Författare: Sara Harmouch Ph.D. candidate in Public Affairs American Uni

The deadly Jan. 1, 2025, attack in New Orleans serves as a reminder of the persistent threat to the U.S. from individuals inspired by extremist Islamist groups.

While the investigation is still ongoing, some details of the suspect have been released. Authorities say Shamsud-Din Jabbar, a U.S. Army veteran, was behind the assault in which a truck was driven into a dense crowd in New Orleans’ French Quarter a few hours after midnight, killing at least 15 people and injuring dozens more. Jabbar, who died in a shootout with police, had pledged loyalty to the Islamic State group in online videos posted on Dec. 31, according to the FBI.

It represents the first major assault on an American city by an individual purportedly influenced by the Islamic State group, or one of its affiliates, since a 2017 truck assault in New York City that killed eight.

The New Orleans attack, like that earlier incident, underscores an important point: While the Islamic State group’s territorial caliphate – the area in Syria and Iraq in which it assumed both political and religious authority and sought to enforce its interpretation of Islamic law – has been dismantled, the group’s ability to inspire acts of terror on U.S. soil through online propaganda and ideological influence remains alarmingly potent.

As a terrorism expert and a scholar specializing in radical Islamist militant groups, I believe the case of Jabbar – an American solider who was radicalized in the U.S. – echoes similar lone wolf attacks in the West over the past decade.

With lost territory in the Middle East, the Islamic State has sought to exploit personal grievances, mental health struggles and ideological vulnerabilities, transforming isolated individuals in the West into deadly instruments of violence.

An attack inspired by the Islamic State

The New Year’s Day attack took place in New Orleans’ famous French Quarter. At about 3:15 a.m., Jabbar plowed his truck into a dense crowd along the popular Bourbon Street.

In the immediate aftermath, investigators discovered a black banner in his vehicle used by many Islamist militant groups, including the Islamic State.

While the Islamic State has not yet officially claimed the attack in any of its social media platforms, subsequent reviews of Jabbar’s online activity revealed videos posted just hours before the incident, in which he pledged allegiance to the group. On Jan. 2, Christopher Raia of the FBI’s counterterrorism division said Jabba was “100% inspired by ISIS,” using an alternative name for the group.

New Orleans attack suspect Shamsud-Din Jabbar had pledged loyalty to the Islamic state group.
FBI/AFP via Getty Images

Jabbar’s background adds complexity to the narrative. A 42-year-old veteran, he had no prior known links to extremist networks, according to the FBI, underscoring the challenge posed by self-radicalized individuals who operate outside the scope of traditional terrorist cells.

At this early stage of the investigation, it appears the attack was planned independently, driven by an ideological alignment with the Islamic State group rather than at the direction of any its leaders. This highlights the decentralized and unpredictable nature of the current terrorist threat landscape.

The growing threat of lone actor attacks

At the height of its power in 2014-2015, the Islamic State group controlled significant territory across Syria and Iraq, establishing a self-declared caliphate. While this physical caliphate was dismantled by 2019 following sustained efforts by the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State, the group continues to operate, conduct and inspire attacks.

Lone wolf attacks, inspired by Islamic State group propaganda but lacking direct operational support, have become the hallmark of the post-caliphate era.

By inspiring individuals to carry out attacks independently, the Islamic State group aims to create an atmosphere of fear and instability, demonstrating its global influence despite lacking a physical caliphate.

It has actively sought to radicalize and mobilize individuals in the U.S. through digital platforms, spreading violent narratives and offering tactical guidance to potential attackers.

This strategy allows the group to maintain relevance and project strength despite its physical losses in the Middle East.

The New Orleans incident follows a pattern seen in previous attacks in the West — such as the 2016 Nice truck attack in France, the 2016 Berlin Christmas Market attack and the 2017 London Bridge attack. In each case, individuals were motivated by the Islamic State group’s call to action, using readily available means – vehicles, knives or firearms – to inflict mass casualties.

This model of terrorism is not only low-cost but also difficult for intelligence agencies to intercept, as it often lacks the logistical trail associated with larger, coordinated plots.

Ideological reach and online propaganda

A critical component of the Islamic State group’s continued influence is its sophisticated use of online platforms to spread propaganda.

Even after significant efforts by social media companies to dismantle extremist content, the Islamic State group, al-Qaida and their affiliates have adapted by migrating to encrypted messaging services, dark web forums and niche platforms.

These digital spaces enable extremist groups to distribute radical content, call for violence and foster a sense of global community among supporters.

Jabbar’s apparent radicalization is, I believe, likely to have been driven by such online materials – more will be known when the FBI is through investigating the many phones and laptops agents retrieved after the attack.

