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Original article: https://theconversation.com/drc-vs-rwanda-at-the-african-court-why-it-could-be-a-decisive-moment-for-human-rights-and-justice-on-the-continent-250074
As the armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) rages on, calls are being made for non-military solutions.
One such process is a court case before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights – a judicial organ of the African Union (AU) established by African states “to ensure the protection of human and peoples’ rights”.
The case was brought by the DRC against Rwanda on 21 August 2023.
The DRC alleges that Rwanda has violated the African Union’s main human rights treaty, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Kinshasa claims Rwanda has supported M23 rebels since 2021 and that they are responsible for mass killings, mass displacement, destruction of schools, destruction of infrastructure and looting. Rwanda has always denied supporting M23.
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I have followed the evolution of the African Court in my research since its inception in 2006. I consider this case to be highly significant. It would set a key precedent for human rights enforcement in Africa and tests the AU’s ability to uphold legal rulings. A successful outcome could encourage peaceful dispute resolution among African nations.
Significant case
The DRC vs Rwanda case is the first inter-state case ever to be submitted to the African Court.
Inter-state cases allow one state to submit a case against another for allegedly violating the African Charter, provided that they have both accepted the court’s jurisdiction. So far, only 34 of the AU member states – including the DRC and Rwanda – have accepted the court’s competence to hear cases against them.
The case of DRC v Rwanda can set an important African precedent. It serves as a way to uphold the integrity of human rights, and not serve the national interest of complaining states.
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It’s also the first time African states have agreed to a judicial settlement of a dispute by an independent body of African judges. Eleven judges, of whom all but the presiding judge serve part-time, hear and decide cases at the court’s seat in Arusha, Tanzania. It may serve as an example that other states in similar situations could emulate, thus allowing for future conflicts to be defused.
Before the case can proceed, the court first has to consider “preliminary objections” by the state against which the case has been brought – in this case, Rwanda. If the court finds that it has the authority to hear and rule on the case, there is the possibility of legal consequences, like reparations.
This will be a big test for the African Union. The challenge will be getting countries to comply with decisions – since the African Court does not have an enforcement arm.
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Even if both countries have accepted the court’s jurisdiction, compliance is not automatic. Compliance with the court’s orders has historically been far from exemplary – less than 10% of its decisions have been fully observed.
It is up to African Union (AU) states collectively to put pressure on non-compliant states. One possibility is imposing sanctions under article 23(2) of the AU Constitutive Act – something the AU policy organs have been reluctant to do so far.
Public hearing in DRC case
At a public hearing of the case in February 2025, Rwanda insisted that the court did not have the competence to deal with the case. It argues that the court does not have territorial jurisdiction to rule on the case, because the alleged violations took place outside the borders of Rwanda.
The DRC countered that while states are usually responsible for actions within their own territory, they are still accountable for actions they control outside their borders.
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The DRC therefore asked the court to conclude that it has jurisdiction over Rwanda, based on the presence in the DRC of Rwanda’s armed forces and their support for M23.
Rwanda objected, claiming no clear “dispute” existed between it and the DRC. The DRC countered that a dispute didn’t need to be formal and one clearly existed due to the many unsuccessful efforts to resolve the conflict diplomatically.
Rwanda argued the case was inadmissible since victims hadn’t exhausted legal remedies in Rwanda. The DRC countered that expecting thousands of people to do so – amid insecurity and rights violations on a massive scale – was unrealistic.
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Rwanda further argued that it was an abuse of process for the DRC to have instituted a similar case (Minister of Justice of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) v The Attorney General of the Republic of Rwanda) before the East African Court of Justice. It has heard “preliminary objections” from the attorney general of Rwanda and is yet to give its judgment on this issue. To this, the DRC responded that it had observed the only relevant requirement stipulated in the African Charter, namely, that it must not submit to the court a matter that had been settled by another dispute settlement process.
Next steps
After the public hearing, the court deliberated. Usually, it gives its judgment at its next session, which is likely to be in early June 2025.
The DRC had already approached the court in 2023 to adopt an “expedited procedure”. While the court dismissed this request, in March 2024, it agreed to deal with the case “on a priority basis”. In any event, it is obligated to deliver its judgment within 90 days of its deliberation.
Rwanda strongly opposed the African Court handling the case, but if the case moves forward, it must cooperate. This is because both Rwanda and the DRC have agreed to follow and enforce the court’s decisions as part of their legal commitment.
While this is a test case for the African Court, in the near future it may well become a test case for the African Union as a whole.