Kategori: News in English

Earlier this week, Saturn gained a whopping 128 new official moons, as the International Astronomical Union recognised discoveries from a team of astronomers led by Edward Ashton at the Academia Sinica in Taiwan. The sixth planet from the Sun now has a grand total of 274 moons, the most of any planet in the Solar System.

The discovery has raised a lot of questions. How do you spot moons, and why hadn’t anybody seen these ones already? Doesn’t Jupiter have the most moons? What are they going to call all these moons? Are there more out there? And what exactly makes something a moon, anyway?

Two moons, Enceladus and Janus, hover over Saturn’s rings. This image was taken by the Cassini mission.
NASA/JPL-Caltech/Space Science Institute

These new discoveries cement Saturn’s place as the winner of the Solar System’s moon competition, with more confirmed moons than all of the other planets combined. But it hasn’t always been this way.

Jupiter’s four largest moons – Io, Europa, Ganymede and Callisto – were the first ever discovered orbiting another planet. They were spotted by Galileo Galilei more than 400 years ago, in 1610. Saturn’s first known moon, Titan, was discovered by Dutch astronomer Christiaan Huygens 45 years later.

Jupiter’s four largest moons: Io, Europe, Ganymede and Callisto. These images were taken by the Long Range Reconnaissance Imager (LORRI) on the New Horizons spacecraft.
NASA/JHU-APL/Southwest Research Institute

The new batch of 128 moons was discovered by stacking images from the Canada France Hawaii telescope. Some of Saturn’s other moons were discovered by space voyages, and some during what are called “ring-plane crossings”.

When the Voyager 1 spacecraft passed by Saturn, it took images that were used to discover the moon Atlas. The Cassini Mission later discovered seven new Saturnian moons.

A ring-crossing is where Saturn’s rings seem to disappear from our point of view here on Earth. This is when Saturn is at just the right angle so we’re looking at the rings exactly side-on (that is, when we can only see the edge of the rings).

Titan was discovered during a ring-plane crossing, and so were 12 other moons. Saturn’s rings will be edge-on twice in 2025, in March and November.

Hubble Space Telescope images of the 1995 Saturn ring-plane crossing. In the lower image we can see Saturn with its ring edge-on, nearly disappearing. Two of Saturn’s moons can be seen as bright dots in the very thin ring.
Reta Beebe (New Mexico State University), D. Gilmore, L. Bergeron (STScI), NASA/ESA, Amanda S. Bosh (Lowell Observatory), Andrew S. Rivkin (Univ. of Arizona/LPL), the HST High Speed Photometer Instrument Team (R.C. Bless, PI), and NASA/ESA

The moon race

From 2019 to 2023, Jupiter and Saturn were fighting for first place in the moon race.

In 2019, Saturn surpassed Jupiter with the discovery of 20 new moons. This took the count to 82 for Saturn and 79 for Jupiter.

Just a few years later, in February 2023, Jupiter took the lead with 12 new moons, beating Saturn’s 83 moons at the time. Only a short time later, still in 2023, the same astronomers who discovered the recent 128 moons discovered 62 moons orbiting Saturn. This placed the ringed planet firmly in the lead.

Elsewhere in the Solar System, Earth has one moon, Mars has two, Jupiter has 95, Uranus has 28 and Neptune has 16, for a total of 142 moons. We only need to discover ten more moons around Saturn to give it double the number of all the other planets combined.

Regular or irregular?

The newly discovered moons are all small. Each one is only a few kilometres across. If something that small can be a moon, what really counts as a moon?

NASA tells us “naturally formed bodies that orbit planets are called moons”, but even asteroids can have moons. We crashed a spacecraft into an asteroid’s moon in 2022. Earth has had a few mini-moons, some only a couple of metres in size. The line of what is and isn’t a moon is a bit hazy.

Moons orbiting planets in the Solar System can be either “regular” or “irregular”. The new moons are all irregular.

One of Saturn’s irregular moons, Phoebe. Phoebe was discovered in 1898 and was the first irregular moon of Saturn ever discovered, This image was taken by the Cassini mission.
NASA/JPL

Regular moons are formed around a planet at the same time as the planet itself forms. Irregular moons are thought to be small planets (planetesimals) that are captured by a planet as it finishes forming. They are then broken into pieces by collisions.

Regular moons tend to orbit their planets in nice, circular orbits around the equator. Irregular moons typically orbit in big ovals further away from planets, and at a range of angles. Saturn has 24 regular moons and 250 irregular moons.

Studying these moons can tell us about how moons form, and reveal clues about how the Solar System formed and evolved.

Saturn’s rings are made of small chunks of ice and rock. Astronomers think they formed out of pieces of comets, asteroids and moons that were torn apart by Saturn’s gravity.

So for Saturn in particular, irregular moons can tell us more about the formation of its beautiful rings.

What’s in a name?

Names of astronomical objects are governed by the International Astronomical Union (IAU). Originally, all moons in the Solar System were given names from Greco-Roman mythology.

But the large number of moons, particularly of Saturn and Jupiter, means the IAU has expanded to giants and gods from other mythology. And it’s all about the details. If binary moons are discovered, they are required to be given names of twins or siblings.

Saturn’s first seven moons were given numbers instead of names. In 1847, John Herschel named them after the Greek Titans. After they ran out of titans and Greek mythological giants, they expanded the naming system to include Inuit and Gallic gods and Norse giants.

Discoverers get to suggest names for moons, and the names they suggest are given priority by the IAU. In the past, there have been competitions to name new moons of Jupiter and Saturn.

With 128 new moons for Saturn, it might take a while to come up with names that follow the IAU rules. Maybe we’ll even see the addition of different mythologies. We’ll have to wait and see. Until then, each moon has a name made of a string of numbers and letters, such as “S/2020 S 27”.

An image of five of Saturn’s moons taken by Cassini. The moons from left to right are: Janus, Pandora, Enceladus, Mimas, and Rhea.
NASA/JPL-Caltech/Space Science Institute

Will we find more moons?

Without a solid definition of what a moon is, it’s hard to say when (or if) we will ever finish finding them. Everyone agrees we shouldn’t call every single chunk of rock in Saturn’s rings a moon, but exactly where to draw the line isn’t clear.

That said, there is probably a limit to the number of moon-like objects astronomers are likely to want to add to the list. Edward Ashton, who led the discovery of the new moons, doesn’t think we’ll be finding too many new moons until our technology improves. Läs mer…

This week, doctors announced that an Australian man with severe heart failure had left hospital with an artificial heart that had kept him alive until he could receive a donor heart.

