefactor espouses the virtues of poverty. Jane’s only solace is a kindly teacher and the ethereal student Helen Burns, who possesses Christ-like powers of submission.

The death of Helen from typhus points to the impossibility of moral perfection in a bleak and fallen world. While Jane admires her friend, she quickly sees that her own path will involve a different kind of suffering and resistance.

An unconventional courtship

Jane is often described as “plucky” or “spunky,” a quality best revealed by her energetic self-reliance. A self-made woman, she spends the next eight years at Lowood educating herself so she can seek out better opportunities elsewhere.

After advertising in the local newspaper, she gets hired to be governess at Thornfield Hall, a large estate with a mysterious proprietor. At this point in the novel, the tone shifts from social criticism to gothic romance, as Jane falls deeply in love with the owner of the estate, Edward Rochester.

The unconventional courtship between the star-crossed (and class-crossed) lovers is one of the novel’s chief delights. Rochester is world-weary and emotional, a dissipated aristocrat who becomes captivated by Jane’s frankness and inner strength. Jane sees glimmers of a finer nature beneath Rochester’s brutish façade, but resists the temptation to become his plaything or ornament.

In a daring renovation of the courtship plot, Brontë depicts Rochester as the needier and more flirtatious of the two. To secure Jane’s interest, he is not above pretending to be engaged to another woman or dressing as a female gypsy to ascertain the true nature of her feelings.

Jane, however, refuses to sacrifice her personal dignity at the altar of romantic love. When Rochester asks her to remain his ward’s governess after he marries his supposed fiancée, Jane bursts forth:

Do you think I am an automaton? – a machine without feelings? and can bear to have my morsel of bread snatched from my lips, and my drop of living water dashed from my cup? Do you think, because I am poor, obscure, plain, and little, I am soulless and heartless? You think wrong! – I have as much soul as you, – and full as much heart!

In a move that scandalised some of Brontë’s critics, Rochester responds warmly to Jane’s principled self-defense and immediately proposes marriage, explaining, “My bride is here […] because my equal is here.”

The trailer for a 2011 film adaptation of Jane Eyre.

Madwomen and missionaries

Most people are familiar with the phrase “the madwoman in the attic,” but few know it comes not from the novel but from a pioneering work of feminist criticism inspired by Brontë’s example.

In The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination (1979), Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar placed the incredible plot twist at the heart of Jane Eyre – that Rochester is secretly married to a mixed-race madwoman from the West Indies, who is confined to the third floor of his house – at the heart of a new symbology of writing by women.

Goodreads

“By projecting their rebellious impulses not into their heroines but into mad or monstrous women (who are suitably punished in the course of the novel or poem),” they write, “female authors dramatize their own self-division, their desire both to accept the strictures of patriarchal society and to reject them.”

Bertha Mason, the madwoman, thus becomes a monstrous double of Jane – a transgressive woman of violent temper who demonstrates what happens when women are oppressed by unequal marriages or violate social norms.

The invention of Bertha is a brilliantly lurid device to keep Rochester and Jane apart. But it has not always sat well with readers.

In Wide Sargasso Sea (1966), the Dominican writer Jean Rhys retells the story from Bertha’s perspective, humanising the bestial other. In place of the “clothed hyena” that Jane observes, Rhys shows how Bertha’s subjection to colonial schemes of exploitation and domination is as much responsible for her madness as any racial or genetic traits. Instead of Jane, it is Bertha who complains of injustice.

Bertha Mason: illustration Edmund Henry Garrett.
Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

Brontë further develops the colonial contexts of Jane Eyre in the novel’s final section, when, after the collapse of her engagement to Rochester, Jane takes up residence with an earnest missionary and his sisters. Here, Jane finally finds herself in a community of equals, except it lacks the romantic dimension of her relationship with Rochester.

When the missionary, St. John Rivers, proposes marriage to Jane, it is because he judges her to be the perfect help-meet for his religious labours in India, not because he desires her erotically. Where Rochester was excessively sensual (we are made aware that he married Bertha for sex as well as money), St. John is coldly ambitious — not a bad man, per se, but one who sees his spiritual destiny as incompatible with the life of the heart.

Through the colonial activities of both men, Brontë associates the wider British empire with masculine egoism and derogation from equality between the sexes. Such a place, she suggests, is likely to produce “revolted slaves” not unlike her heroine Jane.

A radical solution

The most famous line of Jane Eyre – “Reader, I married him” – encapsulates how this sometimes dispiriting novel moves inexorably toward maturity and fulfilment.

While still considering St. John’s proposal, Jane hears Rochester’s voice beckoning to her through the ether – a moment of occult indulgence that recalls the more mythopoetic style of Charlotte’s sister, Emily. Fortunately, the voice inspires Jane to return to Thornfield, where she finds that Bertha has burned the house to the ground, killing herself in the process, and leaving Rochester blinded and maimed.

Branwell Brontë’s painting of his three sisters Anne, Emily, and Charlotte, c. 1834.
Wikimedia Commons

A sombre mood prevails as the two lovers reacquaint themselves, but Jane resumes her teasing manner when she realises that Rochester has become insecure toward her because of his disabilities, not because his passion has cooled.

In contrast to her scepticism about St. John’s mission, Jane delights in the possibility of serving as Rochester’s caretaker and nurse because she is motivated by love rather than duty.

In a culture where most people, but women especially, were encouraged to sublimate their desires to the goals of more powerful men, Jane Eyre offers a radical solution. By marrying a man who has become her physical and financial dependent – but who remains an equal romantic partner – Jane can enjoy both power and femininity, which for many Victorians was an improbable combination.

As Jane puts it,

I hold myself supremely blest – blest beyond what language can express; because I am my husband’s life as fully as he is mine.

Her confident assertion of dignity, of integrity, and of moral and social equality is as relevant to our own time as it was to hers. Läs mer…