Turkey is an incredibly powerful broker in the current world crisis, and a masterful negotiator

While Turkey’s government is struggling to deal with mass protests at home (after Istanbul’s mayor Ekrem Imamoglu was imprisoned), in foreign affairs it is in an increasingly strong position as a key power broker in deals with Europe, the US and Russia. At the crossroads between Asia and Europe, Turkey is strategically important to just about everyone, and is emerging as a clever negotiator.

Since the early 2000s, Turkey has relied on a foreign policy approach that emphasised cooperation instead of competition. Economic ties were a priority, which helped Turkey steadily improve its relationships with Russia, Iran and Syria.

While remaining a part of Nato and a major trading partner with the European Union, Turkey views its ties with Russia, Ukraine, China and countries in the Middle East as equally important. Turkey has shown that it will work with whatever government benefits its interests, and has taken advantage of regional conflicts to be a convenient ally when needed.

At the same time, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has no qualms about confronting both friends and rivals equally, giving it strategic flexibility.

Rocky relationship with Russia

Turkey is Russia’s second biggest trading partner. Ankara continues to rely on Russian gas and banking networks, doing over US$60 billion (£46.3 billion) in trade annually with Moscow. The Turkish relationship with Russia improved dramatically in 1995 when Russia stopped supporting the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and Turkey stopped supporting Chechen rebels.

Since then, Turkey has maintained a functional relationship with Russia, while never being pliant to Moscow.

Turkey was critical of Russia setting up military bases in Syria, in Tartus and Khmeimim and as it controls the airspace in northern Syria it also has the ability to restrict Russian access. Ankara has also used its military presence in Idlib, in northern Syria, to check Russian influence in the past. Turkey’s drone offensive in Idlib in 2020 helped the Syrian opposition and pushed back Syrian government and Russian-backed activity in the north-west.

The importance of the Black Sea

The Black Sea is another area of competition where Turkey has emerged with the upper hand during the war in Ukraine. Russia aimed to exercise control over the Black Sea, even seizing several Ukrainian ports which affected global grain supply in 2022.

But Turkey negotiated the release of millions of tonnes of grain and has ensured the safety of shipping routes through the Black Sea by enforcing the Montreux Convention. This 1936 agreement granted Turkish control over the shipping route between the Black Sea (through the Bosporus Strait, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles, through which hundreds of millions of tons tonnes of cargo pass each year) and the Mediterranean.

Citing the agreement, Turkey also restricted Russian reinforcements into the Black Sea, which has restricted Russian naval power considerably.

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Though Turkey has not levied sanctions on Russia and has kept its revenue streams open, Turkey also does not accept the Russian annexation of Crimea. With more than 5 million Turks claiming to have Crimean Tatar roots, Crimea has both strategic and historical importance to Turkey.

Yet, Turkey maintains communication with Moscow (and Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin are “dear friends”). Complicating this “friendship” is the fact that Turkey also supports Ukraine, supplying it with Bayraktar TB2 drones, heavy machine guns, laser-guided missiles, electronic warfare systems, armoured vehicles and protective gear.

Ultimately, Turkey wants Ukraine to remain independent in order to check Russian naval power in the Black Sea. As such, Turkey is likely to work with Nato to ensure that Ukraine is not defeated.

To that end, Turkey is willing to contribute peacekeepers to a post-ceasefire settlement, under the right conditions.

Meanwhile, Turkey has used the Ukraine conflict to diversify its supply routes for energy (relying more on suppliers from the Caucasus region and central Asia), to reduce its dependence on Russia. Turkey is in a strong position, especially with the discovery of gas reserves in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. Ankara aims to become an energy hub facilitating the transit of gas from the Caucasus, central Asia and Russia to Europe through the Trans-Anatolian natural gas pipeline.

Turkey and Syria

Turkey’s relationship with its neighbour Syria has also been pragmatic and shrewd. Turkey was able to pursue rapprochement with Syria in 2005, when Bashar al-Assad became the first Syrian president to visit Turkey since Syria gained its independence in 1946.

But while Erdoğan maintained a relationship (to prevent Syria from moving even closer to Iran), he ultimately chose to abandon this relationship when it no longer suited him. He hosted anti-Assad figures in Turkey from time to time, and created a safe zone on its border which housed displaced Syrians and armed fighters. He gave rebels the go-ahead to oust Assad in 2024.

Just as the war in Syria provided Turkey with opportunities, so too has the conflict in Ukraine. Ankara has strengthened its bargaining position and pushed for greater diplomatic and economic concessions from western allies. Turkey is taking advantage of the US’s retreat from Nato to push for closer cooperation with Europe.

Turkey also is taking advantage of Donald Trump’s more lenient policies towards Russia to improve its relationship with the US. This is primarily based on wanting to improve defence cooperation. During the cold war, Turkey relied on the US for arms, funding and equipment, but was not able to use these weapons without US authorisation.

After 1989, Turkey carved out different markets for its weapons imports and faced US sanctions for buying S-400 surface-to-air missiles from Russia in 2020. Turkey would like to purchase F-35 supersonic fighter jets from the US, and is hoping that the US will move away from sanctioning third countries that have engaged with Russia.

Whose critical ally?

Turkey has made sure that it is not seen by the US as a junior partner in the Middle East region. For example, when Turkey launched operations in north-east Syria in 2019, where it repeatedly fired close to US forces, the US offered no military response.

