Författare: Alexander Gillespie Professor of Law University of Waikato

The aftermath of one of the most undiplomatic – and notorious – White House meetings in recent history reveals a changed world.

Having berated Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky for supposedly not wanting peace with Russia and failing to show sufficient gratitude to the United States, President Donald Trump has now paused all military aid to Ukraine.

This equates to about 40% of the beleaguered nation’s military support. If the gap is not quickly covered by other countries, Ukraine will be severely compromised in its defence against the Russian invasion.

This has happened while the Russian army is making slow but costly gains along the front in eastern Ukraine. Trump’s goal appears to be to force Zelensky to accept a deal he does not want, and which may be illegal under international law.

New Zealand is a long way from that front line, but the implications of Trump’s unilateral abandonment of Ukraine still create a serious foreign policy problem.

Aside from its unequivocal condemnation of Russia’s actions, New Zealand has provided Defence Force personnel for training, intelligence, logistics and liaison to the tune of nearly NZ$35 million. The government has also given an additional $32 million in humanitarian assistance.

At the same time, New Zealand has supported global legal efforts to hold Russia to account at both the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. With Trump undermining these collective actions, New Zealand faces some stark choices.

Allies at war

While a genuine ceasefire and eventual peace in Ukraine are the right aims, Trump’s one-sided proposal has involved direct talks between Russia and the US, excluding all other parties, including the actual victims of Russian aggression.

With eery parallels to the Munich Agreement of 1938 between Nazi Germany, Britain, France and Italy, peace terms could be dictated to the innocent party. Ukraine may have to sacrifice part of its territory in the hope a wider peace prevails.

In exchange, Ukraine may be given some type of “security assurance”. But what that arrangement would look like, and what kind of peacekeeping force might be acceptable to Russia, remains unclear.

If the current UK and European ceasefire proposals fail, Europe could be pulled more directly into the conflict. Since the Trump rebuff, European leaders are embracing Zelenskyy more tightly, wary of an emboldened Russia threatening other states with substantial Russian populations such as in Estonia and Latvia.

European boots on the ground in Ukraine could escalate the existing war into a much larger and more dangerous conflict. The complexities of this new reality are now spilling over in the United Nations.

Britain’s Keir Starmer and France’s Emmanuel Macron meet Volodymyr Zelensky in London, March 2.
AAP

A fork in the road

While the Security Council finally agreed on a broad statement in favour of a lasting peace, just what that might look like has seen opposing resolutions in the General Assembly.

On February 18, 53 countries, including New Zealand, voted in favour of a resolution condemning Russian aggression and calling for the return of Ukrainian territory. The resolution passed, but the US, Russia, Belarus and North Korea voted against it.

The US then put up its own resolution calling for peace, without recognising Russian aggression or the illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. New Zealand supported this, too.

Those two votes clearly signal a fork-in-the-road moment for New Zealand.

As well as the wider consequences and potential precedents of any Ukraine peace settlement for security in Europe and the Pacific region, there is the immediate problem of supporting Ukraine.

With the US and Europe – both traditional allies of New Zealand – now deeply divided, whatever path the government chooses will directly affect present and future security arrangements – including any possible “pillar two” membership of AUKUS.

Potentially complicating matters further, Trump’s civilian lieutenant Elon Musk has publicly advocated for the US leaving the UN and NATO. Whether or not that happens, the threat alone underscores the gravity of the current situation.

No option without risk

Ultimately, if Trump decides to force Zelensky to the negotiating table against his will, and Europe continues urging and supporting him to fight on, New Zealand will have to take sides. It cannot take both.

The National-led coalition government will either have to abandon the stance New Zealand has taken on the Russian invasion over the past three years, or wait for Europe’s response and align with efforts to support a rules-based international order.

The first option would mean stepping back from that traditional foreign policy position, cutting military support for Ukraine (and trusting the Trump process), and probably ending sanctions against Russia and diplomatic efforts for legal accountability.

The other path would mean spending more on military aid, and possibly deploying more defence personnel to help fill the gap Trump has created.

No option is without risk. But, on balance, the European approach to international affairs seems closer to New Zealand’s worldview than the one currently articulated by the Trump administration. Läs mer…

The appearance of three Chinese naval vessels firing live rounds in the Tasman Sea has caused understandable alarm in New Zealand and Australia. But this has more to do with the geopolitical context than the actual event.

In fact, the Chinese navy is allowed to conduct exercises in the Tasman and has wide freedoms on the high seas in general. So far, China appears to be acting in accordance with both the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea.

While New Zealand would have preferred more notice of the Chinese navy’s intentions, there was no obligation to provide this.

Nor is what is occurring in the Tasman similar to the more aggressive sabre-rattling the Chinese military has displayed around the South China Sea, most recently involving both the Australian and Philippine navies.

And in September last year, just a few days after Australian and New Zealand vessels sailed through the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese test-fired a nuclear-capable intercontinental missile into the South Pacific.

For China, of course, Taiwan and parts of the South China Sea are highly disputed territory. The Tasman Sea is not. But what is disputed is China’s role and influence in the Pacific – and this, rather than a minor naval exercise, is what is causing headaches in Canberra and Wellington.