The patient, a man from New South Wales in his 40s, was not the world’s first person to receive this type of artificial heart. However, he is said to be the first with one to be discharged from hospital to wait for a heart transplant, which he’s since had.

I am a philosopher and bioethicist. I completed my PhD on artificial hearts – particularly how these implants can change people’s lives in profound ways.

Here’s what patients and their families need to consider.

What is an artificial heart?

Artificial hearts began to be developed in the 1960s, sponsored by the United States government and funded in a similar way to space and military programs.

In 1982, a man named Barney Clark received the Jarvik-7 total artificial heart. Doctors removed his failing biological heart and replaced it with a plastic and metal device to circulate blood to his lungs and around his body. He lived for 112 days before dying from multi-organ failure. He never left hospital.

In the 1980s and 1990s, medical device companies began to develop alternatives to total artificial hearts. These partial artificial hearts, known as ventricular assist devices, help out a biological heart by supplementing or replacing one of its two pumping chambers.

These are more straightforward and versatile than total artificial hearts, and can be used for earlier stages of heart failure.

Not all artificial hearts generate a pulse.

Artificial hearts with a pulse generally mimic the biological heart. They pump blood in the same way the heart beats, by filling with blood and squeezing to circulate blood in waves or pulses.

But some devices continuously push blood around the body instead of pulsing. So with these continuous-flow devices neither the patient nor their health team can detect a pulse.

In the US between 2014 and 2024, almost 30,000 patients received continuous-flow ventricular assist devices. In the same period, more than 310 total artificial hearts were implanted.

The total artificial hearts commercially available today are licensed exclusively as bridging therapies – to keep people alive until a donor heart becomes available – rather than permanent implants.

How about the device making news this week?

The device in the news – the BiVACOR Total Artificial Heart – was developed by a US-Australian collaboration. This device is innovative, mainly because it is the first continuous-flow device designed to replace the whole heart. Designers are also aiming for it to be the first total artificial heart suitable as a permanent transplant (known as destination therapy).

A reliable, durable and responsive total artificial heart is, in the words of Paul Jansz, the surgeon who implanted the device, “the Holy Grail”.

The BiVACOR’s clinical success so far gives us reason to be optimistic about an alternative to scarce donor hearts for responding to severe heart failure.

This device is designed to replace the whole heart, and for now, is licensed as a temporary implant, ahead of a heart transplant.
BiVACOR TIQ

Transplants can change lives

However, patients do not just resume their old lives when they leave hospital with an artificial heart.

While the pumping component is inside their chest, there are also external components to manage and monitor. A thick tube perforates their abdomen and connects to an external controller unit and power supply, which the patient carries around in a bag. Controllers must be closely monitored, and batteries must be regularly recharged.

My research showed that even a perfectly safe and reliable total artificial heart could transform patients’ lives in at least three major areas.

1. Is it part of me? Do I trust it?

Patients must trust, tolerate and receive sensory feedback about how the device is working for it to feel like part of them. In the case of an artificial heart, this might mean the device feels responsive to exercise and the body’s needs.

But it may be difficult for artificial hearts to meet these criteria, especially for devices that do not generate a pulse.

Patients may also question whether their heart is located in their body, or in the controller unit. They may wonder if they even have a heart, particularly if they can’t feel a pulse.

2. Beeps and alarms

An artificial heart also changes how patients live their lives and navigate the world.

Interruptions from loud device alarms distract patients from their normal activities. And patients must switch between mains power and batteries when they wake in the night and need to visit the toilet.

3. Marking time

Our hearts may be our natural metronomes, marking time. So removing someone’s heart rhythm can confuse their sense of time.

The need for batteries to be recharged periodically can also reshape patients’ days.

Waiting around for a transplant heart, or the latest software update, may change patients’ perspectives on what months and years feel like.

We need to give patients the whole picture

Artificial hearts are remarkable devices with great promise. But patients and families also deserve to know how these extraordinary treatments might change how they feel about themselves and the world.

They need to know this before they sign up for them. Artificial hearts don’t just save lives – they also change them. Läs mer…

About 90% of flowering plants rely on animals to transfer their pollen and optimise reproduction, making pollination one of nature’s most important processes.

Bees are usually the first insects to come to mind when people think of pollinators. But many other insects – including beetles, flies, moths and butterflies – also visit flowers to feed on nectar and pollen.

In doing so, they can play an essential role in pollinating plants.

Let’s take a closer look at some of nature’s unsung insect pollinators.

Blowflies help pollinate plants.
Tanya Latty

Fabulous flies

An estimated 30,000 species of fly (Diptera) call Australia home, making them the second largest group of insects after the beetles.

Flies have a huge variety of feeding habits including flower-visiting groups such as:

blow flies (Calliphoridae)
bee flies (Bombyliidae)
hover flies (Syrphidae)
noseflies (Rhinidae) and
march flies (Tabanidae).

Blow flies often get a bad rap for their tendency to cluster on faeces and dead animals. But these amazing (and often beautiful!) animals can be important pollinators, especially in alpine regions such as the Australian Alps.

Named for their distinctive hovering flight, stripey yellow-and-black hover flies (Syrphidae) are often mistaken for bees. Hover flies are potential pollinators of several native plants.

A hoverfly feeding. Note the yellow pollen grains stuck to the thorax.
Tanya Latty

The larvae of many common hover fly species prey on pest insects such as aphids, and so play an important role in controlling pest populations.

Another group in the hover fly family, known as drone flies, have larvae that live in stagnant water.

These larvae have a long, slender breathing tube, or “snorkel” that allows them to access air from the surface, earning them the rather unflattering name “rat-tailed maggots”.

Hoverflies are helpful pollinators.
Tanya Latty

Then there are the bee flies. As the name suggests, many species of bee fly (Bombyliidae) have fuzzy, bee-like bodies. Australia boasts around 400 species of bee fly.

Bee flies feed on the nectar or pollen of many native flowering plants and so may act as pollinators.

The larvae of most bee fly species lay their eggs in or on other insects, particularly wasps and solitary bees. The larvae then feed on the insect host, usually killing it.

Being both pollinators and natural regulators of insect populations, bee flies play an important yet often overlooked role in Australia’s ecosystems.

