Date:
Author: Gerrit Kurtz, Peace and Conflict Researcher, German Institute for International and Security Affairs
Original article: https://theconversation.com/peace-in-sudan-a-fresh-mediation-effort-is-needed-how-it-could-work-248330
Intense fighting has ravaged Sudan since 15 April 2023. The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and its erstwhile comrades-in-arms, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, has created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Famine, displacement and mass atrocities are wreaking havoc in the country.
International mediation efforts have been lacklustre and fruitless. The United Nations security council has been preoccupied with other crises and blocked by its own divisions. The African Union has created diplomatic groups, a high-level panel and a presidential committee, none of which has been particularly active. It has been very slow in tackling the political process it wanted to lead.
The US and Saudi Arabia convened several rounds of talks, first in Jeddah, then in Switzerland. The Sudanese Armed Forces delegation failed to turn up in Switzerland. The Rapid Support Forces expressed willingness to talk peace, while simultaneously committing sexual and gender-based violence on a massive scale. The Biden administration only lately slapped sanctions on the top leaders of both forces, Abdelfattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti).
I have studied civil wars, mediation and peacebuilding for more than 12 years, with a focus on Sudan, including regular visits to the country and the region in the past five years. Based on this experience I have identified five reasons why mediation has failed. These are: the resistance of the conflict parties based on the dynamic nature of the war; continued military and financial aid by their external sponsors; as well as mediation attempts that were too narrow, not viewed as impartial, and lacking in coherence.
Clearly, a new approach to mediation is needed, not simply a new mediator. Turkey has recently offered to lead talks between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the United Arab Emirates, the main backer of the Rapid Support Forces, but Egypt, Kenya and several multilateral organisations also keep looking for opportunities.
Any new initiative will have to have certain components if it’s going to succeed:
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political parameters, ideally set by a parallel civilian political process, of what might come next for Sudan should guide mediators
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negotiations should take place in secret so that trust can be established
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back channel communications networks must be established with potential spoilers without ceding undue legitimacy to them
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a gender- and youth-inclusive approach
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more effective international coordination
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consistent pressure on the conflict parties and their external backers.
Why previous mediation efforts failed
Firstly, neither the Sudanese Armed Forces nor the Rapid Support Forces have shown significant willingness to stop hostilities.
The military fortunes of the two sides has waxed and waned. As long as either side feels successful militarily, they are unlikely to commit to sincere negotiations. Outright military victory leading to control of the whole territory (and its borders) remains out of reach for all.
Secondly, their respective allies have not shown any particular interest in peace.
External actors have provided military support to the warring parties, and helped finance them. The UAE is the main sponsor of the Rapid Support Forces. The Sudanese Armed Forces cooperates with Egypt, Eritrea, Iran and Russia, for arms deliveries and training. The UAE promised the US to stop supporting the Rapid Support Forces, but the arms flows continued.
Thirdly, some conflict management efforts were based on a flawed conflict analysis. There were attempts to organise a face-to-face meeting between Hemedti and Burhan, by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the African Union. But the war is not primarily a contest of “two generals”. Neither Hemedti nor Burhan has full control of their forces. Nor is a renewed military government acceptable to large parts of Sudan’s vibrant civil society.
Fourth, mediation efforts suffered because some of the parties saw them as lacking impartiality. Sudanese Armed Forces leaders don’t trust Kenya, whose President William Ruto is closely aligned with the UAE and has, until recently, allowed the Rapid Support Forces to conduct meetings and a press conference in Nairobi. Kenya was supposed to lead the Intergovernmental Authority on Development quartet of mediators, which never really got off the ground. Similarly, Sudan remains suspended from the African Union.
Finally, there was a competition of mediation platforms, allowing the warring parties to shop for the most convenient forum for them.
What a path to a ceasefire might look like
International attention is currently focused on Turkish president Recep Erdogan, who has offered to mediate between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the UAE. The Sudanese Armed Forces has harshly criticised the UAE for its support to the Rapid Support Forces. The offer, then, is based on the assumption the UAE might actually cease that support.
Any new approach should differ from previous efforts.
- Mediators should provide a broad sense of political parameters for a post-war (interim) order, ideally with strong input from Sudan’s civilian groups. Those could include a conditional amnesty as well as assurances of personal safety for the top military leaders and of some stake in a transitional period, without promising any blanket impunity or renewed power-sharing.
But international mediators should grant the warring parties political recognition and legitimacy only in exchange for feasible concessions.
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Negotiations should take place in secret, allowing confidential exchanges between declared enemies. This is particularly important for the Sudanese Armed Forces given the rivalry among its leadership.
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Back channel communications should be established to all actors with real constituencies in Sudan, without empowering them unnecessarily. Turkey is well-placed to reach out to senior members of the previous (Bashir) regime who have found exile there. They control large parts of the fighting forces on the side of Sudanese Armed Forces and could prove to be a major spoiler. The armed groups in the so-called “joint forces” would also need to feel somewhat included.
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Mediators should find ways to include a broad array of civilian actors, in particular women and youth groups. Instead of only targeting “men with guns”, a peace process should be gender-inclusive.
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Any lead mediator should keep other interested parties such as the EU, the UK, Norway, and the other countries and organisations already mentioned, informed and engaged.
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Pressure should be kept up by the US, UK and EU on external backers of the two main warring parties, and target both military and financial flows. Policies, including further targeted sanctions, should be as aligned as possible.
Preparing for a window of opportunity
There’s no guarantee that the violence would cease even if these conditions were met. The main belligerents are likely to continue their current offensives. The Sudanese Armed Forces will try to oust the Rapid Support Forces from central Khartoum completely. The Rapid Support Forces will keep trying to take El Fasher, the only capital in Darfur not under their control.
The impending re-capture of Khartoum by the Sudanese Armed Forces may provide an opportunity for a new round of talks, if it comes with consistent international pressure. Mediators should be ready to push for an end to the fighting.