Författare: Vanessa Newby Assistant Professor Institute of Security and

Israel has launched its sixth incursion into Lebanese territory since 1978. Here’s a timeline of how this seemingly unending conflict has evolved.

1970s: PLO occupation of south Lebanon

The conflict in south Lebanon began in earnest in 1978 but the seeds were sown as early as 1970. In September of that year the Jordanian government expelled the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) from its territory in what was known as “black September”.

In response, the PLO moved its base to southern Lebanon which afforded them the logistical access to launch Katyusha rocket attacks on Israel on its northern border. At the time the Lebanese government in Beirut was unable to extend its authority in the south and after the Lebanese civil war started in 1975, the area remained lawless.

In this environment the PLO thrived, conducting escalating attacks on northern Israel which included incursions into Israeli territory. On March 14 1978, Israel invaded Lebanon as part of Operation Litani.

This was a military campaign partly in response to what became known as the coastal road massacre, when Palestinian operatives killed 38 people and wounded 70 near Tel Aviv. The Israeli operation was designed to clear Palestinian militants from areas south of the Litani river.

1978: Arrival of Unifil and the zone of security

In response to the deteriorating security situation in south Lebanon, on March 19 1978 the UN established a peacekeeping force – the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil) – in the area south of the Litani river. Unifil was mandated to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the Lebanese government in establishing effective authority in the area.

Israel declared a ceasefire on March 21 1978, and the first Unifil contingents arrived the following day. The Israeli withdrawal was supposed to see the area handed over to Unifil. But the IDF reneged on the final stage of the agreement, establishing instead what it called a “zone of security” and awarding authority of it to a local militia – the South Lebanon Army – whom they continued to support. It was into this environment, unregulated and populated with multiple sub-state militia, that Unifil was deployed.

1982: Israel invades

In June 1982, exasperated by the failure of Unifil to eliminate the Palestinian groups and other militia in the south, Israel reinvaded Lebanon in “Operation Peace for Galilee”. This time the army marched as far as Beirut and remained there until September 29 1982, after the PLO had officially withdrawn from Beirut (to Tunisia).

Israel continued to occupy most of south Lebanon until September 3 1983, when it retreated to south of the Awali river in south Lebanon because of rising IDF casualties from guerrilla attacks by militants. In 1985, Israel further retreated in stages between February to April back to the zone of security, which it continued to maintain.

In 1982 the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, led by Yassir Arafat, left Lebanon for Tunisia.
Friedrich Stark / Alamy Stock Photo

The political vacuum left by the PLO in south Lebanon was swiftly filled by a new conflict between two competing organisations. In 1984, Hezbollah was formed and after gaining popularity in the Beqaa Valley, it began to infiltrate the south, competing with rival group Amal for popular Shia support.

By 1986, Amal and Hezbollah were conducting their own war for control of the south, which only ended in 1989.

1990: End of the civil war

In 1990 the Taif Accord brought an end to the wider Lebanese civil war, which had raged since 1975. The power-sharing agreement paved the way for the departure of Syrian and Israeli forces. Most militias disbanded and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) began to be rebuilt, having disintegrated during the civil war due to sectarian tensions.

But the government in Beirut remained unable to exercise authority in the south due to a lack of resources and political consensus and there remained no functioning state authority in the area.

Between 1990 and 2000, Israel launched two further military operations in south Lebanon: Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996. The IDF still occupied the zone of security in Lebanon and both these military operations were launched to support Israel’s wider goal, which was to rid the area south of the Litani river of Hezbollah.

Both incursions caused significant damage to infrastructure and civilian displacement. The most serious incident was the 1996 shelling by the Israeli Air Force of the UN Fijian compound at Qana, 12 miles north of the border, which resulted in the death of 106 civilians.

These two operations failed to eliminate Hezbollah and, in the late 1990s, the group increased its attacks on the IDF and the pro-Israel militia, the South Lebanese Army. Using improvised explosive devices disguised as rocks, as well as snipers and assaults on military compounds, they eroded IDF morale. And the loss of Israeli life made the occupation highly unpopular in Israel.

Local Lebanese civilian protests against the occupation, which had cut the zone off from the rest of Lebanon, also grew in scale and frequency.

2000–2006: Hezbollah rules south Lebanon

On May 25 2000, the IDF conducted a hasty withdrawal and in June the United Nations established the “blue line”, a demarcation line dividing Lebanon from Israel and the Golan Heights for the sole purpose of confirming the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanese territory. But the vacuum that emerged after the IDF withdrawal was quickly filled by Hezbollah .