Don’t forget frit flies and march flies

Despite being relatively common, you’ve probably never noticed tiny frit flies (Chloropidae). No, that’s not a typo; frit flies are different to fruit flies (although they are often around the same size).

There are 322 described species of frit fly in Australia, although the actual number is probably much higher as these diminutive flies are understudied.

Frit flies and their relatives, the jackal flies (Milichiidae), are believed to be the pollinators of midge orchids (Genoplesium spp), many of which are rare or threatened in Australia.

Exactly how midge orchids are attracting these tiny flies is not clear, but at least some Genoplesium species may be mimicking the smell of wounded insects.

A tiny frit fly resting in an orchid.
Tanya Latty

Biting flies can be annoying, but some are also pollinators. March flies, also known as horse flies (Tabanidae), are often disliked for their painful bites, but these large flies can act as pollinators when they visit flowers to feed on nectar and pollen. In fact, it’s only the females that eat blood to support egg development.

One species, the flower-feeding march fly (Scaptia auriflua), has abandoned blood meals altogether, feeding exclusively on nectar and pollen.

March fly larvae, which develop underground, are formidable predators. Equipped with venomous fangs, they actively hunt and subdue prey.

Friendly flower chafer beetles

Many beetle species visit flowers to feed on nectar and pollen, including the flower chafers (subfamily Cetoniinae). The flower chafer group includes beautiful beetles such as:

green (and occasionally yellow) and black fiddler beetles (Eupoecila australasiae)
big buzzy cowboy beetles (Chondropyga dorsalis), and
the delightfully spotty punctuate flower chafers (Neorrhina punctatum).

Adult flower chafers feed on the nectar and pollen of many flowering plants, especially natives such as eucalyptus and angophoras.

Adult flower chafers feed on the nectar and pollen.
Tanya Latty

Their larvae live underground, feeding on decaying organic matter. So don’t panic if you find curl grubs in your garden – they might be baby flower chafers.

Nectar scarabs (Phyllotocus spp) are another beetle frequently seen foraging on native flowers.
There are about 28 species in Australia.

Most are smaller and less conspicuous than flower chafers, although some species form large swarms on flowering trees such as Angophora, Eucalyptus and Leptospermum.

The larvae of nectar scarabs feed on decaying organic matter and grass roots in soils.

Fiddler beetles love native flowers.
Tanya Latty

Even wasps help pollinate

Unlike bees, which mostly get their protein from pollen, wasps are primarily predators, although they may act as pollinators when they visit flowers for a sip of sugary nectar.

Some Australian orchids have evolved a remarkable strategy for attracting their wasp pollinators: they deceive unsuspecting males by mimicking the scent (and sometimes shape) of female wasps. Male wasps attempt to mate with the flower, unwittingly transferring pollen in the process.

Next time you’re outside, say a silent thanks for the many unsung insect pollinators helping to keep our ecosystems healthy.

A cuckoo wasp on a flower.
Tanya Latty Läs mer…

Nearly 30 years before the Christchurch terror attacks of March 15 2019, New Zealand had to grapple with the horrors of another mass shooting. The Aramoana massacre on November 13 1990 left 13 people dead and a nation reeling.

But the firearms law changes made in the aftermath were inadequate, and the failure to tighten regulations arguably left the door open for the Christchurch atrocity – committed by a licensed firearms owner.

By contrast, after the Port Arthur massacre that killed 35 people on April 28 1996, Australia adopted fundamental changes to its firearms laws and banned semiautomatic rifles.

Later analysis suggests those reforms helped avoid a statistically likely 16 mass shootings. New Zealand didn’t match the Australian example, and it wasn’t until the Christchurch attacks that vast improvements to firearms laws were enacted.

But New Zealand still differs in significant ways from Australian federal and state models. With our Arms Act under review, and with a major rewrite due probably later this year, there are six key areas where we might learn from our nearest neighbour.

The memorial at Aramoana to the 13 people killed in the 1990 mass shooting.
Getty Images

1. Genuine reasons to own a firearm

Australia and New Zealand both treat the possession of a firearm as a legal privilege, not a right as it is in the United States. But Australia differs in that a licence applicant must show a genuine reason to possess the firearms.

This is typically associated with other requirements, such as membership of a gun club or proof of other reasons to own a firearm (such as occupational or recreational needs).

Australia also has a 28-day “cooling off” period between an applicant being granted a licence and their ability to buy a firearm.

Licensed gun owners can only buy ammunition suited to the specifically licensed firearm. Australia,
like Canada, also sets a maximum magazine capacity of ten cartridges for most handguns.

Currently, New Zealand gun laws do not carry any of these restrictions.

2. The right character referees

Like Australia, New Zealand requires firearms owners to be “fit and proper” people. But none of the eight Australian state or territorial jurisdictions accept self-nominated character referees.

Instead, they apply a more investigative approach, during which police may talk to a wider range of people to assess the suitability of applicants. Each step of the process is laid out in greater detail, such as when health risk assessments may be required.

3. A more robust firearms register

Australia has taken firearms registration – and the traceability of every gun – very seriously since the shooting of two police officers and a member of the public in an ambush attack in rural Queensland in 2022. A lack of real-time available information about the offenders was identified as a contributing factor in the tragedy.

A national firearms register, hosted by the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, is under construction. This will provide front-line officers with information on owners, firearms and parts, linked to other relevant police and government data.

Unlike in New Zealand, Australian authorities do not accept sales or transfers between individual firearms owners. These must go through registered dealers, who act as brokers for the transfer, adding an extra layer of security.

But the key lesson from Australia is that to be effective, firearms registries should sit within the police, not civilian bureaucracies.

The funeral of the two police officers killed in rural Queensland in 2022. Firearms registration rules are taken very seriously.
Getty Images

4. A gradual licence system for young people

In New Zealand, an applicant for a firearms licence must be at least 16 years old. But there is no minimum age requirement for handling a firearm, only the rule that a young person must be under the “immediate supervision” of someone with a firearms licence.

There have been suggestions of adapted firearms licence safety courses in schools, which would see year 11 to 13 pupils receive initial vetting and a certificate as a stepping stone towards a full licence.

It’s a promising idea, but given the known risks of young people and violent extremism, and international experience of school shootings, this would need to be managed carefully.

An alternative might be the Australian approach, where young people are more formally brought into the licensing system with a “minor’s permit”. These are similar to a learner driver’s licence, with the aim of easing young people into responsible firearms ownership.

