Författare: Amalendu Misra Professor of International Politics Lancaster

For weeks, Donald Trump has been stating his intention to take control of the Panama Canal, a critical 51-mile long waterway that connects the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

At a press conference on January 7, Trump was asked by a reporter whether the US could use military force to acquire the canal. He refused to rule it out and said “we need” the canal for economic security. The president-elect’s refusal to rule out invading Panama does not bode well for his respect for national borders in general, and in Latin America in particular.

The Panama Canal has always been intimately linked to external powers. The idea of connecting the two great oceans through a man-made channel was first mooted by Spanish explorer and conquistador Vasco Núñez de Balboa in the 16th century. But it wasn’t until the 1880s when the French, following their success with the construction of the Suez Canal in Egypt, started working on the project.

And it was finally finished during the US presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. From the inception of the US project in 1903 up until 1979, the Panama Canal and the surrounding area (extending five miles on both sides) remained a de facto US territory under the Panama Canal Zone treaty, or the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty as it was officially known.

The US and Panama would exercise joint control over the canal for next two decades, before the US turned it over to Panama in 1999.

Trump’s gripe

The construction of the canal was a major undertaking. It cost Americans around US$375 million (equivalent to around US$13 billion or £10.5 billion in today’s money), making it the single most expensive construction project in US history at that time.

The US has also certainly poured plenty of resources into the construction, maintenance and successful operation of this major international waterway. Of the 40,000 workers (many of whom were admittedly not American) who were employed in the canal’s construction, more than 5,600 perished to accidents and disease.

But Trump’s ire is directed at the injustice he feels has been done to the US by the Panamanians in recent years. He has falsely claimed that Panama has handed over the operation of this once mega US project to the Chinese.

On January 7, Trump stated: “Look, the Panama Canal is vital to our country. It’s being operated by China. China! And we gave the Panama Canal to Panama, we didn’t give it to China. And they’ve abused it. They’ve abused that gift. It should have never been made, by the way.”

A Hong Kong-based company called Hutchison-Whampoa does operate two of the ports on the ends of the canal. But the canal in its entirety is administered by an independent government agency, the Panama Canal Authority.

Owing to existing treaty arrangements between the US and Panama, Trump cannot take control of the canal legally. However, there is nothing stopping him from staging a military takeover. And there are precedents for this in the history of US interventions in Latin America.

In January 1990, for example, President George H. Bush oversaw the ousting of the former US protégé, Panamanian president Manuel Noriega. A month-long military invasion called Operation Just Cause, which was launched under the pretext of protecting US interests and security in the region, ultimately resulted in the deaths of 23 US soldiers, 150 Panamanian defence forces personnel and around 500 civilians.

Trump’s argument that the Panama Canal is a “vital national asset” for the US and “crucial” for the protection and promotion of its economy and security is likely to resonate with the hawks in his administration as well as his popular base.

Flames engulf buildings in Panama City during clashes between the Panamanian Defense Force and US troops during the invasion of Panama in December 1989.
Everett Collection / Shutterstock

The US role in Latin America

The US has repeatedly intervened in Latin American countries over the past 200 years. These interventions have primarily been undertaken to stop the spread of regimes and ideologies deemed inimical to US interests.

Although these interventions violated the sovereignty of nations, they were never explicitly about the US taking over foreign territories. Rather, they were about installing or supporting a leader that was felt to be in the US interest.

During the cold war years, for instance, the US orchestrated over a dozen coups d’etat in Latin America, from Brazil and Chile to El Salvador and Grenada. But it never occupied those nations’ territories.

Nonetheless, Trump’s latest rhetoric has justifiably rattled the Panamanians. In a video posted on social media in early December 2024, the country’s president, José Raúl Mulino, said: “As president, I want to clearly state that every square metre of the Panama Canal and its adjoining zone is Panama’s and will remain so.” Panamanian officials have since called Panama’s control of the waterway “non-negotiable”.

If Trump were to go ahead and take the canal by force, it would grossly undermine the position of the US in Latin America. It would also probably prompt many worried nations in the region to pull out from the Organisation of American States, the intergovernmental institution of which most North and South American and Caribbean countries are members.

