Författare: Stefan Wolff Professor of International Security University

Since the infamous shouting match between the US president and Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president has been scrambling to try and repair what looked initially like a near-total breakdown in the relationship between the US and Ukraine.

Zelensky, urged by European leaders, including the British prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, and the Nato secretary general, Mark Rutte, has tried to mend his ties with Trump. The US president acknowledged as much in his first post-inauguration speech to congress on March 5, saying that he appreciated Zelensky’s readiness to work for peace under US leadership.

But that happened just 24 hours after he decided to halt all military aid to Ukraine. And since then, the new director of the CIA, John Ratcliffe, and national security adviser, Mike Waltz, have confirmed that intelligence sharing with Kyiv, which was critical to Ukraine’s ability to hit strategic targets inside Russia, has also been suspended.

Neither of these two moves will have an immediate game-changing effect on the war, but they certainly increase pressure on Ukraine to accept whatever deal Trump will ultimately make with Putin.

So far, so bad for Zelensky. Yet Trump’s manoeuvring does not only affect Ukraine. It has also had a profound impact on the relationship between the US and Europe. On Sunday March 2, in the aftermath of the White House debacle, Starmer convened an emergency meeting in London with a select number of European leaders, as well as the Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau.

This “coalition of the willing”“ has been in the making for some time now. Its members straddle the boundaries of the EU and Nato, including – apart from the UK – non-EU members Norway and Turkey. Since the relatively disappointing first-ever EU meeting solely focused on defence on February 3 – which was more notable for the absence of a European vision for the continent’s role and place in the Trumpian world order – Europe has embarked on a course of more than just rhetorical change.

The UK was first out of the blocks. Ahead of Starmer’s visit to Washington, the UK government announced on February 25 an increase of defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027. This was then followed on March 2 with a pledge of additional air defence missiles for Ukraine worth £1.6 billion.

Europe responds

In a crucial boost to defence spending at the EU level, the president of the European commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced the ”Rearm Europe” plan on March 4. It is projected to mobilise around €800 billion (£670 million) for European defence.

This includes a “national escape clause” for EU members, exempting national defence expenditures from the EU’s deficit rules. It also offers a new loan instrument worth up to €150 billion, allows for the use of already allocated funds in the EU budget for defence projects, and proposes partnerships with the private sector through the Savings and Investment Union and the European Investment Bank.

Perhaps most significantly, in Germany, the two main parties likely to form the next coalition government announced a major shift in the country’s fiscal policy on March 5, which will allow any defence spending above 1% of GDP to be financed outside the country’s strict borrowing rules.

This marks an important point of departure for Germany. Apart from what it means in fiscal terms, it also sends an important political signal that Germany – the continent’s largest economy – will use its financial and political muscle to strengthen the emerging coalition of the willing.

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Europe will need thousands more tanks and troops to mount a credible military defence without the US

Donald Trump reads a letter from Volodymyr Zelensky during his speech to Congress, March 4.

These are all important steps. Taken together, and provided that the current momentum is maintained, they are likely to accelerate Europe’s awakening to a world in which US security guarantees as no longer absolute.

The challenges that Europe faces on the way to becoming strategically independent from the US are enormous. But they are not insurmountable.

The conventional military threat posed by an aggressive and revanchist Russia is more easily manageable with the planned boost to conventional forces and air and cyber defences. Close cooperation with Ukraine will also add critical war-fighting experience which can boost the deterrent effect.

Europe for now, however, remains vulnerable in terms of its nuclear capabilities, especially if deprived of the US nuclear umbrella and faced with Russia’s regular threats to use its nuclear arsenal – the world’s largest nuclear power by warhead stockpiles.

But here, too, new strategic thinking is emerging. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, has indicated his willingness to discuss a more integrated European nuclear capability. And in Germany, a country with an otherwise very complex relationship with nuclear weapons, such a European approach has been debated, increasingly positively, for some time, starting during Trump’s first term in office between 2017 and 2021.

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Tectonic shift

A stronger, and strategically more independent Europe, even if it will take time to emerge, is also crucial for the war in Ukraine. Increased European defence spending, including aid for Ukraine, will help Kyiv in the short term to make up for at least some of the gaps left by the suspension – and possible complete cessation – of US military support.

In the long term, however, EU accession would possibly open up the route to a security guarantee for Ukraine under article 47.2 of the Lisbon treaty on European Union.

This so-called mutual defence clause has been derided in the past for lacking any meaningful European defence capabilities. But if the current European momentum towards beefing up the continent’s defences is sustained, it would acquire more teeth than it currently has.

With the benefit of hindsight, Zelensky may have walked away less empty handed from his clash with Trump last week than it seemed initially. If nothing else, Europeans have since then demonstrated not just in words but also in deeds that they are no longer in denial about just how dangerous Trump is and how much they are now on their own.

