Författare: Christopher Isike Director African Centre for the Study of t

Donald Trump’s return as the president of the US in January 2025 is expected to usher in a transformation of US domestic and foreign affairs.

The implications of the second Trump presidency – Trump 2.0 – is debated across the world.

Many observers are hoping that Trump 2.0 will improve the fortunes of some countries, and end the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. Others fear it will cause major disruptions.

There is fear among some African observers that Trump will reduce US interest in the continent, as was the case during his first term.

Based on our ongoing research at the University of Pretoria’s African Centre for the Study of the US, we argue that Trump 2.0 could be a mixed bag, holding both promise and fear for Africa.

For example, a transactional approach to foreign engagement, and his preference for selective bilateral relations based on US strategic needs, could be positive for foreign relations, investment and trade with some African countries.

But it might also endanger African agency and voices in global affairs. It could be bad for democracy, stability, commitment to human rights and climate change. It might also negatively affect African immigration to the US.

America first policy

Trump’s America-first policy orientation means that interests and commitments to other countries and international affairs are secondary. Relations are based on their benefits to the US. Hence, US foreign policy interests and engagements would be tied to strategic security and economic demands.

This is a challenge for African countries with limited strategic importance to the US. For example, during Trump’s first term, (2017-2021), the US indicated interest in bilateral trade deals rather than the African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa). The act grants duty-free access to the US market for certain products from eligible African countries.

This will negatively affect countries benefiting from Agoa. It might benefit those that manage to secure deals with his administration. But it could also lead to fragmentation in US-Africa trade relations, hurting smaller economies with less bargaining power.

Immigration

Another area of concern for many in Africa is Trump’s proposed strict immigration policy. It will tighten the border and deport illegal immigrants. This could make even legitimate African immigration to the US difficult. About 3 million of the 19 million African emigrants between 1990 and 2020 went to the US and Canada.

Although Africa is one of the smallest contributors to the unauthorised immigrant population in the US, Trump’s policy will affect the US-Africa diaspora connection negatively.

Africa’s share of unauthorised immigrant populations in the US rose from 275,000 of about 10.5 million in 2019 to 375,000 of 11 million in 2022. Hundreds of thousands of Africans in the US could face deportation, affecting remittances from the US to Africa, which were US$13 billion in 2023.

Transactional relations

There is also apprehension that Trump’s transactional and contemptuous outlook towards Africa would negate President Joe Biden’s recognition of African agency, and his doctrine of equal partnership with the continent.

Trump’s approach could mean favourable engagements with strategic African partners, and little with Africa collectively. For example, unlike presidents Barack Obama and Biden, Trump didn’t organise a US-Africa Leaders Summit.

Democracy and human rights

There is uncertainty on how Trump will approach democracy and human rights promotion in Africa. He has displayed his love for autocracy and praised dictators.

This tendency endangers struggling democracies and the course of human rights in Africa. Some leaders may welcome reduced external scrutiny. But this could embolden authoritarian regimes, weaken political accountability, and affect governance standards where democratic institutions are fragile and democracy is declining. Examples include Burkina Faso, Guinea, Gabon, Mali and Niger.

Climate change

Trump believes climate change is a hoax. His return means uncertainty for global climate action, to the detriment of vulnerable African and other developing countries. His focus on fossil fuel expansion could roll back environmental policy. It might also limit US engagement with global climate action initiatives, and lead to reduced funding for African climate adaptation projects and clean energy investments. Given the continent’s high dependency on agriculture, such policy stances could worsen climate vulnerabilities in Africa.

It is also uncertain if Trump can sustain the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, a G7 initiative to drive sustainable and transparent investment in quality infrastructure around the world.

Several African countries such as Kenya, Sierra Leone and Mozambique have benefited from the US-led G7 digital infrastructure projects. Others – such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia – stand to benefit from the G7-funded construction of the new 800km rail line connecting these countries, the first open-access transcontinental rail network in Africa. Trump has equally promised massive tariffs on imports, leaving all US trade partners worried.

UN security council transformation

Finally, US support for two African permanent seats at the United Nations security council, promised by the Biden administration, is uncertain under Trump.

Hope and optimism

Still, Trump’s second coming could inspire some hope in three areas.

Firstly, he is unlikely to ignore the increasingly competitive nature of international relations, and Africa’s growing relations with China, Russia and other US competitors.

For example, in his first term, the US maintained a robust counterterrorism presence in Africa. It particularly targeted terrorist groups in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Trump 2.0 could therefore see increased military support for counterterrorism initiatives, with a preference for supporting allied nations such as Nigeria and Kenya. However, he might not commit US troops on the ground.

Secondly, Trump’s first term in office provides some reasons for hope of improved US-African trade relations. US trade with 49 African countries declined from US$104.7 billion at the end of President George W Bush’s tenure in 2008, to US$33.7 billion at the end of Obama’s term in 2016. Trade relations improved in the first two years of Trump, reaching US$40.9 billion before sliding to US$32.7 billion with the pandemic in 2020.

US foreign direct investment (FDI) in sub-Saharan Africa rose in the first two years of Trump’s first term, from US$33.7 billion at the end of Obama’ presidency in 2016 to US$39 billion in 2017 and US$40.9 billion in 2018, although it slid to US$32.6 billion the following year and was US$30 billion in 2020. Equally, Africa’s FDI in the US rose from US$4.6 billion in 2016 to US$9.8 billion in 2020.

Thirdly, Trump 1.0 prioritised investment over traditional aid models, arguing for

prosperity through partnership.

This was reflected in his India strategy; similarly with Kenya.

This stance could lead to cuts in humanitarian and development assistance to Africa, affecting health, education and infrastructure projects dependent on aid. However, it could spur Africans to look inwards and help themselves. This could be just what the continent needs to stop its dependency and take the African Continental Free Trade Area initiative seriously.