Such online propaganda frequently blends religious rhetoric with narratives of personal empowerment and martyrdom. The psychological appeal of Islamic State group propaganda lies in its ability to offer disenfranchised individuals a sense of purpose, framing violence as a form of spiritual fulfillment and resistance against perceived oppression.

The case of Jabbar also raises broader questions about domestic radicalization within the United States.

Individuals like Jabbar – who are not part of any terrorist cell and seemingly have no prior known links to extremism – are often able to operate undetected until they commit acts of violence.

Police say the driver who plowed into a crowded street in New Orleans acted alone but was inspired by Islamic State.
Michael DeMocker/Getty Images

Islamist militant groups’ Western strategy

The Islamic State group’s broader strategy in inspiring lone actor attacks extends beyond mere acts of violence.

By inciting terror in Western nations, the group aims to polarize societies, foster anti-Muslim sentiment and provoke overreactions from governments — conditions that can fuel further radicalization and recruitment.

This cycle of violence and social division serves not just the Islamic State’s but other Islamist militant groups’ long-term objective of destabilizing the West and reinforcing its narrative of a civilizational clash between Islam and the West.

Attacks such as that in New Orleans serve as powerful propaganda tools, demonstrating that the Islamic State group’s ideology remains alive despite its territorial losses. Each successful attack amplifies the perception of the Islamic State group’s resolve, bolstering the morale of supporters and attracting new recruits.

The New Orleans attack is a sobering reminder that the influence of extremist Islamist groups extends far beyond the borders of the Middle East. As the Islamic State and other radical militant groups evolve and adapt, the threat of lone wolf attacks looms over the United States and other nations. Läs mer…

The deadly Jan. 1, 2025, attack in New Orleans serves as a reminder of the persistent threat to the U.S. from individuals inspired by extremist Islamist groups.

While the investigation is still ongoing, some details of the suspect have been released. Authorities say Shamsud-Din Jabbar, a U.S. Army veteran, was behind the assault in which a truck was driven into a dense crowd in New Orleans’ French Quarter a few hours after midnight, killing at least 15 people and injuring dozens more. Jabbar, who died in a shootout with police, had pledged loyalty to the Islamic State group in online videos posted on Dec. 31, according to the FBI.

It represents the first major assault on an American city by an individual purportedly influenced by the Islamic State group, or one of its affiliates, since a 2017 truck assault in New York City that killed eight.

The New Orleans attack, like that earlier incident, underscores an important point: While the Islamic State group’s territorial caliphate – the area in Syria and Iraq in which it assumed both political and religious authority and sought to enforce its interpretation of Islamic law – has been dismantled, the group’s ability to inspire acts of terror on U.S. soil through online propaganda and ideological influence remains alarmingly potent.

As a terrorism expert and a scholar specializing in radical Islamist militant groups, I believe the case of Jabbar – an American solider who was radicalized in the U.S. – echoes similar lone wolf attacks in the West over the past decade.

With lost territory in the Middle East, the Islamic State has sought to exploit personal grievances, mental health struggles and ideological vulnerabilities, transforming isolated individuals in the West into deadly instruments of violence.

An attack inspired by the Islamic State

The New Year’s Day attack took place in New Orleans’ famous French Quarter. At about 3:15 a.m., Jabbar plowed his truck into a dense crowd along the popular Bourbon Street.

In the immediate aftermath, investigators discovered a black banner in his vehicle used by many Islamist militant groups, including the Islamic State.

While the Islamic State has not yet officially claimed the attack in any of its social media platforms, subsequent reviews of Jabbar’s online activity revealed videos posted just hours before the incident, in which he pledged allegiance to the group. On Jan. 2, Christopher Raia of the FBI’s counterterrorism division said Jabba was “100% inspired by ISIS,” using an alternative name for the group.

New Orleans attack suspect Shamsud-Din Jabbar had pledged loyalty to the Islamic state group.
FBI/AFP via Getty Images

Jabbar’s background adds complexity to the narrative. A 42-year-old veteran, he had no prior known links to extremist networks, according to the FBI, underscoring the challenge posed by self-radicalized individuals who operate outside the scope of traditional terrorist cells.

At this early stage of the investigation, it appears the attack was planned independently, driven by an ideological alignment with the Islamic State group rather than at the direction of any its leaders. This highlights the decentralized and unpredictable nature of the current terrorist threat landscape.

The growing threat of lone actor attacks

At the height of its power in 2014-2015, the Islamic State group controlled significant territory across Syria and Iraq, establishing a self-declared caliphate. While this physical caliphate was dismantled by 2019 following sustained efforts by the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State, the group continues to operate, conduct and inspire attacks.

Lone wolf attacks, inspired by Islamic State group propaganda but lacking direct operational support, have become the hallmark of the post-caliphate era.

