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Original article: https://theconversation.com/russia-and-the-west-are-entering-the-grey-zone-of-warfare-and-the-oceans-are-a-key-battleground-244668
The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has claimed that Russia now has the right to target assets of nations that supply Ukraine with tactical missiles, after the US authorised the use of such weapons against targets deep into Russian territory.
So far Putin’s warning feel like a rhetorical escalation, which might not yet result in a direct military confrontation. But short of a “real” war, Moscow can destabilize western economies and societies with operations in what is called the “grey zone”.
The grey zone is not defined geographically. It is a functional space between war and peace, where jurisdictions are blurred, contested or left unclear and where responsibilities and accountability are vague and deniable. It’s where hybrid warfare and below-the-threshold operations flourish, because it is more difficult to tell whether an attack has occured and who might be responsible.
Hybrid warfare comes in myriad different forms. It can be disinformation campaigns designed to create uncertainty or even panic in a population. Or cyberattacks against transport infrastructure intended to seriously disrupt a competitor or adversary.
The maritime domain is often an important theatre for this kind of warfare. The sea is vast and uninhabitable (and in part unmapped) which makes it hard to survey, monitor and control.
Contested and overlapping jurisdictions – for example in the Arctic or South China Sea – make it hard to clearly identify responsibilities. “Fish cross borders”, as do those who fish, and coastguards.
The same is true of people smugglers, drug traffickers and spy ships. What’s more, a multitude of actors are involved in the governance of complex maritime supply chains, from naval forces to shipping companies, from maritime insurers to communication cable operators.
This complexity is particularly salient in the shipping sector. Ships can fly the flag of one country and at the same time be owned and insured by a company from another country. They can have a multinational crew, and transport a cargo whose origin is hardly traceable to any specific state.
So the maritime domain is a perfect playground for a country whose objective is to undermine the prosperity, cohesion or security of an adversary without risking a direct confrontation.
Vulnerabilities at sea
The maritime supply chains and infrastructures on which most nations are dependent for their security and prosperity are under threat.
To take the UK as an example, 90% of its trade by volume is seaborne. Yet relatively unsophisticated non-state groups such as the Houthi rebels in Yemen have managed to disrupt freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, generating a disproportionate costs to the global economy.
About 97% of the UK’s internet communication transits via undersea cables, which are increasingly targeted by hostile players.
On November 15, the Yantar, described by Russia as an “oceanographic research vessel”, was escorted away from critical undersea cables in the Irish Sea. It is very unlikely that the ship was directly involved in sabotage since it operated in plain sight.
Instead, its likely functions are to map important western maritime infrastructures and – crucially – to send the message that Russia is ready to take risks and operate in the west’s backyard.
On November 17, the suspected sabotage of undersea cables in the Baltic Sea created suspicion over a cargo ship registered in China and owned by a Chinese company. It started its journey near St Petersburg in Russia and apparently sailed in the area when the incident occured.
The Danish authorities reacted quickly to stop the ship before it left the Baltic Sea. While a chain of accountability has not yet been established, there might be a better chance to trace back responsibilities this time around.
Establishing responsibility
This incident demonstrates two things: the limits of hybrid warfare and the fact that western countries are ramping up their ability to respond in a timely manner to such incidents.
Being able to establish responsibility is key to this. Maritime surveillance as well as navies maintaining active presence at sea as well as the capacity to respond to incidents in the fastest possible way all play a role in making it harder to conduct hybrid warfare in a deniable way.
Another notable example was the rapid German response to a suspicious drone following the UK aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth into the port of Hamburg on November 24. All these incidents suggest the extent to which tensions are steadily rising between Russia and the west in the grey zone. The direction and firmness of Nato’s response to hybrid warfare and sabotage will be decisive.
Hybrid war at sea entails many uncertainties about jurisdictions and responsibilities as well as the identity, motives, way of operating and capabilities of actual and potential perpetrators.
Grey zone activities create uncertainties and fears. And because of this they can disrupt the global economy, weaken societal cohesion and degrade the west’s ability to respond to security threats in a decisive way. This is why below-the-threshold activities at sea must be addressed in the swiftest and strongest possible way – to prevent deniability.