What should Africa do?

Despite the fear it raises, the second coming of Trump offers opportunities for self-development as Africa may be forced to depend less on US aid. Instead, it could look to harness its vast human and material resources for its own development.

As US priorities shift under Trump 2.0, African leaders will face decisions on how to navigate partnerships to secure investment, maintain political stability, and address the continent’s long-term development needs through inward-looking strategies. This bodes well for the continent in the long run.

In an increasingly multipolar world characterised by multiple powers challenging US hegemony, African countries have an opportunity to pursue diversified alliances. They must balance between US, Chinese, Russian and other international influences in ways that will benefit Africans. Läs mer…

In his first year in office, US president Joe Biden committed to resetting US-Africa relations based on a doctrine of equal partnership.

He sent his secretary of state, Antony Blinken, to Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria. The visit was used to outline the administration’s policy outlook towards Africa. It laid the ground for the official US-Africa policy commitment that Blinken launched the following year in South Africa.

Since then, there have been high level engagements between the US and African countries to deepen ties. They included visits by top cabinet members of the administration: vice-president Kamala Harris, secretary of defence Lloyd Austin and treasury secretary Janet Yellen. First lady Jill Biden also came.

Biden hosted a well attended US-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington DC in December 2022. Kenyan president William Ruto paid a state visit to the White House in May.

Yet our view, which is based on years of studying and writing on US and Africa relations, is that the Biden administration has not fulfilled its commitment to resetting US-Africa relations based on an equal partnership. It hasn’t recognised Africa’s growing agency in international affairs.

We argue that there has been a mismatch between the rhetoric and practice of an equal partnership. For example, African leaders or the African Union were not consulted about the agenda of the 2022 US-Africa Leaders Summit. This was also the case with the US’s Africa strategy.

This reflects the traditional paternalistic relationship of the US with Africa.

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Biden is due to visit Angola in December – his only African visit as president. A much more encouraging message of equal partnership would have been delivered if the US-Africa Leaders Summit, for example, had been held at the African Union headquarters in Ethiopia. Biden would have then been able to engage with African leaders in the continent early in his term.

A full diary of engagements

There are a number of positive indicators of Biden’s commitment to reset relations with Africa.

August 2022: The first tangible step was through the US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. This presented a shift in emphasis from great power politics (vis-a-vis China and Russia in Africa) and Trump’s America First diplomacy, to one of mutual respect and partnership (at least on paper) under Biden.

Priorities included fostering open societies, delivering democratic and security dividends, advancing pandemic recovery and economic opportunity, and supporting the climate agenda.

December 2022: The US-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington DC was attended by 49 African leaders, three months after the release of the Africa strategy. The focus was on

strengthening ties with African partners based on principles of mutual respect and shared interests and values.

Biden pledged US$55 billion in investments until 2025 to advance goals that aligned with shared priorities. The US is said to have allocated 80% of said funds.

The US used the summit to formally announce its support for the African Union’s membership of the G20. This was realised when the AU officially joined the G20 as a permanent member in 2023.

November 2023: Biden hosted Angolan president João Lourenço at the White House on an official visit. They discussed cooperation on the economy, security, energy, transport, telecommunications, agriculture and outer space.

May 2024: Kenyan president William Ruto’s state visit was the first by an African leader in more than 15 years.

September 2024: US ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield announced US support for Africa getting two permanent seats on the UN security council.

Finally, Biden’s visit to Angola, set for the first week in December would be the first by a US president since 2015.

What’s gone wrong

It’s possible to see serious flaws in the US approach towards Africa set against the expectation of an equal partnership.

Firstly, the US has attempted to undermine African agency through its bid to pressure African countries to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Many African countries chose non-alignment.

Secondly, the US championing two seats for Africa on the security council looks commendable on the surface. But the lack of veto power perpetuates power imbalances between Africa and the current permanent security council members – the US, France, the UK, Russia and China.

US vice-president Kamala Harris visited Zambian president Hakainde Hichilema in 2023.
Salim Dawood/AFP via Getty Images.

The question again is how equal the partnership is if Africa will be a junior member of the security council.

Thirdly, there has been a lack of joint agenda setting. African countries have made no input into US-Africa strategy or the US-Africa Leaders Summit.

Failing to consult African leaders, institutions and civil society on the continent’s own priorities reflects the same old practice of imposing priorities on African states. It looks like a continuation of the usual passing off of American national interests as African interests.

Fourthly, there have been challenges in implementing what’s set out in the US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. These have included inadequate resource allocation.

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US-Africa trade deal turns 25 next year: Agoa’s winners, losers and what should come next

Fifth, the Biden administration has used the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa) as diplomatic leverage over African countries. For example, in October 2023 it announced the removal of Uganda, Niger, Gabon and Central African Republic from the beneficiaries. Earlier, the administration removed Ethiopia, Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso. These countries were removed from Agoa for not complying with US human rights and political demands.

Between February and March 2024, the US Congress also considered the US-South Africa Bilateral Relations Bill, which risks South Africa’s exclusion from Agoa because of Pretoria’s position on the Israel/Palestine conflict.

Lastly, the fact that Biden is only visiting Africa in the last days of his presidency suggests Africa is not a priority. The fact that only one African head of state has been afforded a state visit to Washington reinforces this thinking.

If the US is serious about equal partnership, it mustn’t treat Africa as an afterthought. It must always consult African states in shaping policies that affect them and the continent.

Ruth Kasanga, a postgraduate student in the Department of Political Sciences and Research Assistant at the African Centre for the Study of the United States, University of Pretoria, made contributions to this article. Läs mer…