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Original article: https://theconversation.com/west-african-military-leaders-prepare-to-exit-ecowas-regional-bloc-raising-concerns-for-stability-246645
Leaders of the west African regional grouping Ecowas approved the long-awaited withdrawal of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso from the bloc in December. The three countries have been granted a six-month grace period from January 29, when their exit becomes official, to reconsider their decision.
They originally announced their intention to leave in January 2024, a few months after formalising their own regional alliance by signing the Liptako-Gourma Charter. This established what is now known as the Alliance of Sahel States or Alliance des États du Sahel (AES).
Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are all currently led by military juntas, following a series of coups across Africa’s Sahel region since 2020. This wave of military takeovers has earned the region its reputation as the “coup belt” and has drawn widespread international condemnation about the erosion of democratic governance. Yet the coups and their military leaders are supported by many citizens within these countries who see them as liberating forces.
In a joint statement released in January 2024, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger outlined several reasons for their decision to withdraw. These included sanctions imposed by Ecowas in response to the coups, accusations that Ecowas member states are influenced by foreign powers, and a lack of support for combating terrorism in the region.
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Ending French influence also appears to have been a key factor behind the coups and the withdrawal from Ecowas. Some leaders from the AES, such as Burkina Faso’s Captain Ibrahim Traoré, have framed their actions as part of a broader struggle to reclaim national sovereignty and stop the neo-colonial exploitation of their countries natural resources.
These leaders, as well as some commentators, believe that the heads of many civilian governments in west Africa have been puppets for foreign interests. This sentiment is echoed beyond the AES. Other former French colonies in Africa like Senegal, Chad and the Ivory Coast have demanded the removal of French military forces from their countries.
French president Emmanuel Macron sparked further anti-French sentiment in the region on January 7. In a speech at the Elysée Palace in Paris, Macron said that countries in the Sahel would not still be sovereign nations had French forces not intervened against Islamist militants.
The leaders of Chad and Senegal accused Macron of “arrogance”, with Senegalese prime minister Ousmane Sonko asserting that France has “neither the capacity nor the legitimacy” to ensure Africa’s security and sovereignty.
The approach of AES states to security has remained largely unchanged since they announced their exit from Ecowas. They still rely on foreign support to fight terrorist groups, but now in the form of Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group.
And, over the past year, we have seen insecurity and terrorist activities escalate across the Sahel. Terrorist organisations such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM), an umbrella coalition of groups aligned to Al-Qaeda, continue to pose a deadly threat throughout the region as the AES struggles to contain them.
On August 24, for example, an attack by JNIM militants in Barsalogho, Burkina Faso, killed 133 people. This included civilians who were reportedly digging trenches to protect the town. Since the military coup in September 2022, approximately 15,500 people have been killed in Burkina Faso, with over 6,000 of these deaths occurring since January 2024.
Some reports indicate that AES members have increased their use of attack drones, sourced from Turkey and Russia, as part of a strategy to combat terrorist groups. They are also relying on local militia and – in the case of Burkina Faso at least – on forced conscription.
Reports of human rights abuses against civilians have raised concerns over the tactics of this new alliance. How the AES will adapt its counterinsurgency strategy in 2025 remains to be seen.
What lies ahead?
The withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from Ecowas has already affected security in the region. Accusations and counter-accusations between some Ecowas members and the AES, combined with a lack of cooperation in tackling terrorism in the Sahel, may have contributed to the rise in attacks by extremist groups.
In late December, for instance, Niger accused Nigeria of covertly working with France to destabilise the country. Nigeria’s national security adviser, Nuhu Ribadu, responded by telling BBC Hausa that the allegations were “baseless” and “false”.
Some other Ecowas members appear sympathetic to the position of AES military leaders, raising the prospect that more countries will leave the bloc. Senegal’s president, Bassirou Diomaye Faye, has shown some alignment with the AES leaders. He has advocated for a break from the neo-colonial order and the abolition of the CFA franc, a currency used in eight west African countries that is controlled by the French treasury.
Faye’s supporters cheered officials from Mali and Burkina Faso who made the trip to Senegal for his presidential inauguration in April 2024. Faye maintains close ties with the coup leaders in these countries, and he has made several official visits.
Meanwhile, Ghana’s newly elected president, John Mahama, criticised the outgoing administration for its stance towards the AES. He accused his predecessor, Nana Akufo-Addo, of visiting Washington to “gossip about Burkina Faso” with the US government.
During Mahama’s inauguration on January 7, Captain Traoré of Burkina Faso received a resounding cheer from the crowd at Black Star Square in the Ghanaian capital, Accra. The popularity of AES leaders, particularly Traoré, is notable across French-speaking countries in the region and is now spreading to Anglophone nations like Ghana.
The leadership landscape in the region is changing. The influence of the older generation, which had held political power since the 1960s, is waning as they are gradually replaced by younger leaders. These new leaders, whether from military or civilian governments, are advocating for greater self-determination and sovereignty, and less foreign interference in their affairs.
At the same time, the AES is challenging the traditional role of Ecowas in west Africa. But the alliance faces rising security threats and criticism over its tactics. How countries in both regional blocs navigate their security strategies and relationships will shape the future of governance, stability and cooperation in the Sahel and maybe beyond.