The US sees Turkey as a key ally in spite of some different strategic goals. In addition to its geopolitical importance, Turkey also hosts US and Nato military forces at several of its bases and US nuclear weapons (20 B61 nuclear bombs) at its Incirlik Air Force Base.

Turkey now wants to expand its diplomatic and military footprint. As a member of the G20, with one of the 20 biggest economies in the world and the second largest and second most powerful military force in Nato after the US, it has a lot of power. And in geopolitical juggling, currently Turkey is in the luxurious position of everyone wanting Ankara to be on their side. Läs mer…

Ukraine war: how Zelensky rebuilt his relationship with Trump to turn the tables on Putin

After Donald Trump’s “very good and productive” phone call with Vladimir Putin earlier this week, all eyes were on his subsequent call with Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky.

Would it, when they last met in the flesh on February 28 at the White House, descend into disastrous acrimony? Or would Zelensky manage to engage with the US president in a cooperative way that encourages him to see Ukraine and its leader in a more favourable light?

The latter, it seems. In a post on his Truth Social site, Trump referred to their “very good telephone call”, which got the two leaders “very much on track”. Zelensky for his part, talked of a “very good” and “frank” phone call and seemed to agree with everything the US president had to say, taking pains to emphasise and praise Trump and America’s leadership.

With his vocal support of Trump’s proposal for peace, Zelensky has put the attention back on Putin. He clearly wants to appear to be the more reasonable negotiating partner by going along with the US president’s proposals.

In spite of Zelensky’s misgivings about how trustworthy Putin is, he has agreed to a limited ceasefire with Russia on energy infrastructure (while stressing that, unlike Putin, he agrees with Trump’s aim for a complete ceasefire).

Zelensky clearly knows that Russia has a great deal to gain from a pause on attacks on energy grids and oil refineries, given Ukraine’s increasing capacity to use long-range drone attacks. And a maritime ceasefire, if agreed, would also favour Russia.

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But by publicly voicing Ukraine’s support for Trump’s plan for a ceasefire, Zelensky has exposed Putin’s disinterest in stopping hostilities.

In the call, Zelensky emphasised that Ukraine was happy to support the US call for a ceasefire, without conditions. Putin, meanwhile, in his call with Trump laid out a set of frankly unreasonable demands.

These included the complete cessation of military aid and intelligence sharing by Ukraine’s allies, including the US. He also demanded a complete halt on Ukrainian troop mobilisation and rearmament.

The demands were so ridiculous, they were designed to get Ukraine to reject them. Interestingly Trump, when he was interviewed after his phone call with Putin, denied that the pair had discussed aid. Crucially, he didn’t say whether this was something he would agree to.

But the fact that the two leaders discussed the possibility of an ice hockey match between their two countries is an indication of how Putin is able to manipulate the US president with flattery. It helps that Trump clearly admires Putin and has repeatedly said that he trusts the Russian leader.

Has Putin overplayed his hand?

But this could come with a time limit. Trump, who wants a peace deal to trumpet as a crowning achievement, could well get tired of the fact that Putin has made no concessions to allow that deal to progress.

The Russian leader is clearly hoping that by seeming to engage with the “peace” process, while at the same time dangling the prospect of doing business with Russia – for example by offering the US the chance to explore Russia’s own reserves of rare earth minerals – he can keep Trump on side.

But while Trump still leans toward Putin, his relationship with Zelensky seems to have improved. The Ukrainian president appears to have learned that Trump doesn’t have a long memory and that flattery goes a long way with the US president.

Trump, meanwhile, is no longer calling Zelensky a dictator, and as yet there is no mention of halting US military aid or intelligence to Ukraine. There is the opposite, in fact, as the US has said it will assist in finding more Patriot missile defence systems after Zelensky mentioned that they were sorely needed.

By giving Trump credit for the ceasefire initiative, Zelensky is putting the ball in Russia’s court. And his apparent receptiveness to Trump’s idea about the US taking over Ukraine’s nuclear power plants will appeal to Trump’s transactional instincts. In addition to offering Trump business deals, Zelensky is now consistently offering Trump praise for his peace efforts.

And it’s clear from the tone of the briefing given by White House press secretary, Karoline Leavitt, after the call that the US was happy with how it went. Leavitt stressed Zelensky’s praise for Trump’s leadership several times.

The White House reports on a “fantastic” phone call between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky.

Zelensky has also successfully turned Trump’s attention to the 35,000 missing children abducted from Ukraine into Russia during the war. The US state department had stopped tracking them and had deleted the evidence it had gathered, but Trump is now vowing to return the children home.

Putin is generally thought to be stringing these negotiations out as long as possible in order to maximise the amount of Ukrainian territory his army occupies. This could be a risky strategy.

Ending the war in Ukraine as quickly as possible was one of Trump’s repeated campaign promises. So the question is how long Trump can remain distracted or satisfied by Putin’s false engagement with the peace process.

The American president seems to be changing his tune on Ukraine more generally. His disastrous Oval Office press conference last month with Zelensky was viewed by some as a ploy to portray Ukraine as a difficult and ungrateful partner compared to Russia who he maintained was only interested in achieving a peaceful end to the war. Now, with Zelensky seemingly agreeing with whatever Trump says, it’s become harder for him to take that line.

For now, at least, the pressure is back on Putin. Läs mer…