Threatened by both Moscow and Washington, Europe is now on the cusp of a second zeitenwende, the “epochal tectonic shift” that the then German chancellor Olaf Scholz acknowledged after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. They may finally even have found an answer to the question he posed at the time: “How can we, as Europeans and as the European Union, remain independent actors in an increasingly multi-polar world?” Läs mer…

The visit of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky to the White House has not gone to plan – at least not to his plan. There were extraordinary scenes as a press conference between Zelensky and Trump descended into acrimony, with the US president loudly berating his opposite number, who he accused of “gambling with world war three”.

“You either make a deal or we’re out,” Trump told Zelensky. His vice-president, J.D. Vance, also got in on the act, accusing the Ukrainian president of “litigating in front of the American media”, and saying his approach was “disrespectful”. At one point he asked Zelensky: “Have you said thank you even once?”

Reporters present described the atmosphere as heated with voices raised by both Trump and Vance. The New York Times said the scene was “one of the most dramatic moments ever to play out in public in the Oval Office and underscored the radical break between the United States and Ukraine since Mr Trump took office”.

Underlying the angry exchanges were differences between the Trump administration and the Ukrainian government over the so-called “minerals deal” that Zelensky was scheduled to sign. But any lack of Ukrainian enthusiasm for the deal is understandable.

In its present form, it looks more like a memorandum of understanding that leaves several vital issues to be resolved later. The deal on offer is the creation of what will be called a “reconstruction investment fund”, to be jointly owned and managed by the US and Ukraine.

Into the proposed fund will go 50% of the revenue from the exploitation of “all relevant Ukrainian government-owned natural resource assets (whether owned directly or indirectly by the Ukrainian government)” and “other infrastructure relevant to natural resource assets (such as liquified natural gas terminals and port infrastructure)”.

This means that private infrastructure – much of it owned by Ukraine’s wealthy oligarchs – is likely to become part of the deal. This has the potential of further increasing friction between Zelensky and some very powerful Ukrainians.

Meanwhile, US contributions are less clearly defined. The preamble to the agreement makes it clear that Ukraine already owes the US. The very first paragraph notes that “the United States of America has provided significant financial and material support to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022”.

This figure, according to Trump, amounts to US$350 billion (£278 billion). The actual amount, according to the Ukraine Support Tracker of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, is about half that.

Western and Ukrainian analysts have also pointed out that there may be fewer and less accessible mineral and rare earth deposits in Ukraine than are currently assumed. The working estimates have been based mostly on Soviet-era data.

Since the current draft leaves details on ownership, governance and operations to be determined in a future fund agreement, Trump’s very big deal is at best the first step. Future rounds of negotiations are to be expected.

Statement of intent

From a Ukrainian perspective, this is more of a strength than a weakness. It leaves Kyiv with an opportunity to achieve more satisfactory terms in future rounds of negotiation. Even if any improvements will only be marginal, it keeps the US locked into a process that is, overall, beneficial for Ukraine.

‘Not for sale’: supporters of Ukraine protest in Washington, February 2025.
Matthew Rodier/Sipa USA/Alamy Live News

Take the example of security guarantees. The draft agreement offers Ukraine nothing anywhere near Nato membership. But it notes that the US “supports Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace”, adding that: “Participants will seek to identify any necessary steps to protect mutual investments.”

The significance of this should not be overstated. At its bare minimum, it is an expression of intent by the US that falls short of security guarantees but still gives the US a stake in the survival of Ukraine as an independent state.

But it is an important signal both in terms of what it does and does not do – a signal to Russia, Europe and Ukraine.

Trump does not envisage that the US will give Ukraine security guarantees “beyond very much”. He seems to think that these guarantees can be provided by European troops (the Kremlin has already cast doubts on this idea).

But this does not mean the idea is completely off the table. On the contrary, because the US commitment is so vague, it gives Trump leverage in every direction.

He can use it as a carrot and a stick against Ukraine to get more favourable terms for US returns from the reconstruction investment fund. He can use it to push Europe towards more decisive action to ramp up defence spending by making any US protection for European peacekeepers contingent on more equitable burden-sharing in Nato.

And he can signal to the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, that the US is serious about making a deal stick – and that higher American economic stakes in Ukraine and corporate presence on the ground would mean US-backed consequences if the Kremlin reneges on a future peace agreement and restarts hostilities.

That these calculations will ultimately lead to the “free, sovereign and secure Ukraine” that the agreement envisages is not a given.

For now, however, despite all the shortcomings and vagueness of the deal on key issues –– and the very public argument between the parties – it still looks like it serves all sides’ interests in moving forward in this direction.

This article has been updated with details of the meeting between Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump. Läs mer…

There has been much and justified focus on the implications of a likely deal between US president Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin and the overwhelmingly negative consequences this will have for Ukraine and Europe. But if Trump and Putin make a deal, there is much more at stake than Ukraine’s future borders and Europe’s relationship with the US.