By inspiring individuals to carry out attacks independently, the Islamic State group aims to create an atmosphere of fear and instability, demonstrating its global influence despite lacking a physical caliphate.

It has actively sought to radicalize and mobilize individuals in the U.S. through digital platforms, spreading violent narratives and offering tactical guidance to potential attackers.

This strategy allows the group to maintain relevance and project strength despite its physical losses in the Middle East.

The New Orleans incident follows a pattern seen in previous attacks in the West — such as the 2016 Nice truck attack in France, the 2016 Berlin Christmas Market attack and the 2017 London Bridge attack. In each case, individuals were motivated by the Islamic State group’s call to action, using readily available means – vehicles, knives or firearms – to inflict mass casualties.

This model of terrorism is not only low-cost but also difficult for intelligence agencies to intercept, as it often lacks the logistical trail associated with larger, coordinated plots.

Ideological reach and online propaganda

A critical component of the Islamic State group’s continued influence is its sophisticated use of online platforms to spread propaganda.

Even after significant efforts by social media companies to dismantle extremist content, the Islamic State group, al-Qaida and their affiliates have adapted by migrating to encrypted messaging services, dark web forums and niche platforms.

These digital spaces enable extremist groups to distribute radical content, call for violence and foster a sense of global community among supporters.

Jabbar’s apparent radicalization is, I believe, likely to have been driven by such online materials – more will be known when the FBI is through investigating the many phones and laptops agents retrieved after the attack.

Such online propaganda frequently blends religious rhetoric with narratives of personal empowerment and martyrdom. The psychological appeal of Islamic State group propaganda lies in its ability to offer disenfranchised individuals a sense of purpose, framing violence as a form of spiritual fulfillment and resistance against perceived oppression.

The case of Jabbar also raises broader questions about domestic radicalization within the United States.

Individuals like Jabbar – who are not part of any terrorist cell and seemingly have no prior known links to extremism – are often able to operate undetected until they commit acts of violence.

Police say the driver who plowed into a crowded street in New Orleans acted alone but was inspired by Islamic State.
Michael DeMocker/Getty Images

Islamist militant groups’ Western strategy

The Islamic State group’s broader strategy in inspiring lone actor attacks extends beyond mere acts of violence.

By inciting terror in Western nations, the group aims to polarize societies, foster anti-Muslim sentiment and provoke overreactions from governments — conditions that can fuel further radicalization and recruitment.

This cycle of violence and social division serves not just the Islamic State’s but other Islamist militant groups’ long-term objective of destabilizing the West and reinforcing its narrative of a civilizational clash between Islam and the West.

Attacks such as that in New Orleans serve as powerful propaganda tools, demonstrating that the Islamic State group’s ideology remains alive despite its territorial losses. Each successful attack amplifies the perception of the Islamic State group’s resolve, bolstering the morale of supporters and attracting new recruits.

The New Orleans attack is a sobering reminder that the influence of extremist Islamist groups extends far beyond the borders of the Middle East. As the Islamic State and other radical militant groups evolve and adapt, the threat of lone wolf attacks looms over the United States and other nations. Läs mer…

The fall of President Bashar al-Assad has left a critical question: After a half-century of brutal dynastic rule has come to an end, who speaks for Syrians now?

One group staking a major claim for that role is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which, under the leadership of Abu Mohammad al-Golani, spearheaded the opposition advance that toppled Assad.

But what does the group stand for? And who is al-Golani? The Conversation turned to Sara Harmouch, an expert on Islamist militant groups, for answers.

What is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham?

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has its roots in the early stages of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011 as a popular uprising against the autocratic government of Assad.

The group originated as an offshoot of the Nusra Front, the official al-Qaida affiliate in Syria. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was initially recognized for its combat effectiveness and its commitment to global jihadist ideology, or the establishment of strict Islamic rule across the Muslim world.

In a shift in 2016, the Nusra Front publicly cut ties with al-Qaida and adopted the new name Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, which means “Front for the Conquest of the Levant.”

The following year, it merged with several other factions in the Syrian war to become Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or the “Organization for the Liberation of the Levant.”

This rebranding aimed to move away from al-Qaida’s global jihadist agenda, which had limited the group’s appeal within Syria. It allowed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to focus on issues specific to Syrians, such as local governance, economic issues and humanitarian aid.

Despite these changes, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s core ideology continues to be rooted in jihadism, with the primary objective of overthrowing the Assad government and establishing Islamic rule in Syria.

Who is al-Golani? How central is he to the group’s success?

Abu Mohammed al-Golani was born Ahmed al-Sharaa in 1982 in Saudi Arabia.

Al-Golani spent his early years in Damascus, Syria, after his family returned from Saudi Arabia in 1989. His jihadist career began in Iraq, where he joined fighters aligned with al-Qaida after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion.