Worse still, it could also encourage many of the fearful nations to openly seek military alliances with enemies of the US, such as Russia, China and Iran – an outcome that would far from strengthen US security. So, the actual chances of the incoming Trump administration taking the Panama Canal by force looks highly unlikely in practice. Läs mer…

Venezuela’s leader, Nicolás Maduro, will be sworn in as president for a record third term on January 10, four months after being declared the winner of the country’s highly contentious election. Maduro will receive the standard obeisance from his cronies and will hug the limelight, but plenty of Venezuelans will have very little to celebrate.

Both Maduro and opposition leader María Corina Machado, who is currently in hiding, have urged their supporters on to the streets on inauguration day. In a video message released on January 5, Machado said that Maduro will not step down on his own and that the Venezuelan people “must make him leave”.

Since Maduro assumed office in 2013, nearly 8 million Venezuelans have fled the country. Once proud and rich citizens of one of the most successful economies in Latin America, these refugees and migrants have been forced out of their homes due to grave political and economic mismanagement. Meanwhile, millions of others, too afraid or unable to flee, silently endure grinding socioeconomic instability and violent political persecution.

However, hopes of an end to his rule were raised in July 2024. A mild-mannered former diplomat named Edmundo González decided to take on Maduro as the opposition candidate in the country’s presidential election, and surged ahead in the polls. Venezuela’s highest court had barred the immensely popular Machado from running.

According to external observers, González won the popular vote and should have been sworn in as the president. But Maduro, who had publicly stated there would be a “bloodbath” across the country if he did not win the election, was declared as the winner by the government-aligned National Electoral Council. The electoral authorities did not provide detailed vote counts, only adding to suspicion.

The alleged rigging of the vote was strongly condemned by the international community. In November, the US government even recognised González as the “president-elect”, with the secretary of state, Anthony Blinken, taking to social media platform X to demand “respect for the will” of Venezuelan voters. Facing political reprisal, González first hid in the Dutch embassy in Caracas, and later fled to Spain where he was granted asylum.

González shakes hands with the Argentinian president Javier Milei who, alongside the EU, US and several Latin American countries, does not recognise Maduro’s victory.
Juan Ignacio Roncoroni / EPA

In recent weeks, González has returned to Latin America (with a stop in the US) on a tour to garner political support to oust Maduro. Rattled by González’s popularity within Venezuela and his very influential external support base, Maduro’s regime has offered a US$100,000 (£81,000) reward for information leading to his arrest. If González does turn up at the time of Maduro’s inauguration, as he has promised to do, there is also an arrest warrant waiting for him issued by a Venezuelan judge.

The critical question now is whether Maduro’s regime has reached a tipping point from where it can be dethroned with a little jolt?

Treading familiar territory

Venezuela has thrown up many challengers to Maduro’s rule in recent years. In the wake of elections in 2018 that were widely regarded as fraudulent, a lawmaker named Juan Guaidó declared himself as Venezuela’s president until free and fair elections could be held. He was, unsurprisingly, soon forced out of the country.

Helped by international backers, such as the US and Spain, Guaidó sought to lead an anti-Maduro popular revolution from outside Venezuela. However, the revolution never really took off. This was partly due to the government’s crackdown on the opposition and also to the lack of sustained international support for Guaidó.

Machado has fared little in her endeavour, too. Her campaign to end Maduro’s authoritarian rule has faced major roadblocks with González fleeing the country. And there’s a lack of political urgency in her campaign to bring about what she has called “a peaceful and orderly transition”. Maduro is simply not listening to – nor is he afraid of – Machado, González or anyone else.

The Maduro regime follows a well-trodden strategy to get rid of potential opposition leaders. It forces them into exile, discredits them on charges of anti-national activities and, worse still, imprisons them. With all the organs of government institutions on his regime’s payroll, Maduro has little difficulty discrediting and weakening those who challenge his authority.

Under these circumstances, the chances of González making any serious dent on Maduro’s political future remains unlikely. While the US, Argentina and many other countries have recognised González as Venezuela’s rightful president, the possibility of an externally orchestrated plan to rid Venezuela of its corrupt regime is extremely low.

If Cuba’s former revolutionary president, Fidel Castro, could relish in the fact that he outlived 11 US presidents, Maduro can certainly hope to ride out this political storm, having already outlasted three.

The only possible hope for change lies in the hands of Venezuelans. However, many of those capable of orchestrating a popular revolution have fled the country. And the Venezuelans left behind belong to two categories: those on the payroll of the Maduro government, and those too weak, powerless and diffident to engage in anything politically meaningful. Venezuela, it seems, has been truly orphaned. Läs mer…