As we are nearing the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s future is more in doubt than it has ever been since February 2022. For once, analogies to Munich in 1938 are sadly appropriate. This is not because of a mistaken belief that Putin can be appeased, but rather because great powers, once again, make decisions on the fate of weaker states and without them in the room.

Similar to the pressure that Czechoslovakia experienced from both Germany and its supposed allies France and Britain in 1938, Ukraine is now under pressure from Russia on the battlefield and the US both diplomatically and economically. Trump and his team are pushing hard for Ukraine to make territorial concessions to Russia and accept that some 20% of Ukrainian lands under Russia’s illegal occupation are lost. In addition, Trump demands that Ukraine compensate the United States for past military support by handing over half of its mineral and rare earth resources.

The American refusal to provide tangible security guarantees not only for Ukraine but also for allied Nato troops if they were deployed to Ukraine as part of a ceasefire or peace agreement smacks of the Munich analogy. Not only did France and Britain at the time push Czechoslovakia to cede the ethnic German-majority Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. They also did nothing when Poland and Hungary also seized parts of the country. And they failed to respond when Hitler – a mere six months after the Munich agreement – broke up what was left of Czechoslovakia by creating a Slovak puppet state and occupying the remaining Czech lands.

There is every indication that Putin is unlikely to stop in or with Ukraine. And it is worth remembering that the second world war started 11 months after Neville Chamberlain thought he had secured “peace in our time”.

The Munich analogy may not carry that far, however. Trump is not trying to appease Putin because he thinks, as Chamberlain and Daladier did in 1938, that he has weaker cards than Putin. What seems to drive Trump is a more simplistic view of the world in which great powers carve out spheres of influence in which they do not interfere.

The state of the conflict in Ukraine, February 20 2025.
Institute for the Study of War

The problem for Ukraine and Europe in such a world order is that Ukraine is certainly not considered by anyone in Trump’s team as part of an American zone of influence, and Europe is at best a peripheral part of it.

Trump-eye lens on the world

For Trump, this isn’t really about Ukraine or Europe but about re-ordering the international system in a way that fits his 19th-century view of the world in which the US lives in splendid isolation and virtually unchallenged in the western hemisphere. In this world view, Ukraine is the symbol of what was wrong with the old order. Echoing the isolationism of Henry Cabot, Trump’s view is that the US has involved itself into too many different foreign adventures where none of its vital interests were at stake.

Restored hope: Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky with US special envoy Keith Kellogg in Kyiv, February 20.
EPA-EFE/Sergey Dolzhenko

Echoing Putin’s talking points, the war against Ukraine no longer is an unjustified aggression but was, as Trump has now declared, Kyiv’s fault. Ukraine has become the ultimate test that the liberal international order failed to pass.

The war against Ukraine clearly is a symbol of the failure of the liberal international order, but hardly its sole cause. In the hands of Trump and Putin it has become the tool to deal it a final blow. But while the US and Russia, in their current political configurations, may have found it easy to bury the existing order, they will find it much harder to create a new one.

The push-back from Ukraine and key European countries may seem inconsequential for now, but even without the US, the EU and Nato have strong institutional roots and deep pockets. For all the justified criticism of the mostly aspirational responses from Europe so far, the continent is built on politically and economically far stronger foundations than Russia and the overwhelming majority of its people have no desire to emulate the living conditions in Putin’s want-to-be empire.

Nor will Trump and Putin be able to rule the world without China. A deal between them may be Trump’s idea of driving a wedge between Moscow and Beijing, but this is unlikely to work given Russia’s dependence on China and China’s rivalry with the US.

If Trump makes a deal with Xi as well, for example over Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea, let alone over Taiwan, all he would achieve is further retrenchment of the US to the western hemisphere. This would leave Putin and Xi to pursue their own, existing deal of a no-limits partnership unimpeded by an American-led counter-weight.

From the perspective of what remains of the liberal international order and its proponents, a Putin-Xi deal, too, has an eerie parallel in history – the short-lived Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939. Only this time, there is little to suggest that the Putin-Xi alliance will break down as quickly. Läs mer…

European leaders are scrambling to respond to what looks like the end of reliable US protection of the continent. It is unclear what the “main European countries” (which includes the UK) might be able to agree at a hastily convened meeting in Paris on Monday February 17. But individual countries, including the UK and Germany, have come forward to put concrete offers on the table for Ukraine’s security, which could include putting their troops on the ground.

This unusual circling of the wagons was triggered by the 2025 Munich Security Conference, which ended the previous day. It brought to a close a week of remarkable upheaval for Europe, leaving no doubt that two already obvious trends in the deteriorating transatlantic relationship accelerated further.