5. Limits on how many firearms can be owned

Large caches of fully operable firearms (unlike vintage collections, which are permanently inoperable) can attract criminal attention, for obvious reasons.

Western Australia is the first state to impose a limit on the number of firearms an individual can hold, modelled on a number of European systems. A licensed competition shooter can own ten, and a licensed hunter five.

New Zealand has no limits on how many firearms a licensed holder may possess.

6. Strong firearms prohibition orders

The New Zealand government came late to firearms prohibition orders, only realising their benefit in 2022.

These legal orders seek to prevent high-risk people from using, accessing or being around firearms. Although they have recently been augmented with greater search powers, only about 120 orders have been issued.

By comparison, since its own law was created in 1996, New South Wales has issued thousands of orders. In other words, it requires decades of work to mitigate risks to public safety.

The much needed rewrite of the Arms Act is a chance to learn from best practice around the world. Closest to home, Australia has laws, practices and proven results that should prompt us to ask, why not here?

The author thanks Clementine Annabell for assisting with the research for this article. Läs mer…

Following the recent imposition of steel and aluminium tariffs, the Australian government is coming to terms with the reality of engaging with a US ally that is increasingly transactional.

The Trump administration’s approach may signal some inclement weather ahead for the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine project. But it’s far from game over.

A flurry of opinion pieces, including one penned by
a former chief of the Defence Force, has questioned US capacity to deliver on its commitments under the security pact. AUKUS sceptics are calling for a “Plan B”.

Policymakers should always reassess their foreign policy decisions as new information comes to light. However, at present, there is little conclusive evidence that AUKUS is veering off course.

Worrying about what may or may not happen to AUKUS under Trump is insufficient reason to take a wrecking ball to three years of unprecedented, generational investment in Australia’s most important defence partnership.

The ‘Plan B’ problem

Certainly, AUKUS deserves scrutiny. But clutching for alternatives, including the resurrection of the long defunct French deal, is counterproductive for several reasons.

First, it disregards the enormous investment and political will the partners have sunk into AUKUS since it was announced in September 2021. No convincing evidence has been produced to show alternative sub deals could be delivered significantly cheaper or faster. Nor would they be politically viable.

Secondly, it would destabilise an initiative that helps tether the United States to the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s defence strategy is predicated on the United States remaining essential to a favourable regional balance of power.

AUKUS has become central to Australia’s deterrence strategy, in a way that alternatives would struggle to replicate after a sudden change in course. Steadfast continuity with AUKUS seems most likely to inspire ongoing commitment to the region from the Trump administration.

Thirdly, calls to abandon AUKUS overlook the broader benefits this cooperation unlocks for Australia in the US alliance. The political momentum generated by AUKUS has created new opportunities for Australian businesses in US supply chains. Australia’s efforts in advanced technologies and guided weapons have also been empowered.

The replacement of the existing Collins class fleet with nuclear subs will cost up to A$368 billion by mid-century.
Richard Wainwright/AAP

AUKUS is bigger than a single arms agreement. The broad implications of revising, or even dumping, the deal must be understood accordingly.

Trump’s AUKUS

President Donald Trump’s apparent confusion about AUKUS, and his treatment of European allies, has understandably fomented hand-wringing about the future of the deal. Still, an undertaking this central to Australia’s long-term defence merits a pragmatic approach, rather than alarm.

There is cause to feel cautiously optimistic about AUKUS under Trump. Key personnel across the administration – including Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio – have expressed their support.

Trump has promised renewed focus on growing the US industrial base by establishing a new White House shipbuilding office and a maritime action plan. These could set the United States on a firmer footing to meet the production targets tied to the Australian submarine sales.

US Studies Centre analysis reinforces the willingness of key figures in Congress to reform export controls and acquisition policy to see AUKUS succeed, pending improvements to US industrial capacity.

The effectiveness of recent investment cycles in the US submarine base is still to be determined. But Canberra has agency here. Washington is looking, in part, to Australia for answers to prevailing challenges.

Numerous components for US submarines are currently sourced from a single supplier. Achieving supply chain resilience will depend on seeking out alternate manufacturers, including from Australian industry, for valves, pumps, steel and beyond.

Donald Trump’s unpredictability, including on trade and Ukraine, have sparked calls for a rethink of the AUKUS treaty.
Jacquelyn Martin/AAP

From the Australian government’s recently announced A$800 million investment in the US industrial base to the 129 Australian shipbuilders undergoing specialised training in Pearl Harbour, AUKUS will benefit the US in ways that have perhaps been understated.

Australia’s AUKUS challenge

At present, there is little evidence to suggest the Trump administration will tear up the pact. Nonetheless, Australia must remain alert to obstacles that may arise in the partnership.

Trump may seek to elicit additional financial contributions from Australia by trying to cut a better deal than his predecessor.

Unanticipated costs could be absorbed by an existing contingency fund. However, greater investment in AUKUS would risk crowding out competing programs in the Australian defence budget.

In addition, any potential breach between the collaborative spirit of AUKUS and the administration’s transactional instincts could create headaches for Australian stakeholders.

Perceptions AUKUS could be leveraged in strategic competition with China may buoy support for the pact in Congress. But Australian policymakers must communicate a broader strategic rationale for AUKUS that resonates more strongly here at home.

The Australian government will need to adapt its approach to AUKUS cooperation to weather the new political climate. To minimise risks, Australia should continue to strengthen other defence partnerships and embrace greater defence self-reliance, as the “Plan B” commentators suggest.

AUKUS isn’t perfect. But it will endure and continue to be Australia’s best bet. Läs mer…

Following the recent imposition of steel and aluminium tariffs, the Australian government is coming to terms with the reality of engaging with a US ally that is increasingly transactional.

The Trump administration’s approach may signal some inclement weather ahead for the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine project. But it’s far from game over.

A flurry of opinion pieces, including one penned by
a former chief of the Defence Force, has questioned US capacity to deliver on its commitments under the security pact. AUKUS sceptics are calling for a “Plan B”.

Policymakers should always reassess their foreign policy decisions as new information comes to light. However, at present, there is little conclusive evidence that AUKUS is veering off course.

Worrying about what may or may not happen to AUKUS under Trump is insufficient reason to take a wrecking ball to three years of unprecedented, generational investment in Australia’s most important defence partnership.

The ‘Plan B’ problem

Certainly, AUKUS deserves scrutiny. But clutching for alternatives, including the resurrection of the long defunct French deal, is counterproductive for several reasons.