Thereafter a number of factors conspired to prevent peace. The most frequently cited by Hezbollah was the claim that Israel had failed to withdraw from small sections of internationally recognised Lebanese land. Their claim was that Israel, as an occupying force, remained a legitimate target for attacks.

Map of south Lebanon, showing Blue LIne and LItani river.
Striving2767/Wikimedia Commons

After the 2000 withdrawal, Hezbollah became the de facto political and military authority in the absence of the LAF which, while regrouping, was suffering from a lack of funding and was therefore unable to deploy to the south. Support for Hezbollah’s deployment was also backed by Syria, which dominated politics and security in Lebanon and retained around 15,000 troops in the country, until 2005 when they withdrew after massive public demonstrations triggered by the assassination of Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri.

The blue line remained contested in some sections, leading to confrontations between Hezbollah and Israeli troops which gradually escalated and came to a head in July 2006.

2006: War between Hezbollah and Israel

On July 12 2006, Hezbollah operatives ambushed an IDF patrol south of the blue line, killing three soldiers and kidnapping two. After five more IDF soldiers were killed during a failed rescue attempt, Israel launched a heavy retaliatory response. This included air strikes and artillery fire on Lebanese civilian infrastructure and an air and naval blockade, followed by a ground invasion of south Lebanon.

In response, Hezbollah launched rockets into northern Israel and engaged the IDF in guerrilla warfare. The war raged for 33 days and ended on August 14 with the implementation of a UN mandate, which all the parties agreed to abide by.

It is estimated that up to 1,300 Lebanese people and 61 Israelis were killed. The invasion severely damaged Lebanese civil infrastructure and displaced approximately 1 million Lebanese in the south, and 300,000 to 500,000 Israelis from northern Israel.

Since 2006

Because Lebanon and Israel don’t have diplomatic relations, dialogue has largely been between the IDF and the LAF communicating through Unifil. Since 2006, Unifil has been mandated with “assisting the LAF in taking steps towards the establishment between the blue line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL deployed in this area”.

Currently, the Unifil area of operation stretches from the blue line north to the Litani River and east to the foothills of the Golan heights. Despite regular Unifil and LAF patrols, Hezbollah is believed to have retained a military presence south of the Litani.

The LAF has patrolled up to the blue line since 2006, but its ability to defend Lebanese sovereignty by conventional means is questionable and as it lacks the confidence of local communities. Unifil, which has lost over 300 peacekeepers since 1978, continues to monitor and observe the area.

The conflict in south Lebanon is a bleak tale of civilian exposure to political conflicts that rarely directly involve them. The local population have been harassed, intimidated and oppressed by the multiple various armed groups and militaries.

The loss of land, property and life has scarred the people of the south, who nonetheless return to their villages each time a fragile peace emerges because this part of the country is warm, fertile and stunningly beautiful.

The latest Israeli incursion means the human cost will once again predominantly be borne by the people of south Lebanon. Läs mer…

The death of Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut on September 27 has left the militant Lebanese organisation leaderless at a critical time. Two days earlier in a speech broadcast around the world, the head of the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) northern command, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, had told his soldiers to prepare for a possible incursion into Lebanon.

There is every reason to believe Friday’s airstrike, which targeted Hezbollah’s headquarters building in the southern Beirut suburb of Dahiyeh, was in preparation for a possible incursion. It came after days of strikes which Israel claims have eliminated much of Hezbollah’s senior leadership.

Halevi told his troops on September 25 that they would “go in, destroy the enemy there, and decisively destroy” Hezbollah’s infrastructure. As Hezbollah is embedded within the Lebanese population, this strategy promises the deaths of innocent civilians.

Since 2006, both Hezbollah and the IDF have sought to avoid a direct confrontation. For years, they have played tit-for-tat with the rationale of proportionality to prevent an all-out war.

Although the horrific October 7 attacks on Israel by Hamas triggered a resumption of hostilities, until last week both sides were calling for restraint. What has changed? Is a ground invasion now inevitable? And if so, what would that mean for Hezbollah and Lebanon?

Israel has a track record of engaging in military adventures in Lebanon that have only ever served to make its opponents stronger in the long term. The destruction of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) did not prevent the emergence of Hamas – indeed, it helped to create it. Similarly, Israel’s pursuit of the PLO in south Lebanon triggered the creation of Hezbollah. Despite five invasions since 1978, Israel has shown itself incapable of successfully occupying even the smallest sliver of Lebanese land.

While both sides have been preparing for a new conflict for years, the trigger for the escalation began on September 18, when Israel struck the first blow by detonating thousands of pagers and mobile devices owned by Hezbollah operatives, killing at least 32 and injuring several thousand people.