The Cook Islands factor

The surprise agreement signed by the Cook Islands and China under a fortnight ago, aimed at “deepening blue economy cooperation”, is the immediate context for that concern.

The deal avoids controversial areas such as security and policing. But it moves Chinese influence into infrastructure support for wharves, shipbuilding and repair, and ocean transportation.

What really challenges New Zealand’s foreign policy is how this opens the South Pacific up to even greater Chinese influence and activity. Foreign Minister Winston Peters has signalled it is time to reset the relationship with the Cooks.

For its part, China has asserted that its relationship with the Cook Islands “is not directed against any third party and should not be subject to or disrupted by any third party”.

In other words, China has told New Zealand to butt out of a major development in the historically close diplomatic and political relationship with its Pacific neighbour.

A Chinese own goal?

All of this is happening within a rapidly shifting geopolitical sphere. US President Donald Trump is unilaterally attempting to upend the old US-led world order, and other major powers such as Russia and China are adapting.

New Zealand’s relations with China were already difficult. The Security Intelligence Service and Government Communications Security Bureau have both identified state-sponsored Chinese interference in domestic affairs, breaches of the parliamentary network and other malicious cyber activity.

The question now is whether China has scored an own goal with its recent actions. Because while it might prefer New Zealand to operate a more independent foreign policy – balancing its relations with east and west – the opposite may now be more likely.

In times of international stress and uncertainty, New Zealand has always tended to move towards deepening relationships with traditional allies.

Whether it is the fear of Russian invasion in the 19th century, or Japanese invasion in the 20th century – and whether or not those threats are real or imagined – New Zealand reverts to form.

It has been this way for nearly 150 years and is likely to occur again. New Zealand is already grappling with how to respond to the Trump administration’s redrawn global system and will be looking for ways to deepen the friendship.

At the same time, the government now seems committed to joining a new arms race and increasing defence spending as a proportion of GDP. And the supposed benefits of joining the second tier of the AUKUS security pact may now become that much easier to sell politically. Läs mer…

It’s an unfortunate fact that bad people sometimes want guns. And while laws are designed to prevent guns falling into the wrong hands, the determined criminal can be highly resourceful.

There are three main ways to source an illegal weapon: find a lawful owner willing to provide one unlawfully, buy one from another criminal, or make your own.

The first two options aren’t as easy as they sound. The buyer might “know a guy” willing to sell, but the seller generally has good reason to be cautious about who they sell to.

The price of the right firearm can be high, too, as is how “clean” its history is. No criminal wants to be connected to someone else’s crimes by their weapon’s history.

Which leads us to the third option. Privately made firearms, manufactured to avoid detection by the authorities, are nothing new. What has grown is the computer-aided manufacture, of which 3D-printing technology is the best known form, enabling manufacture without traditional gunsmithing skills.

The resulting “ghost guns” will potentially become more prevalent in New Zealand, and are already posing a significant challenge in overseas jurisdictions. With public submissions on the planned rewriting of the Arms Act closing at the end of February, it’s an issue we can’t ignore.

No room for complacency

Although blueprints of fully 3D-printed firearms are most common, hybrid designs, conversion kits, and firearms components sold as a kit or as separate pieces, are all gaining ground.

These are all far more advanced and deadly than the homemade wood and metal weapon used in 2022 to kill former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Their ease of manufacture, improved reliability and performance, non-traceability and lower cost all appear to be driving demand. There is also the ideological attraction of avoiding state scrutiny that makes 3D-printing popular with far-right extremist groups.

New Zealand authorities seized their first 3D-printed firearm in the middle of 2018. As of the end of last year, 58 3D-printed guns and between 200 and 300 firearms parts had been seized.

This growth mirrors overseas trends. But it’s important to keep the numbers in perspective. Of the 9,662 firearms (including airguns) the New Zealand Police seized between August 2016 and July 2022, the most common were conventional rifles and shotguns.

However, that is no cause for complacency. If proposed firearms law reforms – such as a new registry – help shrink the black market, we can expect the ghost gun market to grow.

3D printed guns and gun conversion devices held by the US National Firearm Reference Vault.
Getty Images

Gaps in the law

Legislation passed in 2020 makes the crime of illegal manufacturing (by unlicensed people) punishable by up to ten years’ imprisonment.

Additional penalties can be added for making certain prohibited items, such as large-capacity magazines. In October last year, an Otago man became the first to be imprisoned in New Zealand for 3D-printing firearms.

Despite this, and the foreseeable risk, there are several significant gaps in New Zealand law.

1. Making guns detectable

Unlike the US and some other countries, New Zealand does not mandate that every gun be detectable by containing enough metal to set off X-ray machines and metal detectors.

The US also prohibits any firearms with major components that do not show up accurately in standard airport imaging technology.

2. Penalties for obtaining blueprints

While the manufacture of 3D-printed firearms is illegal, there is nothing specific in New Zealand law about downloading blueprints.

There may be scope within existing censorship laws around downloading objectionable material. But this may be limited by the need to classify each plan or blueprint as objectionable. And artificial intelligence means these plans can change and evolve rapidly.