What the world saw was unabashed US unilateralism when it comes to the war in Ukraine. Ominously, there was also a clear indication of the extent of American intentions to interfere in the domestic political processes of European countries – most notably the upcoming German parliamentary elections on February 23.

None of this should have come as a surprise. But the full-force assault by Donald Trump’s envoys to Europe was still sobering – especially once all its implications are considered. What was, perhaps, more surprising was that European leaders pushed back and did so in an unusually public and unequivocal way.

Over the course of just a few days, two of the worst European fears were confirmed. First, the Trump administration is pushing ahead with its idea of a US-Russia deal to end the war in Ukraine. And all the signs are that Washington plans to leave Ukraine and the EU out of any negotiations and to their own devices when it comes to post-ceasefire security arrangements.

On February 12, the US president announced he had spoken at length with Russian president Vladimir Putin, and subsequently informed Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky of the conversation. The same day, US defence secretary Pete Hegseth, confirmed at a press conference after a meeting of Nato defence ministers in Brussels that direct negotiations between Russia and the US would begin immediately. They will not include any European or Ukrainian officials, he said.

Hegseth also poured cold water on any hopes that there would be robust US security guarantees for Ukraine. He explicitly ruled out US troops for any peacekeeping forces deployed by other Nato members, or that any attack on those forces would be considered an attack on the whole alliance under article 5 of the Nato treaty.

The European response was swift and, at least on paper, decisive. Right after Hegseth’s comments in Brussels, the Weimar+ group (Germany, France, Poland + Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, the EU’s diplomatic service and the European Commission) issued a joint statement reiterating their commitment to enhanced support in defence of Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

On February 14, the EU’s top officials – European council president António Costa and European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen – met with Zelensky on the margins of the conference. They assured him of the EU’s “continued and stable support to Ukraine until a just, comprehensive and lasting peace is reached”.

The following day, Costa’s speech in Munich reiterated this commitment. Similar to earlier comments by Nato’s secretary general, Mark Rutte, Costa underlined Europe’s determination to “to act better, stronger and faster in building the Europe of defence”.

But these declarations of the EU’s determination to continue supporting Ukraine do not reflect consensus inside the Union on such a position. Weimar+ only includes a select number of EU member states, institutions and the UK, underlining the continuing difficulties in achieving unanimity on critical security and defence issues. Unsurprisingly, Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, issued a scathing condemnation of the Weimar+ statement as a “sad testament of bad Brusselian leadership”.

Orbán’s comments play right into many Europeans’ fears about another dark side of Trump’s agenda when it comes to transatlantic relations. As foreshadowed in the influential Project 2025 report by a coalition of conservative US thinktanks, the Trump administration is intent on weakening European unity. This will include preventing the UK from slipping “back into the orbit of the EU” and “developing new allies inside the EU – especially the Central European countries”.

Opening up divides

The US vice-president, J.D. Vance, used his speech in Munich to claim that the real threat to European security was not coming from Russia or China, but rather “from within”. He went on to chide “EU commissars” and insinuated that Europe’s current leaders had more in common with the “tyrannical forces on this continent” who lost the cold war.

Crisis talks: Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky meets with US vice-president J.D. Vance on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference.
EPA-EFE/Ukrainian presidential press service

In Romania, where presidential elections were cancelled after evidence of massive Russian election interference emerged, opposition parties revelled in Vance’s comments that the move had been based on the “flimsy suspicions of an intelligence agency and enormous pressure from its continental neighbours”. The vice-president has further exacerbated political divisions in a key European and Nato ally right on the border with Ukraine.

Vance subsequently sought out Alice Weidel, the co-leader of the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD). The pair reportedly discussed the war in Ukraine, German domestic politics and the so-called brandmauer. This is the agreement between centre-right and left-wing parties in Germany to form a “firewall” to prevent extreme right-wing parties from joining coalitions, which has recently been weakened.

Their meeting was widely criticised as yet another American attempt for the party to boost its chances at Germany’s upcoming parliamentary elections on February 23. Referring to Germany’s historical experience with Nazism, the German chancellor, Olaf Scholz defended the need to hold the line against far-right political parties like the AfD.

Polar shift

There have been many watershed moments and wake-up calls for Europe in the past. What is different now is that a new multipolar order is emerging – and Europe is not one of its poles. Equally importantly, given the determination of this US administration to upend the existing international order, Europe is not a part of any pole anymore either.

Simultaneously at stake are European unity and the transatlantic relationship. These are the two key pillars that have ensured European security, democracy and prosperity since the end of the second world war. Out of necessity, Europe will most likely have to adjust to a much-weakened transatlantic relationship. But the European project will not survive without unity.

This is a critical juncture for Europe. The continent needs to define its future place and role in the dysfunctional love triangle of Trump, Putin and Xi, a triumvirate that will shape and dominate the new global order. Läs mer…