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Original article: https://theconversation.com/ecuador-can-freshly-re-elected-daniel-noboa-govern-a-country-in-crisis-254420
Daniel Noboa has been re-elected as president of Ecuador with a margin that has surprised most observers. Just weeks before the April 13 runoff, polls had him neck and neck with his left-wing rival, Luisa González. In the end, Noboa secured about 56% of the vote against González’s 44%, a difference of more than 1 million votes.
The victory gives Noboa, a 37-year-old businessman and political outsider, a full four-year mandate. Noboa won a shortened presidential term in November 2023 in a snap election called when his predecessor, Guillermo Lasso, dissolved congress in an attempt to escape impeachment.
It also marks the third consecutive presidential defeat for the movement led by former president, Rafael Correa, whose influence remains polarising in Ecuadorian politics.
González is, at the time of writing, refusing to concede, claiming “grotesque” electoral fraud. “I refuse to believe that the people prefer lies over the truth”, she has said. But she has presented no evidence to support the allegation.
International observers, including the EU and the Organisation of American States, have confirmed the elections were free and fair. In the absence of proof, the fraud claims appear to be more political theatre than a real challenge to the integrity of the vote.
Political scion to dominant incumbent
Noboa’s campaign leaned heavily on security – a theme that has come to dominate Ecuadorian public life as the country grapples with record levels of violence. Since assuming the presidency in 2023, Noboa has governed under a permanent state of emergency.
He declared an “internal armed conflict” in early 2024, deployed the military in prisons and on the streets, and launched a wide-ranging security plan called Plan Fénix. This plan includes building a new maximum-security prison in the coastal province of Santa Elena modelled on El Salvador’s much-criticised approach to curbing violence.
Initially, these measures won Noboa widespread support. But the picture soon darkened. January 2025 was Ecuador’s most violent month on record, with 781 homicides. Criminal groups remain entrenched in the country’s port cities and prisons. And human rights organisations have raised serious concerns about arbitrary arrests, the excessive use of force, and the militarisation of civilian life.
Despite these setbacks, Noboa’s message of strength and order clearly resonated with voters. Ecuadorians, exhausted by spiralling violence, appear willing to accept more authoritarian governance in exchange for safety. This is a trend seen across the region, from President Nayib Bukele’s 2024 re-election in El Salvador to rising approval for militarised policing in Brazil, Honduras and Mexico.
The challenges Noboa now faces are daunting. The most pressing is Ecuador’s descent into organised crime and narco-violence. Situated between Colombia and Peru, the country has become a major transit hub for cocaine bound for the US and Europe. Powerful international cartels have partnered with local gangs, and the state has lost control over large swaths of territory.
In response, Noboa has not only empowered the armed forces but has also sought international assistance. In 2024, he met with Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater, a controversial US private military contractor. This raised concerns about the outsourcing of Ecuador’s security and its implications for human rights. He has also floated the idea of hosting foreign troops in Ecuador, a proposal that would require a constitutional amendment.
But militarised solutions alone did not bring an end to violence during Noboa’s first term, nor are they likely to succeed in his second.
Ecuador’s security crisis is not just a matter of policing – it is a crisis of state capacity. The judiciary is riddled with corruption, prisons have become centres of criminal coordination, and police officers are often outgunned and underpaid. Without reforming these institutions, Noboa’s war on crime risks becoming a war without end.
At the same time, Ecuador’s economy is faltering. In 2024, the country fell into recession, with GDP contracting and inflation rising. Ecuador is reliant on hydropower for its electricity generation, and a historic drought that year caused blackouts lasting up to 14 hours a day. This revealed years of under-investment in infrastructure.
In response, Noboa raised VAT, cut fuel subsidies, and secured a US$4 billion (roughly £3 billion) loan from the International Monetary Fund. These unpopular measures provoked grumbling but not mass protests, a fact some analysts attribute to exhaustion rather than approval.
Inequality remains high, especially for young people and those living in rural and coastal regions. Unemployment and underemployment affect nearly half of the working-age population, and around one-third of Ecuadorians live in poverty. Noboa has announced new cash transfers and youth employment programmes, but these are palliative, not structural.
To make matters worse, Noboa governs with limited support in the National Assembly. His party, Acción Democrática Nacional, holds 66 of the chamber’s 151 seats – one less than González’s Citizen Revolution.
The Indigenous Pachakutik party controls a crucial bloc of nine seats, but is itself internally divided. Passing legislation will require building coalitions and compromising. These are skills that Noboa has yet to demonstrate at scale.
Noboa’s credibility has also been challenged. His family’s banana export company, Noboa Trading, has been linked to multiple drug seizures in Europe. While there is no evidence implicating Noboa directly, the revelations raise uncomfortable questions about the president’s anti-drug narrative and potential conflicts of interest.
Towards democratic reform
Noboa’s victory gives him an opportunity, but not a blank cheque. His success will now depend on whether he can pivot from ruling by decree to governing by consensus. The public expects results: less violence, more jobs and greater political stability.
To meet these expectations, he will need to restore the rule of law, protect human rights and build inclusive institutions capable of resisting criminal capture. This means professionalising the police, strengthening the judiciary and tackling the deep inequalities that fuel violence and despair.
It also means stepping back from theatrical gestures, such as alliances with foreign mercenaries, and focusing on the slow, often frustrating work of state-building.
In the coming months, Noboa will face a simple but profound test: can he translate his electoral mandate into real, lasting progress for a country on the edge? Ecuador’s future may depend on the answer.
Nicolas Forsans does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.