First, it disregards the enormous investment and political will the partners have sunk into AUKUS since it was announced in September 2021. No convincing evidence has been produced to show alternative sub deals could be delivered significantly cheaper or faster. Nor would they be politically viable.

Secondly, it would destabilise an initiative that helps tether the United States to the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s defence strategy is predicated on the United States remaining essential to a favourable regional balance of power.

AUKUS has become central to Australia’s deterrence strategy, in a way that alternatives would struggle to replicate after a sudden change in course. Steadfast continuity with AUKUS seems most likely to inspire ongoing commitment to the region from the Trump administration.

Thirdly, calls to abandon AUKUS overlook the broader benefits this cooperation unlocks for Australia in the US alliance. The political momentum generated by AUKUS has created new opportunities for Australian businesses in US supply chains. Australia’s efforts in advanced technologies and guided weapons have also been empowered.

The replacement of the existing Collins class fleet with nuclear subs will cost up to A$368 billion by mid-century.
Richard Wainwright/AAP

AUKUS is bigger than a single arms agreement. The broad implications of revising, or even dumping, the deal must be understood accordingly.

Trump’s AUKUS

President Donald Trump’s apparent confusion about AUKUS, and his treatment of European allies, has understandably fomented hand-wringing about the future of the deal. Still, an undertaking this central to Australia’s long-term defence merits a pragmatic approach, rather than alarm.

There is cause to feel cautiously optimistic about AUKUS under Trump. Key personnel across the administration – including Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio – have expressed their support.

Trump has promised renewed focus on growing the US industrial base by establishing a new White House shipbuilding office and a maritime action plan. These could set the United States on a firmer footing to meet the production targets tied to the Australian submarine sales.

US Studies Centre analysis reinforces the willingness of key figures in Congress to reform export controls and acquisition policy to see AUKUS succeed, pending improvements to US industrial capacity.

The effectiveness of recent investment cycles in the US submarine base is still to be determined. But Canberra has agency here. Washington is looking, in part, to Australia for answers to prevailing challenges.

Numerous components for US submarines are currently sourced from a single supplier. Achieving supply chain resilience will depend on seeking out alternate manufacturers, including from Australian industry, for valves, pumps, steel and beyond.

Donald Trump’s unpredictability, including on trade and Ukraine, have sparked calls for a rethink of the AUKUS treaty.
Jacquelyn Martin/AAP

From the Australian government’s recently announced A$800 million investment in the US industrial base to the 129 Australian shipbuilders undergoing specialised training in Pearl Harbour, AUKUS will benefit the US in ways that have perhaps been understated.

Australia’s AUKUS challenge

At present, there is little evidence to suggest the Trump administration will tear up the pact. Nonetheless, Australia must remain alert to obstacles that may arise in the partnership.

Trump may seek to elicit additional financial contributions from Australia by trying to cut a better deal than his predecessor.

Unanticipated costs could be absorbed by an existing contingency fund. However, greater investment in AUKUS would risk crowding out competing programs in the Australian defence budget.

In addition, any potential breach between the collaborative spirit of AUKUS and the administration’s transactional instincts could create headaches for Australian stakeholders.

Perceptions AUKUS could be leveraged in strategic competition with China may buoy support for the pact in Congress. But Australian policymakers must communicate a broader strategic rationale for AUKUS that resonates more strongly here at home.

The Australian government will need to adapt its approach to AUKUS cooperation to weather the new political climate. To minimise risks, Australia should continue to strengthen other defence partnerships and embrace greater defence self-reliance, as the “Plan B” commentators suggest.

AUKUS isn’t perfect. But it will endure and continue to be Australia’s best bet. Läs mer…

The Albert Park circuit for the Australian Formula 1 Grand Prix has 14 turns over 5.278 kilometres. F1 drivers can tell you the braking points, cornering speeds and preferred line for every one of those corners without actually being there.

How?

A demanding profession

Formula 1 drivers are unique athletes: typically, they are fitter, stronger, shorter and have lower body fat percentages than drivers in other racing sports.

In the early years, drivers were bigger and stronger so they could wrestle cars without power steering. Now, they are shorter, leaner and incredibly fit to deal with the increased G-forces from higher cornering speeds in modern cars.

Beyond the physical demands of F1 racing – like cornering G-forces in excess of 5Gs, the 600 newton forces needed to operate the brake pedal and cockpit temperatures that can exceed 50°C – drivers are subjected to high cognitive demands.

These include synthesising information about the track conditions, opponents and their environment, to help them to anticipate and execute precision driving.

In the past, F1 teams had unlimited opportunities to test cars and athletes on the track: some drivers accrued more than 100,000 km of testing across their careers.

But since 2009, F1 drivers and teams have been limited in the number of testing days and kilometres.

In 2025, drivers will only be allowed to take part in four test days, and they will be restricted to a total of 1,000 km.

The advancement of technology

Following these changes, teams have focused on technology to train drivers and test cars.

Simulators provide drivers and teams with additional testing not otherwise available under current rules.

Drivers typically have access to “factory” simulators owned by their team. These provide an experience as close to actually driving an F1 as you can get without being in the car.

They allow teams and drivers to change almost every aspect of the environment – car setup, tyre wear and even track temperature and humidity.

Drivers will also have a “home” simulator made up of multiple monitors, a steering wheel with force feedback and pedals.

These are used mostly for learning tracks and identifying racing lines, rather than for testing specific car setups.

The benefits of this technology

Arguably, the greatest benefit is safety: crashing a car in an F1 simulator won’t hurt the driver or damage an actual car.

Modern methods and mathematics allow teams to simulate damage without the costs associated with traditional crash testing.

Advanced racing simulators are expensive, costing up to £8M ($A15.9 million). But by eliminating the need for fuel, tyres and track hire, they significantly reduce expenses.

Drivers can also refine their skills, familiarise themselves with circuits and practise high-risk manoeuvres in a risk-free environment.

Simulators enable drivers to hone their overtaking and defensive manoeuvres by adjusting variables such as track conditions, the number of AI-cars on track, AI-car aggression and proximity.

This controlled yet dynamic training enhances problem-solving, sharpens reaction times and strengthens strategic decision-making.

These are all crucial for real-world racing.

At a track, it may take upwards of 20 minutes to make a single change to the settings on a car. In a simulator, changes can be made in seconds.

This allows teams to take a car to the race track with a tested set-up, ready for practice sessions where they can experiment with strategies including engine maps, fuel strategies and pit-stop timing.