In 2011, under the direction of Iraqi militant and then-al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Golani was tasked with establishing the Nusra Front in Syria.

The group quickly became a formidable force within the Syrian civil war.

It was under al-Golani’s leadership that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham sought to portray itself as pragmatic, less focused on global jihad and more on governance issues in the region of Idlib, Syria’s largest rebel stronghold.

This shift in strategy forms part of al-Golani’s effort to transform his national and global image from that of a jihadist leader to a more politically viable figure in Syrian politics.

Al-Golani’s shift toward a more pragmatic approach, particularly post-2017, has been crucial in helping Hayat Tahrir al-Sham control territories and assert itself as a regional governing force. His recent moves, like adopting a more moderate persona and engaging in traditional public service, reflect al-Golani’s central role in the military and the political evolution of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – underpinning the group’s hold on power and its efforts at gaining legitimacy both locally and internationally.

Syrians celebrate after armed groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham oust President Bashar al-Assad.
Omer Alven/Anadolu via Getty Images

How did the group rise to become a major force in Syria?

To keep power over the territories it controlled, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham employed a mix of strategies that includes establishing governance systems that could provide stability and services while legitimizing their control in the eyes of local populations.

Aiming to expand and take more territory, the group’s leaders concluded that it needed to win over the international community to minimize international opposition and effectively work with the broader Syrian revolutionary movement.

This involved working with other actors in Syria, aiming to present a united front that could be more palatable to international observers and potential allies. To do that locally, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham brought many groups within Syria under its control. Regionally and internationally, it reshaped its image through public relations campaigns, such as engaging in social services.

Since 2017, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has been the prevailing force in Idlib, which, after government forces retook control of Aleppo in December 2016, emerged as the last major bastion for various rebel groups.

Over the years, the group has solidified its control in the region by functioning as a quasi-governmental entity, providing civil services and overseeing local affairs – such as controlling highways and collecting duties on commercial trucking – despite reports of human rights abuses.

In recent years, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s propaganda has emphasized protecting Syrian territory and its people from the Assad government.

This has helped the group enhance its position among local communities and other rebel groups.

In an effort to further burnish its image, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ramped up its public relations efforts, both at home and abroad. For example, it has engaged with international media and humanitarian organizations to negotiate – and film – aid deliveries to the areas it governs.

Doing so helped Hayat Tahrir al-Sham gain some local support, positioning itself as a defender of Sunni Muslim interests.

Meanwhile, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham bolstered its military capabilities by establishing a military academy, reorganizing its units into a more conventional military structure and creating specialized forces adept at executing coordinated and strategic attacks. The recent advance appears to be proof that this strategy has paid off.

What does the US think of the group and al-Golani?

The U.S. has long listed al-Golani as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and the Nusra Front as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

In May 2018, the U.S. State Department expanded this designation to include Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. As a result of these designations, the group and its members face legal restrictions, travel bans, asset freezes and banking restrictions.

Additionally, the State Department’s Rewards for Justice program is offering up to US$10 million for information on al-Golani.

However, news has been circulating that the U.S. is considering removing the $10 million bounty on the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader, while the United Kingdom is thinking of removing the group from its terror list.

What happens if al-Golani emerges as a post-Assad leader?

First, we should note that these are very early days, and it remains unclear what Syria will look like post-Assad.

But based on my years researching Islamic history and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, I’m willing to venture a few educated guesses. Historically, Islamic empires have used distinct governance frameworks to drive their expansion and administration, which might inform Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s approach to mirroring these successful strategies.

First, I think al-Golani is likely to strive for authentic religious leadership, positioning himself as a leader whose personal piety and adherence to Islamic principles align with the religious sentiments of the population at large.

This could be complemented by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emphasizing the role of Sunni Islam in Syria’s state functions and integrating religious legal practices into the nation’s laws.

Just as it has established on a localized scale, effective administration might become a cornerstone of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham governance. In Idlib, for example, the group established systems for taxation and community engagement. This is essential for building trust, especially among previously marginalized groups.

Additionally, by allowing some autonomy for regions within Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham could mitigate the risk of unrest, balancing strict Islamic law enforcement with Syria’s cultural and ethnic diversity.

Overall, should Hayat Tahrir al-Sham under al-Golani try to steer the formation of Syria’s new government, we might expect a governance approach that aims for a blend of traditional Islamic governance and modern statecraft, striving to stabilize and unify the diverse and war-torn country.

However, the group’s controversial status and history of militant activities could pose significant challenges in gaining widespread international recognition and internal support.

Sections of this article were first published in an article for The Conversation on Dec. 2, 2024. Läs mer…