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Author: Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, Clinton Institute, University College Dublin
Original article: https://theconversation.com/why-is-israel-expanding-its-offensive-in-gaza-and-what-does-it-mean-for-the-middle-east-expert-qanda-253667
Israel resumed its military offensive in Gaza in March, blaming Hamas for rejecting a new US proposal to extend the ceasefire and free the remaining hostages. Since then, the Israeli military has launched waves of airstrikes on the besieged territory, killing hundreds of Palestinians and forcing many more to evacuate.
Israel now says it is expanding its offensive. In a video statement released on April 2, Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, said the Israeli military had “shifted gears” in the Gaza Strip, “seizing territory, hitting the terrorists and destroying the infrastructure”. Earlier that day, his defence minister, Israel Katz, had announced that troops would “seize extensive territory” in Gaza for “security zones”.
We asked Scott Lucas, an expert in the Middle East conflict at University College Dublin, to explain the key issues that led to the renewed offensive and what the prospects are for Gaza.
Was a new ground offensive always on the cards, even with the ceasefire in place?
The Netanyahu government’s resumption of the ground offensive in Gaza was almost inevitable once it refused to move from phase one of the ceasefire, which involved the exchange of hostages held by Hamas for Palestinian detainees in Israeli prisons, to phase two.
A second phase was never going to be agreed by Netanyahu. Beyond his personal opposition to the requisite Israeli military withdrawal from Gaza, powerful hard-right ministers in his government had made clear that their acceptance of phase one was conditioned on no phase two and on a return to military operations.
But with no phase two, the requirement for a functioning government in the Strip has been abandoned, even as Hamas remains.
So Israel either had to maintain its “open-ended” war in Gaza of bombing without end, or establish an occupation of at least part of the besieged territory. That suits the hard right and those officials who had always favoured an Israeli military government in the area.
Does Netanyahu care about the legality of what he’s doing?
Netanyahu cares about his political and legal survival. Throughout the 18-month-long Israeli assault, I have said that if Netanyahu stops without achieving his stated goal of “destroying” Hamas and returning the hostages, he faces early elections and his trial on bribery charges.
It is therefore in his interests to hesitate, waver and confuse. That is still true today. So, amid the demands by the hard right, Netanyahu has to maintain his government with the claim that he has established “security” through indefinite occupation.
Can he sell this to the Israeli public?
That’s the big question. At this point, Netanyahu can only be stopped from within Israel, not from outside it.
A portion of the Israeli public will continue to support the war. Some will support occupation in lieu of a war. Some even back the hard-right’s goal of “cleansing” Gaza of its residents.
But others will see this move as Netanyahu abandoning the priority of securing the return of the 59 hostages who are still held in Gaza. The Hostages and Missing Families Forum, which represents most captives’ relatives, fear that the decision to resume the war has put the hostages at possibly grave risk.
In a statement, the group said it was “horrified” to wake up to “the defence minister’s announcement about expanding military operations in Gaza”. “Our highest priority must be an immediate deal to bring ALL hostages back home – the living for rehabilitation and those killed for proper burial – and end this war.”
The problem for Netanyahu is that 70% of Israelis, whatever their position on the war, say that they do not trust his government. Even among voters who support the coalition, only 51% have faith in it, and 36% do not.
Almost 70% of respondents want a return of all the hostages in return for an end to the war. And just over 20% favour a continued assault as the priority.
Where is the Trump White House in all this?
Fully supporting the Netanyahu government. In October, Donald Trump told Netanyahu in a phone call: “Bibi, do what you have to do.” This effectively gave Netanyahu a blank cheque to pursue the destruction of Hamas in Gaza once Trump returned to the White House.
There was a brief interlude when Trump took full credit for the limited truce between Israel and Hamas in January. Through his envoy, real estate developer Steve Witkoff, Trump pressed Netanyahu to accept a deal.
But once phase one of the ceasefire had dissolved, Trump and his officials were going to be fully behind the resumption of Israel’s assault on Hamas, with the highest price to be paid by the Gazan people.
Trump posted a “last warning” to Hamas in early March via his Truth Social platform: “I am sending Israel everything it needs to finish the job, not a single Hamas member will be safe if you don’t do as I say.”
He added: “Release all of the hostages now, not later, and immediately return all of the dead bodies of the people you murdered, or it is OVER for you.”
What about the Arab states?
When Israel renewed airstrikes in mid-March, Saudi Arabia stressed “the urgent need for an immediate cessation of Israeli killings, violence and destruction, as well as the protection of Palestinian civilians from the unjust Israeli war machine.” Jordan denounced the “extremely dangerous step”.
Egypt concentrated on trying to revive the ceasefire process and other states, such as the United Arab Emirates remained silent – a reticence that has continued as the Netanyahu government announced the resumption of the ground offensive.
Even if the Arab states wanted to get involved beyond rhetorical tut-tutting, I am not sure what they can do to check the Israelis.
Resisting occupation would have to be done either through the backing of Hamas’s resistance or through the establishment of an alternative administration. The former is anathema to most Arab states, and there is no prospect of the latter.
Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
