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Author: Andrew Buzzell, Postdoctoral Fellow, Rotman Institute of Philosophy, Western University
Original article: https://theconversation.com/thanks-to-social-media-platforms-election-interference-is-more-insidious-and-pervasive-than-ever-251764
Election interference is a much broader phenomenon than is often assumed. Once limited to intimidation, voter fraud or hacking, election interference includes more mundane, pervasive and ubiquitous interactions. A seemingly innocuous and casual chat with a neighbour or barista could now be considered part of a hostile influence campaign.
From this perspective, interference is less about how ballots are cast and more about shaping the motivations, intentions and contexts in which voters think about politics. Yet those same processes, debates, persuasions and messy arguments are integral to democracy.
If “election interference” encompasses all efforts to influence opinion, do we risk diluting its meaning, creating a new hollow accusation like “fake news?” More importantly, if this broad view is right, it raises difficult new challenges beyond the narrow measures of election law.
Blurred lines
Germany recently accused Elon Musk of meddling in their February election, claiming that his prominent endorsement of the Alternative for Germany party on X was an illegal foreign donation. During the 2022 Brazilian election, misinformation on WhatsApp and Telegram swayed voter intentions, and the Superior Electoral Court frequently requested that content be taken down.
Much of this content was homegrown, produced, endorsed and circulated by Brazilians themselves. If such content was traditional journalism, existing laws and standards could be applied. But when it resembles ordinary political speech, many see takedowns as censorship. Blurred lines between citizen speech and journalism complicate the laws and policies designed to address clearly defined electioneering.
During the 2020 Taiwan elections, officials worried that pro-unification memes came not only from Chinese-controlled bots and paid posters (itself a form of election interference), but were trending because the TikTok algorithm systematically prioritized it.
And in the United States, the legislative push to ban TikTok gained momentum alongside political concern that an apparent uptick in anti-Israel sentiment was caused by covert manipulation of TikTok’s algorithm.
Broader concerns
Concerns about election interference should extend the focus beyond the ballot to include information vulnerabilities. Politicians of all stripes have called for action on deceptive speech, but there is little agreement on the nature of the problem, especially across partisan divides
Complaints about fake news are as likely to be strategic as sincere. News isn’t just about facts, it’s about what matters and why, and as such, media regulation should not solely be determined by the legal system. There is the risk that any effort to control content used to interfere with elections (propaganda, disinformation, fakes) will be inescapably partisan, thus unacceptable in democracies.
The European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA) notes some of these concerns. The act indicates that monitoring and reporting about societal risks and public transparency databases will be required. It establishes “trusted flaggers” (experts and civil society groups) to help moderate content. It doesn’t mention elections, but voices concerns that platforms may be “used to disseminate or amplify misleading or deceptive content, including disinformation,” which can undermine fundamental rights.
The DSA is new but already facing friction. The U.S. has indicated that enforcement may undermine free speech. Other issues include the absence of funding, the lack of standards for transparency databases and growing mistrust in the very idea of flagging. Flagging posts has been criticized for conflating editorship with censorship
Free speech
There are two schools of thought in competition with each other pertaining to free speech. The first defines it as freedom from interference with the media environment, and the view that the response to bad speech should be more and better speech, not censure.
Currently, too much speech is circulating, along with the power given to algorithms and human moderators to make sense of it. This suggests a different ideal — the freedom to be informed and in control of our information environments, to feel authentically represented and to have fair dealings with speech platforms. Translating these to policies and slogans is much harder than a hands-off approach to media regulation.
Overwhelmed with information, consumers favour brands, curators, editors, tastemakers, vibes and tribes that align with their personal values. If there is a shift in values, consumers cancel, unfollow and disconnect — and then replace the source.
Trust-breaking disrupts the systems we use to filter, verify and contextualize information. This is exemplified in “firehose of falsehood” tactics and hack-and-leak operations that simultaneously sow distrust and weaponize predictable reactions.
Scales of influence
For every internationally important election or referendum, there are hundreds of local contests, municipal elections, internal party nominations and the like that shape political realities just as meaningfully. Influencers operating at small scales can have outsized effects that ripple through broader constituencies. A post on a local forum might spark a thousand invisible offline conversations.
These broad concerns about vulnerabilities in our media systems matter all the time, not just during elections. Political representation requires trust in the media that inform us about what other people and communities think and care about. These reflections are distorted by online social media platforms and messaging apps.
We will have to eventually consider something like a “made in Canada” Digital Services Act that can give voters a voice in the kind of information environment they want. There’s much to be learned from the EU’s early lessons, especially as they respond to American tech companies that control so much of the online information space.
Andrew Buzzell received funding from SSHRC.