Post-race, teams use simulators to analyse performance data, identify potential improvements and gain insights for future races and car development.

What might the future hold?

Electronic racing (e-racing) is a virtual form of motorsport where competitors drive a computer-generated car on a virtual track.

There are three typical sub-types of e-racing:

sim racing (using realistic physics, tyre wear, fuel consumption and damage)
simcade (incorporating some realistic elements but with reduced complexity)
arcade racing (using simpler controls and physics like Mario Kart).

These online and electronic variants have surged in popularity, bridging the gap between virtual and real-world motorsport.

This is showcased in the movie Gran Turismo. It tells the true story of Jann Mardenborough, who transitioned from simulator racing to professional motorsport after winning a competition in 2011.

However, while simulators provide a controlled environment for skill development, they lack factors such as psychological and emotional stress, g-forces, thermal strain, and the unpredictable elements that exist in real-world competition.

Despite these differences, e-racing has gained credibility, with several F1 drivers regularly competing in virtual events.

Four-time F1 world champion Max Verstappen, for example, is also one of the best simulator racers in the world. He uses virtual racing to sharpen his skills and remain competitive between real-world races.

As e-racing continues to evolve, the role of simulators remains a key area of exploration.

Advancements in simulator technology — including enhanced motion feedback, physiological stress replication and AI-driven race dynamics – may further bridge the gap between virtual and real-world racing.

The question is no longer whether simulators can aid driver development but how they can be refined to better replicate the demands of on-track competition, ultimately shaping the future of motorsport training and performance. Läs mer…

It’s a tough time for Canadians to start a new business. A looming recession, intensifying trade war with the United States and geopolitical uncertainty are making the economic landscape difficult for many business owners.

While all Canadian entrepreneurs face these risks to a greater or lesser degree, Indigenous entrepreneurs may be most affected.

Indigenous people make up only five per cent of the Canadian population despite being the fastest growing demographic, with 30 per cent growth compared to nine per cent for non-Indigenous people.

Indigenous people start entrepreneurial ventures five times more often than non-Indigenous Canadians. The Canada-U.S. trade war threatens the future of these Indigenous entrepreneurs across Turtle Island (North America), potentially undermining the pursuit of reconciliation.

Indigenous entrepreneurship in Canada

Indigenous-owned businesses contribute approximately $50 billion annually to the Canadian economy from an estimated 50,000 businesses. While this contribution is significant, starting a new venture can be difficult for Indigenous entrepreneurs due to a variety of barriers.

Unlike large businesses that may find workarounds or absorb costs, Indigenous businesses may find it harder to adapt to tariffs or an economic downturn due to poor access to capital, barriers to digital access, infrastructure challenges and a lack of financial slack (a company’s unused financial resources).

Jewelry on display at the International Indigenous Tourism Conference in Montréal in February 2025. Indigenous businesses act as a way of sharing Indigenous culture more broadly.
THE CANADIAN PRESS/Graham Hughes

These constraints can increase Indigenous people’s dependence on external organizations and may weaken the control Indigenous people and nations have when making decisions about their money and economies. This is something Indigenous people have long been fighting for.

Industries such as oil and gas, forestry and mining are expected to be hit hard by the tariffs — industries that Indigenous communities are becoming increasingly involved in, through employment, revenue sharing and equity participation agreements.

The longer tariffs remain in place, the more Indigenous-owned small- and medium-sized businesses are likely to be disproportionately affected.

Trade agreements

Under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which is set to be reviewed in 2026, there are rules that lessen the effect of trade barriers on Indigenous entrepreneurs dealing in textile and apparel goods.

Article 6.2 allows Indigenous handiwork, such as moccasins, to cross borders duty-free. While this offers some protection against tariffs, only 7.2 per cent of small- and medium-sized Indigenous businesses sell their products to other countries. On average, 12.1 per cent of Canadian small businesses are exporters.

Indigenous businesses come from many industries. Construction, retail trade and professional services make up almost 40 per cent of Indigenous small businesses in Canada. Because of this, Article 6.2 only applies to some Indigenous firms.

These provisions must stay in effect. Raw materials brought in for making products are not included under the USMCA’s Indigenous trade rules, leaving an important gap that must be addressed by the Canadian government.

Firms that pay retaliatory tariffs to the Canadian government on imports may apply for a remissions process. The federal government will provide relief to firms that pay import tariffs on a case-by-case basis. It will check whether there are Canadian alternatives to the U.S.-sourced raw materials. If the answer is yes, it may be harder to get money back for tariffs paid.

Indirect financial impacts could also be damaging. The Canadian economic outlook is not good, with expected job losses, reduced investment, weaker productivity and lower consumer spending. These economic effects are likely to impact Indigenous businesses, too.

Moccasins on display during the International Indigenous Tourism Conference in Montréal in February 2025. The USMCA allows Indigenous handiwork, such as moccasins, to cross borders duty-free.
THE CANADIAN PRESS/Graham Hughes.

There is also growing concern about the U.S. potentially sidestepping USMCA rules. Ratified trade pacts have not stopped Donald Trump’s administration from levying taxes on imports, such as those on steel and aluminium. Some experts argue these measures break World Trade Organization laws, raising concerns about future American actions that could erode the benefits of the USMCA for Indigenous businesses.

Social and cultural impacts

The Canada-U.S. trade war could lead to some Indigenous businesses shutting down. In turn, this could have significant sociocultural impacts on Indigenous entrepreneurs and their communities.

Many Indigenous entrepreneurs start businesses in line with their cultural practices, and as a way to contribute to their community’s economic and overall well-being. If a business fails, the entrepreneur may have to leave their community and work for a non-Indigenous firm. This may impact their ability to maintain cultural connection and support.

Many Indigenous businesses prioritize hiring Indigenous people, and closures can result in fewer culturally affirming work environments for Indigenous workers. For youth, this may present as fewer opportunities for community-based professional and interpersonal knowledge transfer through apprenticeships, mentoring and skill-building.

It can also further embed colonial economic structures in Indigenous communities by forcing them to rely more heavily on external businesses.

In addition, more non-Indigenous people are buying Indigenous products, such as hand-carved sculptures and jewellery. These sales are a way of sharing Indigenous culture more broadly. When Indigenous firms close, their owners lose an important way of sharing cultural knowledge.