This technological attack had been years in the making and could be described as a strategic masterstroke to disable the enemy. The timing appears to have been because Hezbollah was becoming suspicious about the devices, so the IDF had to act or lose the “surprise”. This suggests operational considerations are taking precedence over strategic and political ones, which research suggests is rarely a good idea.

Nonetheless, these strikes are believed to have crippled Hezbollah’s command in the short term, and emboldened the IDF’s leadership. On September 18, Israel’s defence minister, Yoav Gallant, told Israeli troops: “We are at the start of a new phase in the war — it requires courage, determination and perseverance.” While he made no mention of the exploding devices, he praised the work of Israel’s army and security agencies, noting their results were excellent.

A tactic used in recent days by the IDF is one that has been developed over many years on the “Blue Line” – the de facto border that divides Israel and Lebanon. Emboldened by the failure of the IDF to defeat it in the July war of 2006, Hezbollah’s senior operatives have been active and visible on the Blue Line, which is monitored closely by the IDF.

This has enabled the IDF to photograph, identify and track senior Hezbollah leadership, which is why since October 7 we have seen a succession of assassinations of its key operatives, including Ibrahim Aqeel, a commander of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan force, and more recently, Mohammed Sarour in Beirut, as well as many others.

The IDF now believes it has Hezbollah on its knees – or at least, on one knee. The escalation we are currently witnessing is because the IDF is driving home its advantage and applying the same strategy as in Gaza: bombing any area it can plausibly claim to be a Hezbollah target.

This has had devastating consequences for the Lebanese population. The Health Ministry stated on Friday that 1,540 people had been killed since October 8 2023, with thousands of innocent civilians injured. Over 70,000 civilians have reportedly registered in 533 shelters across Lebanon, with an estimated 1 million people having been displaced from their homes.

Can Hezbollah fight back?

The death of Nasrallah has left Hezbollah temporarily leaderless, while the killing of several of its senior figures has deprived it of seasoned commanders, many of whom had recent combat experience in Syria. And the bombing of south Lebanon is reducing Hezbollah’s supply of rockets and other weapons.

Hezbollah’s former leader, Hassan Nasrallah, delivering a televised speech on September 19, the day after thousands of Hezbollah pagers were detonated across Lebanon.
EPA-EFE/Wael Hamzeh

However, Israel should not assume that Hezbollah is out of the game or underestimate the group. Hezbollah’s real strength has always lain in its ability to melt into the population – and it will be ready to commence a war of attrition with hit-and-run tactics if the IDF makes the mistake of putting boots on the ground again. The fact that all five previous invasions failed should be an indication that the outcome may be a repeat of what occurred between 1982 and 2006.

Furthermore, while Iran’s response to the escalation has been muted thus far, it is unlikely to abandon Hezbollah. A long, drawn-out, low-intensity conflict would favour the kind of asymmetric tactics used by the “axis of resistance”, which also includes Lebanon’s neighbour, Syria.

By bombing and displacing the Lebanese population, the IDF aims to reduce morale. It is now destroying private homes and public buildings on the grounds they are Hezbollah ammunition and weapons depots.

In Lebanon, the Palestine issue has always been regarded as the primary cause of the civil war that took place from 1975 to 1990. As such, the IDF is banking on Lebanese people turning against Hezbollah for bringing a new war down on them as a result of its rocket barrages into northern Israel, in solidarity with Hamas since the October 7 attack.

But, while there are many people in Lebanon who do not support Hezbollah and its activities in south Lebanon, the IDF should remember the past. Even if sentiment against Hezbollah is high today, indiscriminate bombing of the kind we are currently witnessing in Lebanon will not be tolerated by the population indefinitely.

It’s worth noting that in 1982, when the IDF invaded south Lebanon, some Lebanese welcomed them with rice and flowers – viewing them as liberators from the PLO. But that welcome did not last long.

In 2006, the IDF applied a similar strategy, targeting civilian evacuation convoys and UN compounds. And once again, the tide of public opinion swiftly swung back in favour of “al-muqawimah” (the resistance).

The stated IDF aim is to drive Hezbollah back north of the Litani river, to force it to comply with UN resolution 1701 and allow displaced people in northern Israel to return to their homes. But it is naive of Israel and the IDF to think that an invasion or a bombing campaign, no matter how successful in the short term, will enable Israeli civilians to live in peace along the Blue Line for the long term.

Ultimately, the only way forward is for both parties to come to the table and negotiate. The human cost of Israel’s current strategy in Lebanon is appalling to contemplate, and in all likelihood will create more hatred – fostering a new generation of anti-Israel fighters, rather than creating the basis for a durable peace. Läs mer…