More wholesale laws covering the computer-aided manufacture of firearms or their individual parts would be preferable.

Canada, for example, introduced recent changes to firearms law making it a crime to access or download plans or graphics. Knowingly sharing or selling such data online for manufacturing or trafficking is also a crime, with penalties of up to ten years in prison.

New South Wales, Tasmania and South Australia are all making new laws in this area. In the case of South Australia, offenders face up to 15 years in prison for the possession of 3D-printer firearms blueprints.

3. Preventing ‘ghost ammunition’

Privately manufactured firearms still require ammunition to be effective, and the Arms Act is only partly effective in this area.

Only firearms licence holders can lawfully possess non-prohibited ammunition, and all firearms dealers and ammunition sellers must keep a record of those transactions.

But that obligation does not apply when firearms licence holders give, share or otherwise supply ammunition among themselves. Furthermore, there are only limited regulations around obtaining the precursors or tools for making ammunition, with only a few key ingredients, like gunpowder, restricted to licence holders.

This is similar to the Australian approach. But Australia also requires licensed owners to purchase only the type of ammunition required for their specific firearms type.

Trying to the correct balance here is tricky: the law must be practical to work but also ensure a potential ghost gun market does not create a “ghost ammunition” market, too.

The ability to privately manufacture firearms, by computer-aided methods in particular, is a foreseeable and potentially hard-to-police problem. But by learning from other jurisdictions and making a few simple law changes, New Zealand can move now to make communities safer.

The author thanks Clementine Annabell for assisting with the research for this article. Läs mer…

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 2023 strategic foreign policy assessment, “Navigating a shifting world”, accurately foresaw a more uncertain and complex time ahead for New Zealand. But already it feels out of date.

The Trump administration’s extreme disruption of the international order (which New Zealand helped construct) is going further and faster than foreseen in the assessment. Were another nation responsible, the government would have been quick to condemn it.

But New Zealand has so far been largely mute while Trump has quit the World Health Organization and the Paris Climate Accord, attacked foreign assistance programs and withdrawn funding from key United Nations organisations.

Had Russia or China threatened the annexation or acquisition of Canada, Panama and Greenland, New Zealand would have reacted strongly. But it has said nothing substantive.

The United States still belongs to the World Trade Organization and various regional trade agreements. But Trump’s use of tariffs threatens havoc throughout the multilateral trade system.

Similarly, Trump has not quit the International Court of Justice. But his proposal to remove two million Palestinians from Gaza amounts to an unequivocal rejection of the court’s recent ruling on Israeli policies and practices in the Occupied Territories – as well as international law.

On all these fronts, New Zealand has preferred not to make a stand.

The coming Russia-Ukraine test

While other countries have been quick to criticise Trump’s Gaza plan, New Zealand has opted not to comment until greater clarity is available, other than to reiterate its support for a two-state solution for Palestine.

When Trump imposed sanctions on the International Criminal Court, New Zealand (along with Australia and Japan) failed to join a statement from 79 other countries expressing unwavering support for the court.

The next likely test will be Trump’s attempt to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. While the goal is undoubtedly worthy, the question will be at what cost.

If the price is ignoring the UN Charter, and if European supporters of Ukraine find the illegal annexations of its sovereign territory unpalatable, New Zealand will face a stark choice.

For Australia, with its special trade relationship with the US and membership of the AUKUS security pact, this may be simple politics. For New Zealand, without a special free trade agreement with the US, frozen out of ANZUS and not part of AUKUS, the equation is more complex.

Discord in the Pacific

Last year, Prime Minister Christopher Luxon said New Zealand must “stand up for this international rules-based system that has actually served New Zealand incredibly well”. Quietly sitting down will not be an option forever.

Furthermore, all this is happening against the backdrop of New Zealand’s apparently waning influence in its own back yard, the South Pacific.

While China seeks to expand its own influence, cuts and possible retrenchment in New Zealand’s aid budget suggest little appetite for tangible counteraction.

The loss of influence was first apparent with Kiribati, which has steered towards a much closer relationship with China since 2022. More recently, China has made inroads into other Pacific countries, including the Solomons and East Timor, working in an increasingly grey zone with support for civilian and military security.

But the recent fracture with the Cook Islands takes things to a new level.

Struggling to find a voice

While no longer a dependency, the Cooks’ free association agreement with New Zealand gives its people immense benefits, including citizenship and the right to work and live in New Zealand.

In return, the Cooks undertakes to consult over foreign affairs matters, including any policy or initiative that might affect the interests of the other signatory.

But the development of a somewhat opaque “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China blindsided New Zealand, and has strained what is meant to be a good-faith relationship. Again, however, New Zealand has struggled to find its voice.

If it speaks too loudly, it risks further undermining that special Pacific relationship, as well as irritating its largest trade partner, China. If it speaks too softly, the respect and influence the country deserves will fade.

New Zealand’s vaunted independent foreign policy is a fine ideal and has been a workable mechanism to navigate the challenges facing a small trading nation reliant on a rules-based global order.

This has worked well for the past few decades. But as the old world order erodes, losing its voice for fear of offending bigger powers cannot become the country’s default position. Läs mer…