Action is needed

Minister of Crown-Indigenous Relations Gary Anandasangaree speaks in the foyer of the House of Commons on Parliament Hill in Ottawa in October 2024.
THE CANADIAN PRESS/Spencer Colby

The growing trade barriers resulting from Trump’s tariffs raise concerns about the future of Indigenous entrepreneurship as a tool for sovereignty and independence. If the right choices are not made, Canada risks undoing progress made towards reconciliation.

The Canadian Council for Indigenous Business has proposed steps to fix the unequal effects of the tariffs. These include more infrastructure investment in Indigenous communities and greater access to funding for Indigenous businesses. It also encourages Canadians to prioritize buying Indigenous products and services.

Removing trade barriers within Canada may also help grow local markets by making it easier for Canadians to trade and do business with one other.

Read more:
Canada, the 51st state? Eliminating interprovincial trade barriers could ward off Donald Trump

The business community as a whole faces uncertainty and harm from ongoing geopolitical and trade risks. Weakened Canadian companies are easier targets for hostile takeovers by foreign corporations — a concern that recently prompted Ottawa to change the Investment Canada Act to block predatory investment behaviour.

Encouragingly, Gary Anandasangaree, the minister of Crown-Indigenous relations, recently pledged government programs and support to Indigenous businesses affected by the tariffs. However, some Indigenous leaders feel they are not receiving a seat at the table in negotiating a “Team Canada” response to trade challenges.

Indigenous voices need to be heard and considered in economic decision-making and policy development. Indigenous people and communities are up against unequal and harmful effects that are not only economic, but also social and cultural. Public policymakers, institutions and activists would do well to remember this. Läs mer…

US President Donald Trump appears to have abruptly upended America’s most trusted alliances with European countries since taking office just two months ago. But are we misreading the cues?

In addition to putting pressure on Ukraine to secure a deal to end the war, he has suggested the US may no longer honour its commitment to protect NATO allies that aren’t meeting the bloc’s guideline of spending at least 2% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defence spending.

These tough tactics have had some results. European countries have committed to spending beyond 2%, as Trump has demanded. And his drastic positions on Ukraine have suddenly been reversed. The horsetrading over what this means for NATO isn’t over yet, but Trump’s resourcefulness in this second term should not be underestimated.

A top Pentagon official is now calling on Australia to similarly increase its defence spending from 2% to 3% of GDP.

Australia has not managed to avoid Trump’s tariffs on steel and aluminium, although this accounts for a small fraction of its output and international trade – and no allies have been exempt from his tariffs. Other countries have chosen to retaliate, but Australia would be wise not to do so.

Should Trump’s recent actions, however, make Canberra worry about his commitment to the broader US-Australia alliance?

Emotional reactions over Trump should be avoided. There’s no real reason to fear a potential alliance abandonment. The US and Australia have plenty of compelling, enduring and overlapping interests that make a Trump about-face unlikely.

Deep, mutual ties

Those inclined to be critical of the US alliance and the AUKUS agreement have barked loudly about Trump’s recent actions. Former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, in particular, has warned of Australian leaders being part of a “conga line of sycophants” paying homage to Trump and not being more forthright in their criticism of his policy decisions.

Others have declared “the special friendship is over” and called for a drastically more independent Australian foreign and defence policy. This is premature and counter-productive.

Turnbull is arguably trying to shame Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Opposition Leader Peter Dutton into following his lead and challenging Trump more forcefully. But how would that help with a man who evidently revels in escalating tensions?

There is a clear need to put emotional reactions to the side and weigh Australia’s national interests dispassionately.

Australia is heavily invested in the United States for its security and wellbeing. The AUKUS agreement alone will see Australia spending A$368 billion in the coming decades on nuclear-powered submarines.

Australia is also hugely invested in American defence technology across the sea, air, land, space and cyber domains. Overall, Australia invests over A$1 trillion each year in the US – by far its largest destination for overseas investment.

The US, in turn, has a demonstrated interest in having a bigger security presence in the Indo-Pacific region in a way that might even improve great power relations. And as defence expert Des Ball once said, Australia is a “suitable piece of real estate” to accommodate this increased presence.

Australia already hosts shared intelligence facilities at Pine Gap, US Marine Corps facilities in Darwin and shared submarine facilities near Perth. Jointly funded upgrades of the Tindal air base will soon accommodate American B-52 bombers, too.

Washington is also heavily invested in Australia. The US is the biggest foreign direct investor in Australia by a country mile – and also enjoys a trade surplus with Australia.

A US Marine Corps combat aircraft participating in a formation flight over Darwin in 2022.
US Department of Defense/Supplied

Boosting regional ties

With so much in flux, though, Australia does need to increase its defence spending.

Australia’s boutique force, structured as it was for the unipolar moment, when the world was dominated by one power (its ally, the US), is no longer fit for purpose. It needs to muscle up, and quickly. A scheme for national and community service would help.

Indeed, what most critics are calling for reflects many of the arguments made in the Australian Foreign Policy White Paper of 2017, written when Trump last came to office. I describe this as Australia’s “Plan B”. It was not dismissive of the US alliance, but looked to mitigate the risks associated with a more transactional and less predictable US leadership.

More can be done, though. Australia should also look to bolster its diplomatic, security and economic cooperation with regional partners in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

As part of this, Australia should avoid cutting its aid to the region and offer better options to Pacific partners – what I have called a “grand compact” with Pacific Island states, or even a Pacific federation.

In addition, more security and development cooperation is needed with nations further afield, such as Japan, India and South Korea.

We should avoid making upfront commitments to a land war in Asia or Europe, though. We have only recently recovered from the setback in regional defence relations from the distraction of the distant, US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

We need to muscle up, yes. But let’s not think we can make much of a difference on the ground as part of a peacekeeping force for Ukraine. It’s best to support Ukraine with resources from afar and remain focused on bolstering regional ties.

The danger of overreacting

Pundits are also questioning whether the US can still be counted on in regional long-term defence and security planning.

I contend we are in danger of overreacting to the early moves of a presidency in a hurry to make significant changes. Rather than the sky falling in, we are in the midst of a storm.

It is not pretty. But we should wait for the dust to settle.

Trump’s tariff threats against Canada have caused an unprecedented rift between the two neighbours.
Frank Augstein/AP

We also should recognise the limits of Australian power, authority and reach when it comes to influencing US behaviour. We have tended to be a middle power without large-power pretensions. We no doubt can do more to stand up for ourselves, but let’s not get ahead of ourselves in terms of what this means for the relationship with Washington.

Trump evidently sees the world as “multipolar”, meaning a world dominated by several powers, notably the US, China and Russia.

While comparisons between Trump’s interactions with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Franklin D Roosevelt’s wartime dealings with Joseph Stalin are flattering to the US president, they aren’t as far-fetched as some critics would claim. They reflect a hyper-realist and transactional approach to foreign policy, where (to quote Thucydides) “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”.

While Trump advances such an approach to international relations, it is important to remember how invested the US and Australia are in one another.

Like Australia, the US is a continent-spanning, federal, cosmopolitan, English-speaking, New World, common-law, free-market, bicameral, constitutional and broadly still liberal democracy. We still talk about “shared values” because of these persistent overlaps. And these overlaps have driven the alignment of these two countries’ priorities for generations.

In Trump’s new, transactional and multipolar world view, the US needs Australia more than it needs Europe. (Though, it should be noted, despite Trump’s tough words for Europe, the US still has more than 100,000 US military personnel there.)

Over the longer term, Australia’s unique geography and shared history mean it matters in the great game of containing its main competitor, China, from dominating East Asia and the Pacific.

This is an enduring American interest and a longstanding Australian concern. Australia, therefore, will continue to be a Pacific partner. The deterrent effect from this solidarity remains the best bet to help prevent the outbreak of another war in the Pacific. Läs mer…

Almost half of Australians will experience mental health problems in their lifetime. Recent floods, droughts, cyclones, bushfires and the COVID pandemic have increased distress in the community.

Yet, many people who need mental health services are unable to access them. Cost, stigma and availability of mental health workers are barriers to care. Australia also has a critical shortage of mental health workers. And by 2030, it’s predicted we will be missing 42% of the mental health workforce needed to meet the demand.

To partially address this gap, the Australian government has committed to investing A$135 million in digital mental health programs if re-elected.

Online mental health programs can be more innovative and less expensive than other types of therapy. But do they actually work? Let’s assess the evidence.

What are digital mental health services?

Digital mental health services vary widely. They include online or app-based mental health information, symptom tracking tools, and learning or skills programs. These tools can be accessed with or without support from a therapist or coach, with some using generative generative artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning.

The umbrella term “digital mental health services” also includes peer-support networks, phone helplines and human-delivered phone, chat, or video-based telehealth services.

Services such as Mindspot, for example, offer online assessment, feedback and referrals to online treatments that have optional therapist support.

The MindSpot website online assessments and treatments. It’s funded by the Australian government.
Mindspot (screenshot)

Digital mental health services target a range of mental health problems, such as depression, anxiety, trauma and eating disorders. Some are designed for specific groups of people, including culturally diverse communities, LGBTQIA+ people, new parents and young people.

With so many digital options available, finding the right program can be challenging. The government-funded Medicare Mental Health portal was set up to help Australians find evidence-based services.

This website outlines Australians’ options for mental health support.
Medicare Mental Health (screenshot)

Do they work?

A 2020 review of the evidence found almost half of people who used online programs for common mental health conditions benefited.

This review included online programs with self-directed lessons or modules to reduce symptoms of depression or anxiety. These programs were as effective as face-to-face therapy, but face-to-face therapy required on average 7.8 times more therapist time than online programs.

The evidence for other types of digital mental health programs is still developing.

The evidence for smartphone apps targeting mental health symptoms, for example, is mixed. While some studies have reported mental health benefits from the use of such apps, others have reported no differences in symptoms. Researchers suggest these apps should be used with other mental health supports rather than as standalone interventions.

Similarly, while AI chatbots have received recent attention, there is uncertainty about the safety and effectiveness of these tools as a substitute for therapy.

Chatbots, such as the AI “Woebot” for depression, can give users personalised guidance and support to learn therapeutic techniques. But while chatbots may have the potential to improve mental health, the results are largely inconclusive to date. There is also a lack of regulation in this field.

Early studies also show some benefits for digital approaches in treating more complex mental health conditions, such as suicidal thoughts and behaviours, and psychosis. But more research is needed.

Do users like them?

Users have reported many benefits to digital mental health services. People find them convenient, accessible, private and affordable, and are often highly satisfied with them.

Digital services are designed to directly address some of the major barriers to treatment access and have the potential to reach the significant numbers of people who go online for mental health information.

Digital supports can also be used in a “stepped care” approach to treating mental health problems. This means people with less complex or less severe symptoms try a low-intensity digital program first before being “stepped up” to more intensive supports. The United Kingdom’s National Health Service’s Talking Therapies program uses this model.

The NHS Talking Therapies program includes the option of learning self-guided cognitive behaviour therapy techniques.
NHS/Every Mind Matters (screenshot)

But some people still prefer face-to-face services. Reasons for this include problems with internet connectivity, a perceived lack of treatment tailoring and personal connection, and concerns about quality of care.

Some Australians face challenges with digital literacy and internet access, making it difficult to engage with online services.

Privacy concerns may also discourage people from using digital platforms, as they worry about how their personal data is stored and shared.

What do clinicians think about them?

Mental health professionals increased their use of digital mental health tools (such as telehealth consultations) markedly during the COVID pandemic. Yet many clinicians struggle to use these tools because they have not received enough training or support.

Even when willing, clinicians face workplace barriers which make it difficult to incorporate them into their practice. These include:

limited funding and reimbursement
unclear policies related to liability and risk management, data storage and security
workflow disruptions, such as integrating these tools into existing systems, training clients to use them, and monitoring their use.

Some patients and clinicians prefer in-person therapy.
VH-Studio/Shutterstock

Some clinicians remain sceptical about whether digital services can truly match the quality of in-person therapy, leading to hesitation in recommending them to those who might benefit.

What needs to happen next?

With mental illness and suicide estimated to cost the Australian economy $70 billion per year, there are strong personal, social and financial reasons to support innovative solutions that increase access to mental health services.

But for digital approaches to reach their full potential, we need to upskill the mental health workforce and support organisations to include digital technologies into their practice.

It’s also important to improve awareness of digital mental health programs and reduce the barriers to accessing these services, or we risk leaving behind the very people who need them the most.

For Australians with more complex mental health issues, or those for whom digital mental health treatment hasn’t worked, access to in-person therapy and other mental health treatments should remain available. Digital mental health programs are one part of the mental health care system, and not a replacement for all types of care.

If you or anyone you know needs help or support, you can call Lifeline on 13 11 14. Läs mer…